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EXPORTING  "THE PURSUIT  OF HAPPINESS"
AIDING DEMOCRACY  ABROAD:  THE LEARNING  CURVE.  By Thomas
Carothers.  Washington:  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace.
1999.  PP. x, 412.  $39.95  (hardcover), $19.95  (paper).
Reviewed  by William P.  Alford*
I  can understand "life."  I can understand "liberty."  But if only you Americans weren't
so  busy with the "pursuit of happiness," you  might come  to  appreciate life  and liberty
even more.
1
I.  INTRODUCTION
Serious authors generally  can only dream  that their work will  earn
the  type  of reception  that Aiding Democracy Abroad, by Thomas  Ca-
rothers,  began  to enjoy  even  prior to  its  December  1999  publication.
Major scholars, such as  Stephen Holmes of Princeton and Jack Snyder
of  Columbia,  have  richly  praised  it.'  The  New  York  Times  com-
mended  the  book  on  the  paper's  editorial  page,3  and  later  ran a  full
review4  by an important  academic  figure  whose  critique was promptly
denounced  by  the  Undersecretary  of State  for  Global  Affairs.5  And
the  financier/philanthropist  George  Soros  lent  his  name  to  its  dust
jacket,  describing  Carothers's  work  as  "a landmark  book,  of tremen-
*  Henry L.  Stimson Professor and Director, East Asian Legal  Studies,  Harvard Law  School.
As  always, the comments  of colleagues  have enriched  my work.  In this instance, I am grateful  to
Jonathan  C. Carlson, Jacques  deLisle, Marsha  Echols, Paul D. Gewirtz, Stanley  B. Lubman, Ma-
kau  wa Mutua, John  K.M. Ohnesorge,  John  C.  Reitz,  Arthur  I. Rosett,  Anne-Marie  Slaughter,
Henry J. Steiner, Matthew Stephenson, Richard Wasserstrom,  Kenneth I. Winston, and the editors
of the Harvard Law Review  who worked  on this piece,  though I alone bear  responsibility  for  the
views herein expressed.  1 also want to thank the University of Iowa College of Law for inviting me
to deliver the Ida Beam Distinguished Lecture through which I was able to develop ideas set out in
this  Review,  and  the Harvard  interfaculty  Seminar  on  International  Ethics and  the  Professions.
Finally, I thank the Harvard  Law School  for research support  as well  as Benedict Hur and the in-
defatigable staff of the Harvard Law Library  for securing needed materials.  This Review is dedi-
cated to the memory  of three dear faculty colleagues,  Gary Bellow, Abe  Chayes, and  Jim Voren-
berg, each of whom exemplified the best American law has to offer.
I  Statement of a Chinese student at the China Center for American Law Study, Beijing, P.R.C.
(July 1987).
2  Holmes's and Snyder's praise appear on the book's dust jacket.
3  See Tina Rosenberg, Editorial  Observer:  America Finds Democracy a Difficult Export, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25,  1999, at A3o.
4 See Michael Mandelbaum, Civics Class, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.  12,  1999,  § 7 (Book Review), at 22.
5 See Frank E. Loy, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000,  § 7 (Book Review), at 4.
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dous  value  to  ...  all  ...  concerned  with  democracy's  future,"  and
lauding  Carothers  as  "the  ideal  guide"  to  "one  of the  defining  chal-
lenges of our time."'6
Aiding Democracy Abroad owes  its  warm  reception  in  important
part to the salience  of its subject matter.  The United States has  a long
history of endeavoring  to enlighten, if not save,  our foreign  brethren by
exporting ideas  and institutions  that we  believe  we  have realized  more
fully.7  These  include  efforts  to  bring  "civilization,"  principally  in  the
form  of Christianity, to  age-old  civilizations  in  Asia,  Africa, and  else-
where;8  to  foster  "modernization,"  especially  as  manifested  through
economic  development;9 and  to expound  a gospel  of science  and  tech-
nology.I0  With the ebbing of the Cold War,"  democracy promotion  -
6 Soros's quotation appears on the book's dust jacket.
7 The  United  States  is  hardly  unique  in  this  regard.  See  generally, e.g.,  A  CENTURY'S
JOURNEY:  HOW  THE GREAT  POWERS SHAPE THE WORLD (Robert  A. Pastor ed.,  1999) (examining
the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and China as case studies).
8 See generally THE MISSIONARY  ENTERPRISE  IN CHINA  AND  AMERICA  (John K.  Fairbank
ed.,  1974);  DAVID  J. BOSCH,  TRANSFORMING  MISSION:  PARADIGM  SHIFTS IN THEOLOGY OF MIS-
SION  (igi);  PAUL  A.  COHEN,  CHINA  AND  CHRISTIANITY:  THE  MISSIONARY  MOVEMENT  AND
THE GROWTH OF  CHINESE ANTIFOREIGNISM  I86O-i870 (1963);  ELIZABETH ISICHEI,  A HISTORY
OF  CHRISTIANITY  IN  AFRICA:  FROM  ANTIQUITY  TO  THE  PRESENT  (i995);  SUSHIL  MADHAVA
PATHAK,  AMERICAN  MISSIONARIES  AND HINDUISM:  A STUDY OF  THEIR CONTACTS  FROM  1813
TO 19IO  (1967).
9 Building on longstanding ideas of convergence toward a Western  model, "modernization the-
ory" grew out of the  structural-functionalism of the noted Harvard  sociologist Talcott Parsons, who
saw society as organized to address specific  functions.  See COLIN LEYS, THE RISE  AND FALL OF
DEVELOPMENT THEORY  9 (1996).  Particularly as applied  in the i96os, modernization theory  pre-
sumed that society  would pass through stages of increasing  modernity, and that the  United States
and other major Western  nations represented  the pinnacle of this progression.  See generally WALT
WHITMAN  ROSTOW,  THE  STAGES  OF  ECONOMIC  GROWTH:  A  NON-COMMUNIST  MANIFESTO
(I96O).  Some of its leading academic  exponents,  such as Walt Whitman  Rostow of the Massachu-
setts Institute  of Technology, endeavored  to  foster the  application of these  ideas  through  govern-
ment service.  Although  modernization theory itself is now out of favor, many of its  basic assump-
tions linger in developmental  studies.
10  For an example  of this "gospel,"  see NATHAN  ROSENBERG  & L.E. BIRDZELL,  JR.,  HOW THE
WEST  GREW  RICH:  THE  ECONOMIC  TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE  INDUSTRIAL  WORLD  242-68
(1986).
11 It is important not to overstate  the break with the past.  There are tens of millions of people
in China, Cuba, North Korea,  Vietnam, and  even parts of Eastern  Europe  and the  former Soviet
Union to whom  the conclusion  of the Cold War would  be  news.  See, e.g., John  W. Garver, Fore-
word to IN  THE EYES OF THE  DRAGON:  CHINA VIEWS  THE  WORLD at vii, x (Yong Deng & Fei-
Ling Wang  eds.,  i999)  ("[M]any  Chinese  believe  that the  very existence  of the  coalition of demo-
cratic  countries is a 'remnant  of Cold War mentality ...  .").  For example,  some  Beijing residents
assumed  that the  accidental  bombing  by U.S.  planes (under North  Atlantic Treaty  Organization
command)  of the embassy of the People's Republic  of China (PRC) in Belgrade  during  the spring
of 1999 was willfully undertaken  to teach China a lesson.  See Seth Faison, China Honors  3 Killed
in Belgrade, but the Street Protests  End, N.Y. TIMES,  May  14,  1999,  at Ai 3. Moreover, even  as
many  individuals in formerly Communist countries  express deep  gratitude for  American  support,
doubts about the motivations  of the United  States persist in some  circles,  exacerbated at times by
the difficulties of the adjustment  to a new era.  See, e.g.,  JANINE R. WEDEL,  COLLISION AND COL-
LUSION:  THE  STRANGE  CASE  OF  WESTERN  AID  TO  EASTERN  EUROPE  1989-1998,  at  42-43
1678 [Vol. 113:1677
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a  capacious  term  used  to  encompass  efforts  to  nurture  electoral  pro-
cesses, the  rule of law, and civil  society, all  broadly defined  - has be-
come  a key organizing  principle  of American foreign  policy, if not this
nation's  broader interface with  the world  (p.  3).12  Political leaders  ex-
tol  it,13  the  federal  government  alone  spends  more  than  $700  million
annually on democracy promotion during a time of diminishing foreign
assistance, 14 and a spectrum  of other actors - including philanthropic
bodies,  nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs),  academe,  business,
and the  practicing  bar, not to mention  multilateral  entities  and foreign
governments  and  institutions  - participate  in  it.I5   Amidst  a  bur-
geoning literature  on democracy promotion, Aiding Democracy Abroad
(1998);  Patrick  E.  Tyler, Russia's Communists, Still Active, Await an Opening, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar.
13,  2ooo, at A6 (describing ongoing  support  for the Communist  Party in Russia);  Lech  Walesa, 'I
see the Commies, I see the clever guys doing well', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, I999, § 6 (Magazine), at 81
(expressing doubts about Poland's parliamentary democracy and criticizing  the failure of Western
leaders to provide sufficient aid to Eastern Europe).
12 American democracy promotion  has extensive  antecedents.  Consider, for example, the case
of China.  A  century  ago,  W.A.P.  Martin  and  other missionaries  coupled  their  religious  message
with a call for the Chinese to absorb Western  legal principles.  See WAY MARTIN,  THE SIEGE IN
PEKING: CHINA AGAINST  THE WORLD  142-70 (1900);  see also Helen  H. Kim, The Ambiguities of
Superiority:  WAR  Martin  and  the  Analog Between  Introducing  Christianity  and  International
Law to China (April  28,  1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School  Li-
brary) (discussing Martin's attempts  to spread  both Christianity and  American ideas of legality in
China).  During the first  half of the  twentieth century, distinguished  academics such  as President
Frank  Goodnow  of the Johns  Hopkins  University  and Dean Roscoe  Pound of the Harvard  Law
School  endeavored  to  convince  different  Chinese governments  of the need  to  remake  themselves
and their legal institutions along American lines.  See Frank J. Goodnow, Reform in China,  9 AM.
POL.  Sci.  REV.  209,  219  (1915);  Roscoe  Pound, Problems  of a  Modern  Judiciary  21-31  (unpub-
lished manuscript, on  file with the  Harvard  Law School  Library);  Roscoe Pound,  Second  Report
for  1947  (1947)  (unpublished manuscript,  on file  with the  Harvard  Law School  Library);  Roscoe
Pound, The  Training, Mode  of Choice  and  Tenure  of Judges  16-18 (unpublished manuscript,  on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
Other countries, such as the Philippines,  Germany, and Japan, furnish  additional examples.
See generally TONY  SMITH,  AMERICA'S  MISSION:  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  WORLDWIDE
STRUGGLE  FOR DEMOCRACY  IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY  (1994).  The  pertinence  of this his-
tory for contemporary  democracy promotion is discussed below at pp.  1698-99,  1704-09,  1710-1i,
1714-15.
13  See, e.g.,  Remarks  to the  United States Institute  of Peace,  35  WEEKLY  COMP.  PRES.  DOC.
591,  595  (Apr. 7, 1999)  (praising programs that allow  Chinese  lawyers  and  judges  "to  come  to
America to study our system").
14  This figure is roughly equivalent  to io% of "traditional  nonmilitary foreign  aid," or o.o1%  of
our gross national product as of 1997.  Karen DeYoung, U.S. Grows Stingier on Foreign  Aid: Amid
Prosperity,  Country Is World's Least Generous in Helping Poor,  INT'L  HERALD TRIB.,  Nov.  26,
1999, at i.  But cf. Doug Bandow, The Capitol Eye: Isolationist  Myths, COPLEY  NEWS  SERVICE,
Dec. 14,  1999,  available in LEXIS, News  Library, COPNWS File (arguing  that the United States
remains more engaged in the world than proponents of greater foreign assistance suggest).
15 Larry Diamond  chronicles such actors  in PROMOTING  DEMOCRACY  IN THE  I9oS: ACTORS
AND  INSTRUMENTS,  ISSUES AND IMPERATIVES  (1995).  For a thoughtful  overview  of U.S. assis-
tance concerning law, see Jacques  deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, Ameri-
can Legal Models, and Legal Change in the  Post-Communist World  and Beyond,  20  U.  PA.  J.
INT'L. ECON. L. 179 (1999).
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is the first systematic study of the range of such programs that the U.S.
government has  fashioned  or funded in the  years since  the  collapse  of
the Soviet Union. 16
Beyond  timeliness,  however, Aiding Democracy Abroad's ready re-
ception  is  also  a  product  of  its  author's  stature  and  the  manner  in
which he has cast his study.  Thomas Carothers  is a  serious public in-
tellectual  who  not  only  has  written  extensively  about  transitions  in
Latin  America,  Europe, and  elsewhere, 17 but who  also,  as  Vice  Presi-
dent  for  Global  Policy  at  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International
Peace,  is  well-positioned  to  play  an  important  role  in  influencing  the
direction  of democracy  promotion.  In  Aiding Democracy Abroad, he
speaks  to  a  variety  of audiences  - including  those  who shape  schol-
arly and  popular  understandings  of democracy  promotion,  those  who
make  and execute policy regarding it, and those who foot the bill for it
- drawing on case studies of his own devise emanating from four con-
tinents,  hundreds  of  interviews,  heretofore  underutilized  government
documents,  and a broad cross-section  of the pertinent  academic  litera-
ture.  Moreover,  Carothers  consistently  displays  an  admirable  judi-
ciousness,  confronting  problems  that have  beset American  democracy
promotion  with candor and suggesting  ways to enhance  the undertak-
ing, as currently conceived.
The  attractiveness  of Aiding Democracy Abroad - especially  for
those  seeking  to  redeem  democracy  promotion  from  the  difficulties  it
has experienced  - should  be  apparent.  Yet  the  book's  considerable
strengths are  also its  most notable  weaknesses.  By hewing  as closely
as  it  does  to  democracy  promotion's  present  parameters,  defined  in
isolation from many of the  broader  political, philosophical,  and ethical
issues  the  endeavor  implicates,  Aiding  Democracy Abroad  does  not
provide  as much guidance  as it might, either to those seeking to under-
stand this latest American  effort at transforming  the  world or to  those
aspiring to play an  active role in this venture.  Ironically, even  as Aid-
ing Democracy Abroad argues  persuasively  that a  principal  failing  of
such programs has been their  tendency to treat situations  fraught with
complex  political  and  normative  considerations  as  amenable  to  rela-
tively formulaic  solutions, Carothers's  work does  not delve  as  fully  as
16  Other  noteworthy  works,  representing  an  array  of  perspectives,  include  EXPORTING  DE-
MOcRAcY:  THE UNITED STATES  AND  LATIN AMERICA:  THEMES AND ISSUES  (Abraham F. Lowen-
thal ed.,  '991);  JOSHUA MURAVCHIK,  EXPORTING  DEMOCRACY:  FULFILLING  AMERICA'S  DESTI-
NY  (iggi);  WILLIAM  I.  ROBINSON,  PROMOTING  POLYARCHY:  GLOBALIZATION,  US  INTERVEN-
TION,  AND  HEGEMONY  (1996);  SMITH, supra note  12; and  HOWARD J. WIARDA,  CRACKS IN  THE
CONSENSUS:  DEBATING THE DEMOCRACY  AGENDA IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1997).
17  See  THOMAS  CAROTHERS,  ASSESSING  DEMOCRACY  ASSISTANCE:  THE CASE OF ROMANIA
(1996);  THOMAS  CAROTHERS,  IN  THE  NAME  OF  DEMOCRACY:  U.S.  POLICY  TOWARD  LATIN
AMERICA  IN THE REAGAN  YEARS ('99'); Thomas  Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN
AFF., Mar./Apr. io98, at 95.
168o [Vol. 113:1677
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motion.  That may well be  a product of the author's desire to deliver a
clear  message  to  those  in  whose  hands  the  future  of  such  programs
rests, but it ultimately diminishes  this noteworthy study's contribution.
The  enthusiasm  that  has  marked  American  efforts  to  spread  the
fruits of our experience  abroad makes it difficult,  especially at the  apo-
gee  of  such  undertakings,  to  probe  underlying  assumptions,  lest  we
appear to be dismissive  of the  worthiness  of the  objective  in question,
doubtful  of the  sincerity of its proponents,  or  indifferent  to the fate  of
the would-be  beneficiaries.  This disinclination  to appear to be raining
(or even  drizzling) on  the  parade  may be particularly  intense  with re-
gard  to  current  efforts  at  democracy  promotion.  As  perhaps  most
crisply articulated  in popular discourse  in Francis Fukuyama's  notion
of the end  of history, there  is a widely  held  perception  that with  the
collapse  of the  former  Soviet Union  and the  robustness  of the  Ameri-
can  economy  relative  to  those  of  France,  Germany,  and Japan,  the
forms of democracy, the rule of law, the  market, and even civil  society
currently  dominant in  the  United States  have  been  irrefutably  vindi-
cated. 18  Although  some  in legal  academe  express  disdain  for  Fuku-
yama's  thesis, 19  there  seems  to  be  an  all  too  common  belief  among
American scholars  of the law, cutting  across  conventional  political  di-
vides,  that  our  political  and  legal  institutions  singularly  warrant  the
attention of nations in transition, if not of the rest of the world.20
The  very  pervasiveness  of such  sentiments  suggests  the  value  of
raising  even  more  fundamental  concerns  than  does  Carothers.  We
cannot allow  our sense  of faith in the  value of the  enterprise to divert
us  from inquiring  into  our motivations  for democracy  promotion  and
what  our  actions,  whether  as  a  state  or  a  society, suggest  about  the
depth  of our commitment  to  assisting  others  in achieving  democracy.
18  See FRANCIS  FUKUYAMA,  THE END OF HISTORY AND  THE LAST MAN  at xi-xxiii (1992).
19  See, e.g.,  BRUCE  ACKERMAN,  THE  FUTURE  OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION  122  (1992);  SMITH,
supra note  12, at 369.
20  See, e.g.,  Steven  G.  Calabresi,  An Agenda for Constitutional  Reform, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES,  CONSTITUTIONAL  TRAGEDIES  22,  22  (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson
eds.,  1998)  ("[T]he Federalist  Constitution  has proved to  be a brilliant success, which  unitary  na-
tion states and  parliamentary  democracies  all over the  world would do  well  to  copy.").  But see
Bruce Ackerman,  The New Separation  of Powers, i13  HARV. L. REV. 633,  634-40  (2000) (quoting
Calabresi and  disapproving of his overzealous  promotion of the American  constitutional system).
With respect to  cause lawyering, see  Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the
Reproduction of Professional Authority: An  Introduction, in  CAUSE  LAWYERING:  POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS  AND  PROFESSIONAL  RESPONSIBILITIES  3, 6  (Austin  Sarat  & Stuart Scheingold
eds.,  1998) (urging cause lawyers  worldwide  to focus on the American example).  But see  Stephen
Ellmann,  Cause Lawyering in  the  Third World, in  CAUSE  LAWYERING:  POLITICAL  COMMIT-
MENTS AND  PROFESSIONAL  RESPONSIBILITIES, supra, at 349, 356 (arguing that the contribution of
developing country cause lawyers to "the world's human rights culture" is more "original and sub-
stantial" than generally  recognized in the West).
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Inconclusive  though  it may prove,  we  need  to  ask difficult  questions
about  matters  such  as  the  relationship  between  the  various  "goods"
being  promoted  (that is,  democracy,  the  rule  of law,  fundamental  hu-
man rights,  markets, economic  development,  and civil  society) and the
challenges  inherent in discerning  and measuring both the intended and
unintended  consequences  of what  we  advocate.  And  throughout,  we
need to be mindful of the ethical implications of seeking to mold others
in such  basic  ways,  even  as  we are  alert  to the  respects  in  which  the
experience  may be shaping us.
At first  blush, asking  such questions  may  seem  all  too "academic"
an exercise that threatens to enmesh those determined to foster democ-
racy  in a web  of self-absorption  and  indecision  for which  they  simply
do not  have  time.  To  the  contrary, however, this process  has  the  po-
tential to speak  forcefully  to problems  such as  the  hubris and inatten-
tion  to  power  that  Carothers  rightly  argues  have  plagued  democracy
promotion efforts  to date.  That is not because  ready  answers loom on
the  horizon,  for  in many  instances,  they  are  simply  not  to  be had  or
vary depending on one's normative outlook,  but rather because the ex-
ercise  itself - with  its sober  reflection  on  ends  as  well  as  means  -
underscores  the  true  complexity  and  gravity  of attempting  so  funda-
mentally  to influence  others.
My  examination  of  Aiding Democracy Abroad  begins  by  setting
forth  in  Part  II  the  essence  of  Carothers's  argument.  Part  III  then
raises  the  type  of  questions  that  I  believe  should  inform  democracy
promotion and that would, inter  alia, have enabled Carothers  better to
justify  and impart  the lessons of humility  and local  fit he  suggests  are
critical to  the future  of the  enterprise.  It is  in the  posing  and  consid-
eration of such  questions,  I suggest  in my  conclusion,  that academics
may make  their  fullest  contribution  to what  George  Soros  rightly has
termed "one of the defining challenges  of our time." 21
II.  PROMOTING  DEMOCRACY ABROAD
A.  A Short History of Democracy Promotion
Carothers acknowledges  at the outset of Aiding Democracy Abroad
that America  has long been in the business of endeavoring  to make the
world  "safe  for  democracy,"  as  Woodrow  Wilson  phrased  it,22  but  he
suggests  that  it was  only  with  the  Kennedy  administration  that "the
idea of giving aid specifically  to promote democracy  caught on among
policy makers"  (p.  i9).  To be  sure,  initial efforts,  which  were largely
21  Soros's quotation appears on the book's dust jacket.
22  Woodrow Wilson, Necessity of War Against Germany, Address to Congress (Apr. 2,  1917),  in
SELECTED ADDRESSES  AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON  195  (1918).
1682 [Vol.  113:1677
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funneled  through  the  newly created  United  States Agency  for  Interna-
tional  Development  (USAID),  took  a  long-term  perspective  on  demo-
cratic development, having  been shaped by the Cold War  and by mod-
ernization  theory  as  propounded  by  Walt  Whitman  Rostow  and
others.2 3  USAID  focused  its resources  chiefly  on  buttressing  regimes
friendly  to  American  interests  in  the  Cold  War  (which  had  varying
commitments  to  democracy, to  put  it charitably)  and  on  fueling  eco-
nomic  growth  which,  according  to modernization  theory, would  foster
a  middle class and otherwise  contribute  to the  eventual  flourishing  of
democratic  institutions  akin  to  our  own.  With  little  to  show  in  the
way of positive  results through  the  I96os,  by the decade's  end USAID
began  to alter its strategy.  The agency sought, at least in a preliminary
way,  to  nurture  democratic  development  more  directly  through  the
promotion  of sympathetic  political parties, "civic  education" (including
support of American-style labor unions), "municipal  development" (de-
signed to strengthen  local  government), and law and development pro-
jects  that  aimed  "to  encourage  lawyers  and  legal  educators  in  devel-
oping countries to treat the law as an activist instrument of progressive
social change" (p. 24).
In  Carothers's  account,  the  Carter  administration's  attention  to
human rights concerns  in  foreign  policy  lent support  to the American
government's  still  modest  democratization  programs,  but  it  was  not
until the  Reagan  administration  that the  United  States  undertook  an
extensive "global  program  of democracy  assistance" (p. 3).  "The  ob-
jective,"  as  President  Reagan  would  have  it,  was  quite  simple:  "[T]o
foster  the  infrastructure  of democracy, the  system  of  a free  press,  un-
ions,  political  parties,  universities,  which  allows  a  people  to  choose
their own way to develop  their  own culture, to reconcile  their own dif-
ferences through peaceful  means" (p. 3).
This emphasis on a more programmatic  form of democracy promo-
tion  initially  grew  out  of the  Reagan  administration's  desire  to  stem
Soviet  influence  and  was  directed  toward  governments,  including
those of Chile, Haiti, Paraguay, the Philippines,  and South Korea, then
better  known  for  their  anti-communism  than  their  heartfelt  commit-
ment to democratic  ideals.  By  the second  Reagan  term, however,  de-
mocracy promotion came to  be understood  more broadly.  It grew, Ca-
rothers  tells  us, to encompass  assistance  for electoral  reforms  in  Latin
America and, to a lesser  degree, Asia, as  well  as support for dissidents
and human rights groups chiefly  concerned  with the Soviet Union and
its satellite states.
23  Carothers seems  to confuse  the two Rostow  brothers - the  political  economist  Walt Whit-
man  Rostow and  the legal  scholar (and later Dean  of the Yale  Law  School) Eugene  Victor  Debs
Rostow - both of whom served in the Kennedy administration.
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The  199os witnessed a mushrooming of U.S. government-sponsored
democracy  assistance  and  of related  efforts  by other  governments  and
by  multilateral organizations,  foundations,  and  NGOs.2 4  Federal gov-
ernment expenditures  on democracy  assistance  multiplied almost  five-
fold  to nearly  $720  million  annually  over  the  course  of the decade  (p.
54).  More  than  ioo countries  now  receive  such  assistance.  And  the
target  of  such  support  has  come  to  include  not  only  such  staples  as
electoral,  legislative,  and judicial  processes,  but also  "civil  society"  as
manifested  in  independent  media,  nonpartisan  NGOs,  free  labor  un-
ions, small businesses, and general "civic  education."
B.  Applying a "Democracy Template" Worldwide: The Mechanics of
Democracy Promotion
The principal  vehicle  through  which  the  U.S.  government  directs
democracy assistance continues  to be USAID  (pp. 48-53).  That agency
has had responsibility  for some two-thirds  of such assistance  in  recent
years, totaling  more than $530 million  in fiscal year  1998 (the  last year
for  which  Carothers  provides  comprehensive  data)  (p.  54).  Other
agencies  involved  in  democracy  promotion,  either  through  direct  ap-
propriations  or through  funding  provided  by USAID,  include  the  De-
partments of State, Defense, and Justice, the United States Information
Agency  (which  has  recently  been  reabsorbed  into  the  Department  of
State), the  National Endowment  for Democracy, the Asia Foundation,
and the  Eurasia Foundation (p. 54).
From  its inception,  USAID's  principal  operating  method  has been
to define a potential recipient nation's needs for assistance,  design pro-
jects to  meet  those  needs  (alone or  in  conjunction  with an  American
intermediary,  which  might  be  either  a  for-profit  consulting  firm,  an
NGO, or a university-related  entity), and  then fund  such  intermediar-
ies to  carry out the  project, typically  in cooperation  with  one or more
local partners.  Other  federal  agencies,  including  the  Departments  of
Justice  and Defense,  have  more  routinely  dispensed  with intermediar-
ies, carrying  out project  design  and  even  implementation  themselves.
Of late, both aid  providers  and  American  intermediaries  have  discov-
ered "localism" (p. 339),  leading them to involve recipient country  spe-
cialists  at earlier  and  more important  parts  of the  endeavor, and  even
to make occasional  direct grants to host country NGOs.
24  For  a  depiction  of  the  range  of  such  efforts,  see  generally  DIAMOND,  supra note  15.
Throughout  Aiding Democracy Abroad, Carothers  devotes  little  attention  to  nongovernmental
programs.  Instead, he scrutinizes  U.S. government programs  largely in isolation, even though one
of his principal  recommendations  is that officials  responsible  for  democracy  promotion  "should
push to  build a relationship  between aid for democracy  and the larger, more  established world  of
aid for social and economic development"  (p.  344).  The implications of his treatment of U.S. gov-
ernment programs in relative isolation are discussed below at pp.  698-99,  17o4-o6.
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have  pursued  are  "almost  everywhere  ...  strikingly  similar"  (p.  85),
notwithstanding  the enormous variety in recipient countries'  standards
of living, economic  bases,  literacy  levels, ethnic  unity/disunity, histori-
cal attitudes  toward state authority, recent political  experience, interac-
tion  with  the  United  States,  access  to  other  foreign  assistance,  and  a
host of other variables.  In  part, this reliance  on  what  is essentially  a
"democracy  template" reflects  the  institutional needs  and  character  of
USAID, which has long been notorious as one  of the most inflexible  of
Washington  bureaucracies.'3  But this reliance  on  the  formulaic  also,
Carothers tellingly indicates, incorporates  both a substantive  "model of
democracy" and a procedural "model  of democratization" (p. 85).
USAID  and  most  other  federal  agencies  involved  in  democracy
promotion  derive  their  model  of democracy,  not  surprisingly,  from  a
somewhat  idealized  sense  of  the  American  experience,  suggests  Ca-
rothers (p. 91).  Nations  should take  as the  centerpiece  of their public
life  a largely fixed,  written  constitution  that  divides  government  into
three  separate  but equal  branches,  while  also  ensuring the  citizenry's
rights,  making  the  rule  of  law  a cardinal  principle,  and  placing  the
military in a position subordinate to civil authority.  Elections are to be
held at  both the national  and  local levels,  with electoral  politics  to  be
conducted via "a few  major  parties" of an essentially  moderate  nature
organized around national policy issues, rather than regional, religious,
or strong ideological divisions (pp. 86-87).  And  the model  emphasizes
a  vigorous  civil  society, including  an  independent  media,  strong  un-
ions, and NGOs "involved in public interest advocacy" and unafraid to
take the government to task (p. 87).
Whatever  the  differences  between  this idealized  model and Ameri-
can democracy, Carothers  argues that they  pale in comparison  to those
between  the  methodical  process  of democratization  promoted  by  U.S.
governmental  aid  programs  and the  history of our nation's democrati-
zation  (p.  91).  Although  our  democracy  came  into  being  through
revolution  and  was  "deepened  and  broadened"  through  subsequent
traumatic  events such  as the  Civil War, the Great  Depression, and the
struggle  for  racial  justice,  U.S.  governmental  programs  embrace  a
"technocratic,  gradualistic  conception  of democratization"  that assumes
a well-modulated  sequencing  (p. 91).  Essentially, this model  presumes
that an authoritarian  regime  (if for no  other reason than to save  itself)
will  open  to  the  possibility  of  reform  as  its  legitimacy  fades  and  its
populace  presses  for greater  freedoms.  With  that opening,  "opposition
25  See, e.g., WEDEL, supra note  Ii, at 34 (noting that USAID programs in Eastern Europe after
the fall of communism "generally discouraged risk taking and allowed little flexibility').  Carothers
discusses  the  limitations  of USAID's reliance  on an  "external project method"  (pp.  257-59)  and
criticizes its faith in "the false dream of science" (pp. 287-97).  See infra pp. 1698-99,  1703-o6.
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groups and independent civic actors multiply" (p. 87) and interact with
the  state  in  such  a way  that  the  regime  allows  meaningful  elections,
the  implementation  of  additional  reforms,  and  eventually,  the  irre-
versible  consolidation  of  new  democratic  institutions.  To  the  extent
that USAID  has  refined  the model,  it has  been  to divide recipient  na-
tions into three  broad categories,  with the chief difference  in approach
being USAID's relative emphasis on the promotion of ideas as opposed
to direct action.  The first category, Carothers  suggests,  includes  "pre-
transition"  states such as  China, Myanmar,  Vietnam, and (before  their
recent  openings) Indonesia and Nigeria (p. 95).  A second is  comprised
of states  said to  be  in the  process  of consolidating  their  move  toward
democracy,  such  as  Guatemala,  Mexico,  Romania,  and  South  Africa.
And the third group consists  of states "backsliding" into authoritarian-
ism,  such  as  Armenia,  Cambodia,  Kazakhstan,  Peru,  Russia,  and
Zambia (pp. lo8-O9).
Although  Carothers  acknowledges  that the  notion of a gradual,  se-
quenced  process  of democratization  bears  some  resemblance  to  ideas
advanced  in  the  scholarship  of  Guillermo  O'Donnell  and  Philippe
Schmitter, among others, 26 he  seeks  to dispel any  suggestion  that aca-
demic  work  has  had  more  than a  negligible  influence  "on democracy
aid generally over the past fifteen years" (p. 93).  There has, he asserts,
"been  little  borrowing  of  concepts  from  the  literature,  nor  has  there
been  that  much  direct  interchange  of ideas"  (p.  93).  Those  shaping
and administering governmental  programs have  had little time for the-
ory, he  tells  us, because  they view scholarship  as  far removed from the
concrete problems with which  those  in the field must deal, not to men-
tion  riddled  with  contradictions,  excessively  jargon-laden,  and  often
ideologically  ill-disposed  toward  the  American  government  (p.  94).
Nor, apparently, have  such officials  delved deeply  into the  histories  of
other mature  liberal  states  such  as  Britain, Germany, or Japan;  of ju-
risdictions  that have  made  fairly  successful  transitions  such  as  Chile,
the  Czech  Republic,  Korea,  and  Taiwan;  or  even,  Carothers  empha-
sizes,  of the  intended  targets  of American  democracy  promotion  pro-
grams.  Instead,  they have  tended to rely  exclusively  on their  own  ex-
perience  concerning  either  the  United  States  (in  which  much  of  the
basic  process  of democratization  occurred  prior to  their  lifetime)  or  a
small  subset  of nations  that previously  were  major  foci  of American
democracy  assistance (pp. 97-98).
Carothers's  assessment  of  the  core  strategy  underlying  American
democracy  promotion programs  is  incisive,  even as it builds, in a tem-
26  See  GUILLERMO  O'DONNELL  & PHILIPPE  C.  SCHMITTER,  TRANSITIONS  FROM  AUTHORI-
TARIAN  RULE: TENTATIVE  CONCLUSIONS  ABOUT  UNCERTAIN  DEMOCRACIES  (1986);  see also 4
DEMOCRACY  IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES:  LATIN  AMERICA  (Larry  Diamond,  Juan  J.  Linz  &
Seymour Martin Lipset eds.,  1989).
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Galanter  expressed  in  their  celebrated  1974  study  Scholars in  Self-
Estrangement. 2 7  At  the  most  general  level,  Carothers  identifies  three
major shortcomings.  First, U.S.  democracy  promotion programs  have
drawn  far  too  much  and  far  too  uncritically  on  idealized  American
models.  Practices  that  may  be  quite  understandable  in  one  setting
(such as "American-style  legal  activism") may  "have grown  out of par-
ticular aspects of America's  social  makeup and history - whether the
immigrant  character  of  society,  the  'frontier'  mindset,  the  legacy  of
suspicion  of central  government  authority, or the  high  degree  of indi-
vidualism" (p. 98).  As  such,  they  may not  map  effectively  even  onto
civil law democracies  in Europe, let alone developing  nations.  Second,
the core  strategy seems remarkably, if not even  willfully, inattentive  to
political,  social,  or economic  power  in recipient nations.  This inatten-
tiveness tends to lead to an undue  and often naive emphasis on formal,
as  opposed  to substantive,  change.  "Aid  providers," writes Carothers,
"treat political  change  in a  pseudoscientific  manner  as  a clinical  proc-
ess  to be guided  by manuals,  technical seminars,  and flowcharts  speci-
fying the intended outputs and timeframes" (p.  102).  The third general
flaw in American thinking has  been its assumption that there  is an or-
derly  and  universally  valid  process  of  democratization.  Experience,
indicates  Carothers,  argues  against  this  notion,  suggesting  that  pro-
grams that are  insufficiently  supple  and flexible  may collapse  of their
own  weight  as  events  depart  from  the  stages  that  methodical  se-
quencing would seem to prescribe (pp. lO8-13).
Heeding his own message  about the importance of attention to con-
text, Carothers elaborates  his critique of the broad strategy underlying
democracy  promotion  programs  by  interweaving  case  studies  of Gua-
temala,  Nepal,  Zambia,  and  Romania  into  his  principal  discussion.
The  four  nations,  to  be  sure, share  some  features.  Perhaps  most  sig-
nificantly, "the  recent  transition  [to  democracy]  had  strong  roots  in
[each]  country's past" (p. 82)  - including efforts  to  liberalize  prior to
the  imposition  of  autocratic  governments  during  the  Cold War  years.
Further  democratization,  however, remains  far  from complete  in each
instance.  Indeed,  according  to  Carothers,  "[i]n  all  four,  most  of the
core  state  institutions  have  remained  citadels  of corruption,  incompe-
tence,  and  inefficiency"  (p. 81),  while  the  public  in  each  has  come  to
take  a somewhat  skeptical,  if not jaundiced, stance  toward democrati-
zation  after initially  having viewed  its potential  benefits with consider-
able anticipation.
27  See David M. Trubek &  Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV.  io62.
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Despite  these  similarities,  Carothers  notes  several  differences
among  the subjects  of his case  studies  beyond  the obvious  ones  of ge-
ography  and  ethnicity.  These  include  the  nature  and  provenance  of
the  recent  authoritarian  past  that each  is  struggling  to  leave  behind
(ranging from  the  right-wing  dictatorship  so long dominant in  Guate-
mala to  Ceausescu's  repressive  communist  regime  in  Romania);  their
current political  arrangements  (Nepal, for instance,  is a monarchy  and
Zambia is still, in effect, a one-party state);  and the degree of attention
accorded  by the  United  States  (which has  run  from  massive  involve-
ment via the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA) in  the  case  of Guate-
mala,  to  the  turning  of a blind  eye  toward  brutality  in  Romania,  to
near  indifference  with  respect  to  Zambia  and  Nepal).  And  although
the  United  States  has  essentially  adopted  a common  strategy  toward
each, the  amount  of funding  that Washington  has been  willing to  de-
vote has varied.  Guatemala,  for example,  has  received  approximately
$60  to  $8o  million  over  the  I99OS  (for  a  population  of  ii  million),
roughly double  the  amount  allocated  for  Romania  (with a population
of 22 million),  and three to four times that spent on Zambia and Nepal
(with populations  of io million  and  22  million,  respectively)  (pp.  120-
21).
C.  Your Society Can Be Civil, Too: The Elements of Democracy
Promotion
Within the four nations  that Carothers  highlights,  and the  hundred
or  so  more  that  are  recipients  of  American  democracy  assistance,
USAID has concentrated  its attention on  three principal  areas:  institu-
tion building,  electoral  and  political processes,  and  civil  society - all,
no doubt, worthy, but each  of which,  Carothers  suggests, presents very
complex  challenges.  By  institution  building,  Carothers  principally
means work on national constitutions  and the promotion  of the  rule of
law,  although  he  also includes  in this  category  more  modest  attempts
to  improve  legislative  operations,  devolve  responsibilities  from  central
to local  units of government, and  institutionalize  civilian  command  of
the  military  (p.  158).  Support  for  constitutional  development  "is
probably the form of democracy  assistance  best known to Americans,"
(p.  I6o) taking such forms  as  the provision  of direct  advice  by promi-
nent American  scholars and  the convening  of high-profile  conferences
involving  key  foreign  draftspersons.  Alas,  observes  Carothers,  while
such assistance  may be  "tremendously appealing  to U.S. aid  providers
...  its promise  of great  bang  for  the  buck  is  seldom  fulfilled  ...  [as]
most constitutional  aid is very much on  the sidelines when  the writing
or  rewriting  is going  on" (p.  16o).  In  an  important  sense,  this  is as  it
should be if a constitution  is  to be  expressive of the experience  and  as-
pirations  of the people  to whom it is to apply and  is to emerge from  a
drafting  process  in  which  they  have  been  able  to  participate  signifi-
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shaping  another  people's  constitution  may be  even  more  pronounced
in the  case of American  assistance,  given the particular  prominence  of
constitutionalism  in our national history and civic life, and the belief of
some  specialists  that, for  all  its  virtues,  the  U.S.  Constitution  may  be
less  well  suited  than  Western  European  models  for  Eastern  Europe
and perhaps  other  regions  (p.  162).28  In fact,  as  Carothers  illustrates
with  respect  to  Zambia,  local  authorities  may  even  turn  such  assis-
tance  on its head, utilizing constitutional  change  to buttress  one-party
rule (pp. 162-63).
Rule  of law  assistance  - within  which  rubric  Carothers  includes
aid  directed  toward  legislative  drafting; judicial,  prosecutorial,  police,
and prison reform; strengthening of the private bar, public providers of
legal  assistance,  and  advocacy  groups  "that use  law  to  pursue  social
and  economic  goals"  (p.  i68);  university-level  legal  education;  and en-
hancing public  familiarity with the  law - has  become  a second focus
of American  programs  designed  to  foster  democracy  through  institu-
tion building.  The first generation  of these efforts, in which academics
such  as  Trubek  and Galanter  were  involved,  concentrated  chiefly  on
Latin  America  and  Africa  and  was  relatively  low-profile.  Over  the
course  of the past decade,  rule of law programs  have  been  directed to-
ward  Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and a variety  of Asian
venues,  while  being  targeted  for  considerable  attention  both  here  and
in recipient  nations (pp. 163-64).
Indeed,  notes  Carothers  in  one  of  his  more  pointed  observations,
donors are increasingly advancing  the rule of law as a remedy for most
major  challenges  facing  transitional  countries  (p.  65).  As  with  the
promotion  of civil  society, it has  of late become  a central  part of the
conventional  wisdom regarding  democracy assistance  and is  now  seen
as  indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  democracy,  economic  success,
and social stability.
For  all this  new-found  faith - not  to mention  a good  deal of cash
and  a  surfeit  of American  legal  scholars  and  jurists  - "what  stands
out  about  U.S.  rule-of-law  assistance  since  the  mid-I98os,"  concludes
Carothers,  "is  how  difficult and  often  disappointing  such  work  is"  (p.
170).  In part, this difficulty  results  from the  magnitude of the changes
that are involved in promoting  something approximating  a rule of law
in nations  suffering from  an  inadequately  trained and poorly paid ju-
diciary, weak  supporting  institutions,  and  seemingly  endemic  corrup-
tion.  In Nepal,  for  instance,  "various  aid  efforts  to  improve  the  ad-
ministration  of the  courts  sank almost  without a trace into a judiciary
riddled  with corruption and mismanagement"  (p.  173).  But the  disap-
28  See, e.g., Ackerman, supra notc  20, at 643-64.
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pointing quality of work  in this area  is a  result of more  than just the
size of the problem.  In concentrating upon law  drafting (which  all too
often has  meant law  drafting based  on American  models) and judicial
assistance,  even  well-meaning  American  reformers  have  frequently
demonstrated  little  appreciation  of the ways  in which law  is  rooted  in
a social context that may  well vary among nations.  And, contends Ca-
rothers, they have  in all too many instances failed  to discern the limits
of  support  for  such  reforms,  not  only  in  political  circles,  but  also
among economic  and social  elites and even  in the  leadership of the ju-
diciary itself (p.  174).
The  second  major  prong  of American  democracy  promotion  pro-
grams  concerns  the  electoral  process  and  party  politics.  Efforts  to
promote  electoral  processes,  suggests  Carothers,  take  five  principal
forms.  These include the design of electoral  systems (with a preference
for single member, rather than proportional, districts - because that is
what  American  advisors  know  best),  electoral  administration,  voter
education,  election  observation,  and  the  mediation  of disputes  arising
from  elections  (pp.  125-28).  The  utility  of such  advice  is  ultimately
very  much  dependent  on  the  commitment  of  the  host  nation  - and
especially  its ruling party - to an  electoral  process  with  the potential
to  dislodge  those  holding  office.  As  a  consequence,  what  Carothers
characterizes  as  "intensive,  generally  well-conceived  technical  assis-
tance"  in  Romania  and  Zambia  essentially  went  for  naught  (p.  130),
while more successful  elections in Guatemala  "[were]  influenced  by the
surge of elections  elsewhere  in  Latin America,  but  very  little  by  U.S.
officials,  to whom the  Guatemalan  military was not in the habit of lis-
tening  carefully"  (p.  137).  Beyond  such  obvious  and fundamental  is-
sues,  American  and  other providers  of such  assistance  confront  some-
what more subtle challenges.  Election observers, he  notes, find it more
difficult  than  one  might  initially  imagine  to  articulate  standards  for
evaluating  elections  that  are  appropriate  (given  local  circumstances)
and yet also readily comprehensible  to an audience  abroad (p. 133).  Of
late, there  have  been so many observing  missions afoot that there  is a
need  to  avoid tripping  over  other well-intentioned  teams  of observers
(p.  134).  Nonetheless,  for all these  and other difficulties,  Carothers  on
balance  seems  to  view  democracy  promotion  efforts  directed  toward
electoral  processes  more  favorably than those  aimed  at the building of
political  parties.  Notwithstanding USAID  guidelines stressing nonpar-
tisanship,  the very nature  of aiding partisan  political  parties  makes  it
well-nigh  impossible  for  foreign advisors  to  avoid  at  least the  percep-
tion  of intervening  in the  domestic  affairs  of another  state,  as  appar-
ently was the case in Romania  (pp. 144-45).
Although  of relatively  recent  origin  as  a consequential  component
of U.S.  democracy  promotion  programs,  "civil  society"  - which  Ca-
rothers  defines  as  "the  space  for  a  society  between  individuals  and
families, on  one  hand,  and  the  state  or  government,  on  the  other"  (p.
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o9).  An  admittedly  vague  concept,  civil  society29  is  attractive  for  its
open-endedness,  as  well  as  for  its  potential  to  redress  the  overly  top-
down  nature  of earlier  programs,  not to  mention  the  opportunities  it
provides  to engage  important  American  popular  constituencies  in the
work of democracy  promotion.  The principal  focus  of U.S.  civil  soci-
ety assistance  has been  on  so-called  advocacy  NGOs,  although  broad
civic  education,  independent  media,  and  free  labor  unions  have  also
received  considerable  support  (p.  2 io).  Issue-oriented  NGOs  are seen
as having the potential  to stimulate  greater citizen involvement in gov-
ernance  in  a  manner that  is, at least  in  theory, relatively  nonpartisan
and distinct  from  religious entities,  clans, or  other predominantly  eth-
nically-defined  groupings (pp. 2 11-12).
Carothers  has  considerable  unease  about  the  extent  to  which  de-
mocracy  promotion  has  emphasized  advocacy  NGOs.  In  important
measure,  his  reservations  arise  because  he  views  advocacy  NGOs  as
very  much  a  product  of the  American  experience.  The  notion  that
such  bodies can  readily bridge  the gap  between  state and society  may
have  been validated  to  some  degree  in Romania,  but even  there  they
evidence  a "faddishness[]  and  opportunism" that he  believes  common
in  many  countries  (pp.  224-25).  Reliance  on  advocacy  NGOs  has,
moreover, been  a dismal  failure in Nepal, where the  problem of "fran-
tic  politicization,"  inter  alia,  belies  the  conceit  that any socially  active
organization can eschew  partisanship.  Nor has the experience  differed
appreciably  in  Zambia,  where  much-vaunted  popular  participation
has been achieved only through payments to local participants  of more
than  they  can  earn  from  a  day's  work.  Carothers  expresses  further
skepticism  about  the  assumption,  underlying  the  emphasis  on  such
NGOs,  that this  type  of advocacy  will  perforce  "lead  to  the  predomi-
nance  of wholesome  public  interests"  (p.  223).  This,  he  suggests,  has
not  necessarily  been  the  case  in  the  United  States,  where  there  is
growing public concern regarding  the ways  in which monied lobbyists
distort the  legislative  process.  Moreover, there  is the  added complica-
tion that for  all its statements  of nonpartisanship,  U.S. civil  society  as-
sistance:
clearly often  reflects  the application  abroad of the basic  U.S. domestic  lib-
eral  agenda  - support  for  human  rights,  the  environment,  women,  in-
digenous  people, and  so  forth  ....  Aid  providers  say  that the  advocacy
NGOs  they support  are pursuing  the public interest, but the  public  inter-
est is interpreted  very much  in  accordance  with  the worldview  of the U.S.
NGO community  from  which  come  most U.S.  enthusiasts  of civil  society
promotion abroad. (p.  212)
29  The complexity of the term is discussed in ADAM B. SELIGMAN,  THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIE-
TY (1992).
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Money has also created its own  problems.  In Nepal, "bad NGO prac-
tices growing out of too many  donor funds chasing  too few worthwhile
organizations  in the capital  have  led, many Nepalese to  hold NGOs  in
contempt"  (pp.  217-18).  And  in  Zambia,  the  flow  of  USAID  cash,
coupled with a rhetoric  of "partnership," left local NGO  leaders  with a
"deep  bitterness  toward  USAID  ...  and  feeling  mistreated  by  the
United States" when Washington's gravy train came to a halt (p. 220).
Carothers  has many of the same  concerns  regarding  efforts  by the
AFL-CIO,  among  other  bodies,  to  promote  unionization  abroad.
While  believing  that  strong,  independent  unions  can  be  a  potential
bulwark for a robust civil  society and for development  more generally,
he is critical of the extrapolation of what he describes  as  an American-
style  contentiousness  into  labor-management  relations  abroad,  espe-
cially given his view  that "the  model does  not even seem to work  well
at home  [where] the  U.S.  labor  movement  has  been  in  serious  decline
for decades"  (p.  246).  Additionally, Carothers  is bothered  by what he
describes  as  the  secrecy  and  relative  lack  of accountability  that sur-
rounds  the  funding of such labor-based  initiatives  (which  he,  in  turn,
traces to the AFL-CIO's  power base  in Congress) and by their  absence
of strong links to other aspects  of American  programs  intended  to fos-
ter civil society.
Carothers  takes  a  slightly  more  sanguine  view  of efforts  to  foster
civic  education  and  independent  media.  He  suggests that  the  former
has had  some effect in Guatemala  and  the latter has, as  an  adjunct to
domestic  efforts,  played  a constructive,  if modest  role  in  the  restruc-
turing  of  certain  media  in  Romania.  Even  here,  though,  Carothers
underscores  the  need  for sobriety.  He  points out that factors  such  as
low literacy  rates  and  host  country  governmental  actions  inconsistent
with the  message  of civic  education  reduce  its  effectiveness,  while the
model  of private ownership  of media preferred  by American aid givers
raises  difficult issues  concerning  matters  such  as  commercialism  and
candidate access  to the airwaves.
D. Carothers's  Conclusion: Realism About Idealism in Democracy
Promotion
For  all  his  quite  substantial  criticisms  of  American  democracy
promotion  programs,  Carothers  is  of  the  opinion  that  those  charged
with  responsibility for  them have  begun  to address  some  of the  afore-
mentioned problems.  He therefore  focuses  in his final chapters on how
such  gains might  be  consolidated.  Perhaps  most vitally, he  concludes
that  those  Americans  shaping  such  programs  would  do  well  to  ap-
proach  their  work  with much  more  humility.  Democracy  assistance,
Carothers  believes,  has  a  valuable,  if  ancillary,  role  to  play  in  facili-
tating  the efforts  of those  with a "will  to reform" in the  target nations.
As such,  Americans,  whether  at USAID or  in the burgeoning  ranks of
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NGOs  involved  in democracy promotion,  should move  away  from ex-
cessive  utilization of formulaic templates  based on  the American expe-
rience  and of associated  modes of evaluation.  In their stead, he  urges
that  far  greater  attention  be paid  to  tailoring  assistance  to  local  cir-
cumstances.  In  the  same  vein,  even if the  United  States  continues  to
bankroll  such work, there  needs  to be a  concerted effort  to include  lo-
cal  personnel  far  more  readily  and  substantially  in  the  undertaking.
And expectations about what such programs  might accomplish  need to
be  scaled back as well.
Within  this  more  realistic  set  of parameters,  democracy  promoters
should, suggests  Carothers, accentuate  three  substantive  concerns  that
he  believes have received insufficient attention.  The first is the need to
"build  a relationship  between  aid  for  democracy and the  larger, more
established  world of aid  for social  and  economic  development,"  given
that  these  two  international  assistance  communities  have  operated
with  surprisingly little  interaction,  if not a  good deal of mutual  suspi-
cion (p.  344).  The  desired linkage  between these areas  of development
is  far from  clear, but there  is  no  doubt in  Carothers's  mind  that they
are  inextricably interwoven.  Second,  greater  attention  should be  paid
to the  role  of women  in democratization  for, notwithstanding  his  ear-
lier  point about  the  influence  of American  NGOs,  Carothers  empha-
sizes  that  women  continue  to  play  a secondary  role  in  all  aspects  of
democratization  - including  new  public  institutions,  reinvigorated
electoral  and  political  processes,  and  emerging  civil  society  entities.
Third,  far  more  emphasis  needs  to' be  placed  on  helping  "recipient
countries  better understand  and use democracy aid" (p.  346).  In some-
thing  as  vital  as  democracy,  passivity  among  recipients  and  their
agents is not desirable.
The changes that  Carothers  advocates  in America's  efforts  to  pro-
mote democracy  abroad will not, in the end, occur  without changes  in
the United States.  Some will entail  institutional reform of the manner
in  which  USAID  conducts  and  evaluates  its work,  if not  even  of the
structure  or mission  of the  agency  itself.  But as  difficult as it may be
to  imagine  recasting  such  practices  or reshaping  so  entrenched  a  bu-
reaucracy, these proposed reforms pale in the face of the larger changes
in public  consciousness  that Carothers  proposes  (if, at times,  more  by
implication  than direct  statement).  Americans  should  reverse  the  re-
cent trends  of sharply  reduced  foreign  aid  budgets  and  relative  self-
absorption3 0  in  order  to  provide  the  financial  and  political  support
needed  to  seize  this  extraordinary  moment  in  history.  At  the  same
30  See DeYoung, supra note  14 (noting the decline in American  foreign aid since the end of the
Cold War).  But cf. Bandow, supra note 14 (expressing the view that it is the quality rather than the
quantity  of involvement abroad that matters).
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time, though, the public  must understand just how  difficult the under-
taking is.  The very  type of transformations  this assistance  is intended
to  foster  will,  by  definition,  be  slow,  painful,  uneven,  and  capable  at
most  of producing  a hybrid  rather  than a replica  of what we  think is
best about  ourselves.  And our role is likely  to be  an  ancillary one  for
which both common sense  and decency suggest we refrain from taking
substantial credit.  As Carothers puts it in concluding  his book:
Americans  are so  used to debating  foreign policy  from positions  of realism
and idealism,  in which  America's  interests  and capabilities  are  either sys-
tematically  understated  or  overstated,  that it  is  hard  to  avoid  discussing
democracy  promotion  in those terms.  A  position  based  on  idealistic aspi-
rations tempered  by deeply realist considerations  makes both sides  uncom-
fortable.  For democracy  promotion, however,  it is the only  real choice.  (p.
352)
III.  FUNDAMENTAL  QUESTIONS THAT  SHOULD BE ASKED
ABOUT  DEMOCRACY  PROMOTION
There  is  so much to commend  about Aiding Democracy Abroad
it is  hard to imagine  a  book on  this general  topic  that might  actually
be  read  in  Washington  that  better  blends  an  awareness  of  theory,
hands-on  case studies,  and  policy  - that  one  is  loathe  to voice  criti-
cisms of it.  Yet the high standard  that Carothers  has established  war-
rants that one not hesitate to do so.
Carothers  himself  reveals  what  is  arguably  Aiding  Democracy
Abroad's  most  significant  shortcoming  in  his  seemingly  innocuous
statement  in the  book's  conclusion  that "[t]he  most  common  and  de-
bilitating  weakness  of democracy  programs  is  the  manner  in  which
they are carried  out - above  all, the failure  to fit activities to the local
environment  and  to  give  people  and  organizations  of  the  recipient
country a  primary  role"  (p.  344).  This  observation,  no  doubt,  has  a
great  deal  of truth  to it,  as  will  be  discussed  below.  Nonetheless,  it
also evidences Carothers's too ready acceptance  of the current parame-
ters of America's  efforts at democracy  promotion and  his concomitant
failure to ask at an even more fundamental  level  about the  motivation
for democracy promotion,  the logic  of the  models  it employs, the  diffi-
culties  of measuring  its  intended  and  unintended  consequences,  and
the  ethical  challenges  the  enterprise  poses.  This  Part  of my  Review
raises  many  such  questions.  It  may  well  be  unreasonable  to  expect
Aiding Democracy Abroad to  have  explored  them  all,  but  Carothers
would  have  fostered  more considered  - and  more  democratic  - de-
liberation  about  democracy  promotion  both here and among  potential
aid recipients had he pursued such lines of inquiry.
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A.  Why  Democracy Promotion?
Carothers  surely  is right  to  urge a  greater  attention  to  "local envi-
ronment" in  countries  receiving  democracy  assistance.  Logic  suggests,
however, that he should as well have scrutinized  the local environment
of this  and  other countries  providing  the  assistance.  Whether  from  a
scholarly  or  more  policy-oriented  perspective,  questions  regarding  a
country's  rationale  for  and  degree  of commitment  to  democracy  pro-
motion  are  vital  to  any  meaningful  assessment  of such  undertakings.
Aiding Democracy Abroad has much to say (little of it favorable) about
USAID,  but  it is  surprisingly  reticent  about  the  genesis  of the  larger
policies that the  agency  executes,  either  with  respect  to  contemporary
partisan politics  or to longer-term  theoretical  issues, particularly  given
that the book calls  on policymakers  and  the public  to  support democ-
racy promotion even though  the endeavor  is unlikely to yield "rapid or
decisive  change"  (p.  351).  Nor  does  the  book systematically  examine
how our broader  conduct  as a state  and a society  may reinforce  or re-
tard such programs,  although  such an inquiry would have illuminated
the priority we accord  democracy promotion.
The question  of motivation  is more  complex  than  it might  at  first
seem.  One could imagine  a number of different and  perhaps  simulta-
neous purposes at play in the American  impulse to promote  democracy
abroad.  For example,  such efforts  could result from  a genuinely  altru-
istic desire to  share  what we  believe  is  best about  our society;  from  a
belief in the  promise  of a  more peaceful world (premised on the  Kant-
ian  notion  that  democracy  restrains  governments  from  going  to  war,
save  against  tyrants);3'  or from  a  conviction  that  democracy  is  more
conducive  than  any  other  political  system  to  sustained  economic
growth.
32  Alternatively, American  efforts may be more  attributable to
an  unwitting  hegemonism;  to  a need  to  vindicate  our  ideals  (or  the
ways in which we aspire to realize  them) by having others  adopt them;
or to the  waging  of domestic  academic  and  ideological  debates  on for-
eign terrain.33  Or perhaps  the explanation  owes more  to realpolitik  -
as  borne  out  in  the  solution  democracy  promotion  may  provide  to
31  For a portrayal of the Kantian argument, see BRUCE  RUSSETT, GRASPING  THE DEMOCRAT-
IC  PEACE: PRINCIPLES  FOR A  POST  COLD-WAR WORLD ('993); and  Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Lib-
eral Legacies, and Foreign  Affairs, Part  1, 12 PHIL.  & PUB.  AFF.  205  (1983).
32  See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON,  POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST  AND CAP-
ITALIST  DICTATORSHIPS  89-oo  (2000);  AMARTYA  SEN,  DEVELOPMENT  AS  FREEDOM  146-59
('999).
33  One  has the sense, more  than occasionally, of scholars in the  American academy  seeking to
vindicate  signature theoretical positions  through the invocation  of foreign examples  that purport-
edly bear out the wisdom  of their views.  The ways in which  both American  and Chinese scholars
have done this vis-A-vis one another  is the subject of RICHARD MADSEN,  CHINA AND  THE AMER-
ICAN DREAM:  A MORAL INQUIRY (I995).  Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately), Madsen's  subtle
book does not encompass legal studies.
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practical  political  battles;34  in  its  potential  for  legitimating  measures
taken for American  security, economic,  and other  interests;35  or in the
capture by some  self-interested subset of actors (such as aid bureaucra-
cies,  consultants,  developing  country elites,  etc.)  of a policy  in  which
most  Americans  have  little  direct  stake.36  What  is  the  mix  at  any
given  point  of  these  and  other  factors?  How  are  tensions  between
them  to be  resolved?  After all,  it  is conceivable  that the  goal  of em-
powering  others  to  elect  governments  that  may better  represent  their
views  might  simultaneously  be  at odds with  the goal  of using democ-
racy promotion  programs  to advance  specific  American  national inter-
ests (as, for example,  when the  Senate of the post-Marcos  Republic  of
the  Philippines  voted  to  terminate  the  U.S.  lease  on  Clark Air  Base
and the Subic  Bay Naval Station that the ancien  regime had been  only
too happy to allow the United States to hold).37
34  Consider, for example,  the Clinton Administration's  rule of law initiative for  the PRC which
Carothers discusses briefly in The Rule of Law Revival, supra note  17, at io6.  Without downplay-
ing either the importance  of the PRC's developing greater respect for legality or the commitment  of
those in the United States involved in that undertaking, one might take note of its perceived poten-
tial  to  help the  Administration  navigate  some  very  difficult domestic  political  shoals.  Since  the
time  of the  Chinese  government's  violent termination of the  occupation  of Tianaman  Square  by
students and workers in I989, the American business and human rights communities have  been at
odds  over the U.S.  government's  approach toward China, with the former advocating  a policy of
engagement and the latter arguing that human  rights considerations should be  prominent even at
the risk of offending Beijing.  See William  P. Alford, MFN Fiasco  Exposes Need for a Better China
Policy, CHRISTIAN  SCI.  MONITOR,  July 8,  1994,  at  19.  A  U.S.  government program  directed  at
helping the  PRC  build  basic  legal  infrastructure not only  spoke  to  a need identified  by  both the
Beijing government and at least some Chinese dissidents, but also in the mid-iggos provided a rare
way for an Administration  facing reelection to  reach out to business interests that had  some  wari-
ness toward the Democratic Party while  also taking steps  that might over time advance the objec-
tives of the  human  rights community.  See  William  P. Alford, In China, Respect for Law Must
Come First,  L.A.  TIMES,  Feb.  2,  1995,  at  B7  (discussing the  pertinence  of legal  development  for
both the business and human rights agendas).  The considerable  challenges  confronting efforts to
foster legal  development in China are discussed  below at pp.  17o6-o9.  See  also WILLIAM  P. AL-
FORD,  To STEAL A BOOK IS AN  ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE
CIVILIZATION  I  12-23  (I995)  (considering the interplay between  human rights and property rights).
35  As William  Robinson suggests, the rhetoric of democracy promotion is rather more appealing
than that of polyarchy or domination.  See ROBINSON,  supra note  i6, at 4.  Other  oft-used termi-
nology  warrants  scrutiny  as well.  For example,  we  need  to  guard  against  the assumption  that
"transitional" means that a nation is inexorably moving toward democracy or marketization.
36  Carothers's  generally  well-researched  book  touches  only  fleetingly  on  the  question  of the
economic and other interests of individuals and firms involved in the "democracy  promotion indus-
try" itself.  Others have  been somewhat  less delicate  about describing  consultants feathering  their
own nests.  See, e.g.,  WEDEL, supra note  Ii, at 45-82.
37  Carothers  speaks  of U.S.  democracy  assistance  at the  time  of the  Philippine  transition  as
providing "a crucial boost to the emergence  of democracy aid generally" (p. 37).  For an account of
the  termination  of the  military  base  lease,  see  DAVID  JOEL STEINBERG,  THE  PHILIPPINES:  A
SINGULAR  AND  A  PLURAL  PLACE 176-80 (3d ed. 1994).  A similar tension is arguably at play in the
United States-Taiwan relationship,  with Washington expressing irritation at statements by Taipei's
political leadership that it views as needlessly  provocative of Beijing.  There seems  insufficient ap-
preciation on the American side of the need for the leaders of an increasingly democratic Taiwan to
respond  to  and  express popular  sentiments.  See  Robert A.  Manning  & James  Przystup, Straits
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Unfortunately, Carothers  does  not address  questions  of motivation
other than in a six-page "interlude  for skeptics"  (pp. 59-64).  Even this
interlude  is little  more than a  cursory response  to the  most  dismissive
of critics.  He seems instead to operate  on the  assumption that Ameri-
can motivations are  so self-evidently  positive  and straightforward  that
they neither require explication nor pose any problems of internal con-
sistency.  This  approach  is  unfortunate,  not because  those  who doubt
American  motivations  are necessarily  correct,  but because  the tensions
inherent in a complex  democratic  society's attempt to foster democracy
abroad  pose  some  of the  most  challenging  issues  such  a  book  might
explore.  Carothers  understandably  bemoans  the  American  public's
broader lack of interest in democracy promotion programs.  But it may
be, even  at a very mundane level, that this lack of interest and the im-
patience  of most American  political figures  with democracy  promotion
programs  that  are  unlikely  to  bear  fruit  quickly  (or  the  concomitant
tendency  to  overstate  the  immediate  benefits  of any  such program)3
are,  in the end, simply democracy  at work in a large,  powerful  nation
with secure borders and pressing domestic  concerns.  Can taxpayers  be
expected  to  support  something  so  remote,  in  every  sense  of the  word,
especially  if  there  is  a  belief  afoot  that the  international  community
has not been grateful for the contribution that this country  has already
made?39  To  what extent  do  domestic  political  concerns  lead  democ-
Jacket: The "One China" Problem, NEW REPUBLIC,  Sept.  27,  1999,  at  13 (discussing Washington's
difficulties in adjusting to the growth of democracy in Taiwan).
38  By way of illustration, consider the ways in which  the Clinton Administration  has routinely
oversold the significance  of dimensions of its China policy concerning  matters such as intellectual
property protection,  military cooperation,  rural elections, and most recently, the PRC's accession to
the  World Trade  Organization  (WTO).  See,  e.g.,  Remarks  at the  Paul  H.  Nitze  School  of Ad-
vanced International  Studies, 36  WEEKLY  COMP.  PRES.  DOC.  487 (Mar. 8,  2000) (illustrating the
President's tendency  to overstate  the  certainty, extent, and speed  of change  that his Administra-
tion's policy vis-a-vis China will  bring); see also Remarks  at a Democratic Leadership  Conference
in San Jose, California, 36  WEEKLY COMP. PRES.  DOC.  709,  715 (Apr. 3, 200o)  ("[T]he narrow, or
broad, economic consequences [of the PRC's accession to the WTO] are ioo-o in our favor.").  Such
exaggeration,  perhaps  believed  necessary  to  generate  public  support for  a policy  toward  which
strong opposition has been voiced  in Congress, is not without its baleful effects.  It has the poten-
tial to raise  undue expectations  on the part of the American populace  which,  in turn, may foster a
sense  that the  PRC  has  betrayed  its  obligations  to  the  United  States.  Moreover,  it may  even
weaken  the  position  of our  would-be  allies in  the PRC  by overstating  the  concessions  they  may
have  made to  the United States during  negotiations or by accentuating  the possibility that meas-
ures purportedly  taken  principally  for economic  reasons,  such as accession  to  the WTO,  may in-
duce major political change.  See James  V Feinerman,  Free Trade, To a Point, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27,  1999, at Ai5 (urging sobriety in characterizing  America's capacity  to influence China); see also
William  P Alford, Making the World Safe for What?  Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights
and Foreign  Economic Policy in the Post-European  Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
135,  146-52  (1996-1997) (discussing the formation of U.S. policy toward the PRC).
39  Senator Jesse Helms expressed such sentiments, albeit in a rather exaggerated  form, in a re-
cent speech to the United Nations Security Council.  See In the Words of Helms: 'A Lack of Grati-
tude', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,  2oo0,  at A8 (containing excerpts from Senator Helms's speech).
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racy  promotion  programs  to advocate  primarily  the  adoption  of spe-
cific  forms  of governance  derived  from  the  American  experience,  in-
stead  of suggesting  a broader panorama  of possibilities  or focusing  on
core  underlying  ideas  and  universal  notions  of  human  rights?  And
how  does  the  effort  to  foster  democracy abroad  shape  democratic  life
in the state rendering  assistance?40
Carothers  is  equally  terse  in  his  consideration  of  what  American
behavior  more  broadly  suggests  about  the  motivation  for  democracy
promotion  (as well  as its effectiveness).  For  example,  Carothers men-
tions  briefly  that during  the  195Os,  I96Os,  and  early  I970s,  the  CIA "engaged in numerous covert efforts to bolster selected political parties,
to  tilt  elections,  and  otherwise  to  influence  political  outcomes,"  and
that it sometimes sought to justify its actions  "as support for the cause
of democracy"  (p. 25).  Carothers  is critical  of this practice,  noting that
it  "created  a  powerful  legacy  ...  with  which  democracy  programs  of
the  I98os and  I99OS have had to contend" (p. 25).  But ultimately, even
in  his  case  studies,  he  does  not  illustrate  the  contemporary  interplay
between  different  government  missions  involving  the  world  beyond
our  borders  (such as  the  promotion  of our  ideals,  economic  interests,
national security, and drug interdiction) and thus fails  to illuminate the
relative  level  of priority the American  government  accords  democracy
promotion  in its  foreign  policy.41  Nor, notwithstanding  his  praise  for
the philanthropy  of George  Soros (who "has  contributed  more  democ-
racy-related  aid to  many countries  in Eastern  Europe  and  the  former
Soviet Union  than has  the U.S.  government or any other government"
(P. 349)), does Carothers indicate what the activity of nongovernmental
actors might  suggest about  the extent  of state  or societal  commitment
to  democracy  promotion.4 2  Indeed,  there  seems  little  recognition  in
Aiding  Democracy Abroad of  the  importance  of  viewing  American
governmental  programs  in  the  context  of  nonstate  actors,  whether
from  business,  the  NGO  community,  or  civil  society  more  broadly,
40  At times, Americans have  used  our government's efforts abroad  to press for a fuller realiza-
tion at home of our stated ideals.  In an intriguing recent study, Azza  Salama Layton depicts  how
the  leadership  of the American  civil  rights movement  used its "awareness  of  the nexus  between
U.S.  racial policies and  the government's  ability to sell democracy abroad, especially  in Africa and
Asia"  during  the early  Cold  War years  to  advance  the  cause  of equality  for  African-Americans.
AZZA SALAMA  LAYTON, INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS AND  CIVIL RIGHTS  POLICIES IN THE UNITED
STATES,  1941-1960,  at 73-74 (2000).
41  The New  York Times editorial page, for example,  has recently argued that U.S.  assistance for
drug interdiction  efforts  in Colombia  may have  the  effect  of impairing  democratic  development
there.  See Editorial, Dangerous  Plans  for Colombia, N.Y. TIMES,  Feb.  13, 2000, § 4, at 16.
42  For example, Aiding Democracy Abroad does not contain an index entry  for the Ford Foun-
dation despite its extensive  support for almost a half century of legal development in Asia, Africa,
and  Latin  America.  Ford's  role  is  recounted  in  THE  FORD  FOUNDATION,  MANY  ROADS  TO
JUSTICE: THE  LAW  RELATED  WORK  OF  FORD  FOUNDATION  GRANTEES  AROUND  THE WORLD
(Mary McClymont & Stephen  Golub eds.,  2000).
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given  how many areas  of endeavor  undertaken  elsewhere  by the state
are addressed by society in the United States.
B.  Whose Model of Democracy and Democratization?
Carothers's  discussion,  described  earlier,  of the  models  of democ-
racy  and  democratization  employed  by  American  aid  providers43  is
more extensive than his treatment of motivation and yet it, too, fails to
push the inquiry as  far as it might.  These models,  he suggests,  have  a
pragmatic rather than an ideological  or theoretical  foundation that dif-
fers from European models,  but is  in keeping with what  some observ-
ers term a deep-seated pragmatism  in American  life, especially  among
the  legally  trained.44   The  fact  that USAID  and  other  agencies  may
have  an  uneasy  relationship  with American  academia,  however, does
not mean  that they are  acting in an  intellectual  vacuum.  Scholars,  in
law  among  other  fields,  have  been  somewhat  more  involved  in  the
shaping  and execution  of prominent  parts of such assistance  than  Ca-
rothers acknowledges. 4- But even  more importantly, there is operative
in  the  models  of  democracy  and  democratization  a vision  of  what  a
well-functioning  democratic  state  looks  like  and  how  it  is  to  be
achieved.  Such a  vision, not surprisingly, is composed  of ideas deeply
rooted in American  society.  For example, in the  case of democracy, it
is  one  that, inter  alia,  places  considerable  emphasis  on  formal  rights
and embodies  a wariness  of state authority, generally favors  individual
rights over communal rights, and typically accords  a higher  priority to
political  and  civil  rights  than  to  their  economic  and  social  counter-
parts.  These preferences,  in turn, presume a relatively constrained  ex-
ecutive power, a strong and independent judiciary (in the American, as
opposed to the civil law, ideal), a relatively weak civil service, a sizable
and vigorous bar, and a vibrant civil society.  At the same time, the ac-
companying  model  of  democratization  seems  to  exhibit  great  confi-
dence  in the capacity of a people,  aided by law, rapidly  to build a new
43  See supra sections II.B-C, pp.  1684-94.
44  See  T"ubek  & Galanter,  supra note  27,  at  1097  (noting American  lawyers'  preference  for
pragmatic problem  solving).  Carothers  sees European  models of democracy and  democratization
as having a more ideological or theoretical foundation than their American counterparts  because  a
considerable  portion  of European  (and especially  German) democracy  assistance  has  been  chan-
neled through party foundations and is "usually focused more on long-term party building than on
specific  campaigns" (p. i5o).  This results, he suggests, in certain "entrenched flaws," namely "dog-
matic  efforts  to teach  party ideologies, an overemphasis  on  ritualized exchange  visits and confer-
ences, and the often forced method of identifying and cultivating ideological partners" (p. 142).
45  See, e.g.,  deLisle, supra note  15, at 199-200  (discussing the role  of legal  academics  and law
schools in  law reform  work  in the  former Soviet Union,  Eastern  Europe,  and  China).  Although
focused  on  a  project  funded  by  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme,  the  book
LEGISLATIVE  DRAFTING  FOR  MARKET  REFORM:  SOME  LESSONS  FROM  CHINA  (Ann Seidman,
Robert B. Seidman  & Janice Payne eds.,  1997)  contains accounts by  a group of American  academ-
ics assisting legislative drafting in the PRC.
1699 2000]
HeinOnline -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1699 1999-2000HARVARD  LAWREVIEW
nation4 6  while  displaying  relatively  little  concern  about  possible  ten-
sions  between  building  state  institutions  and  entrenching  individual
rights,  or  between  economic  and political  liberalization.  Finally, im-
plicit in these models is the assumption that they are readily conducive
to communication  across linguistic, national, and cultural boundaries.
Fifty years  after  the  promulgation  of the  Universal  Declaration  of
Human  Rights and a  decade  following  the  collapse  of the  Soviet  Un-
ion,  it is understandable  why one  might want to treat these  models  as
vindicated.  Nonetheless,  Aiding Democracy Abroad would have  been
a  richer  book had  it inquired  more  deeply  into the  models  of democ-
racy  and  democratization  undergirding  efforts  of  the  American  gov-
ernment  to  promote  democracy  abroad.  Consider, for  example,  ques-
tions  raised  by  the  writings  of  two  of  our  most  eminent  public
intellectuals,  Richard  Posner47  and  Amartya  Sen 4   regarding  the
course that developing  nations (and those who would aid them) should
embrace.  As Posner would have it, developing nations  would do well
to postpone  plans to create  a "first-class judiciary  or an  extensive  sys-
tem of civil liberties"  in favor  of a few  clear  rules  regarding  property
and  contract 9 and a relatively  modest judicial,  arbitral,  or  other  en-
forcement  apparatus.50   For Sen,  on the  other hand, civil  liberties and
46  This statement mirrors the self-perception  of America, in  the words  of Seymour Martin  Lip-
set, as "the first new nation."  SEYMOUR  MARTIN LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION:  THE UNITED
STATES IN HISTORICAL  AND COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVE  2 (1979) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
47  See Richard  A. Posner, Creating  a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13  WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER  I (1998).
48  See SEN, supra note 32.
49  Posner, supra note 47,  at 9.  These  rules, Posner suggests, might  be borrowed "wherever pos-
sible from established foreign models," and adjusted, if necessary, for local conditions.  Id. at 6.
5o  See id. at 7.  The logic of Posner's position is that "an extensive system  of civil liberties" and
an elaborate  judiciary absorb human and other resources  that a developing society can ill afford  to
lose from more  productive  economic activity.  Id. at 9.  One  need not move to the opposite extreme
(that is, that all societies are or should be adopting  the type and volume  of laws that the economi-
cally advanced  nations have) to note that Posner's argument is flawed,  even were  we  to posit the
centrality that he  accords economic development.  A modest system  of civil  liberties may  impede
economic  development  (if, for  instance,  the  media and  nongovernmental  organizations  lack  the
legal  protections  needed  to  report  vigorously  on  corruption,  mismanagement,  or  other  sensitive
information  important to the operation  of a marketplace).  Moreover, it seems doubtful  that limit-
ing substantive  law to  a few clear rules regarding property  and contract will  adequately  serve the
needs of a nation undergoing rapid economic transformation (with attendant social dislocation  and
disruption  of historic modes  of dispute  resolution), prevent  harassment  of those  who  might com-
pete  economically  with those who are well connected,  or satisfy  the demands of the international
business community, which is likely to seek a higher rate of return to compensate  for the perceived
heightened  risk  resulting from  the absence  of effective  legal protections.  In addition,  we  should
guard against the  assumption that  the  involvement of international  business will necessarily  lead
to an overall improvement  in public  legal institutions.  As I suggest elsewhere, foreign parties doing
business in the PRC appear to be pursuing  a variety  of strategies  to achieve their ends.  These in-
volve resort to arbitration (in effect establishing a private system of justice for multinational enter-
prises  while  doing little to  enhance public  institutions) and,  less attractively, reliance  at times  on
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prosperity but also an indispensable  precondition for prosperity. 51  The
models  USAID  has  been  employing  would  seem  hard  put to  accom-
modate both of these visions,  particularly  with respect  to the relation-
ship  between  political, economic,  and  legal  development.  Carothers's
readers would  have been  well served had he provided  a fuller account
of  the  choices  made,  or  at  least  implied,  by  the  models  USAID  has
been  utilizing  - for  in  the  end,  there  is  a  normative  foundation  to
whatever  definitions  of democracy  and democratization  one might em-
ploy.
A  more  concerted  treatment  of  the  models  might  also  have  ad-
dressed  why  "fit[ting]  activities  to  the  local  environment"  has  proven
so difficult, by raising  the question of the  relationship  between  democ-
racy and the values and institutions  that underlie  it.  This inquiry may
be another way of asking just how much  and what type of change dif-
ferent  definitions  of  democracy  may  entail  in  current  political,  eco-
nomic, social,  and other arrangements  - and what provides  a basis of
legitimacy for such change.  Although Carothers does not describe it in
this  manner,  one  might  think  of  the  history  of  the  programs  with
which  he  is  concerned  as  an  expanding  circle  in  which,  over  time,
those  advocating  the  promotion  of democracy  abroad  have  regularly
broadened the ambit of the  assistance being transmitted.  That is,  they
have  gradually  added  elements  such  as  support  for  the  formation  of
political  parties,  the  administration  and  monitoring  of  elections,  the
drafting  of constitutions  and  legislation,  the  building  of an  indepen-
dent judiciary, the strengthening of the bar, the liberation  of the media,
the  buttressing  of civil  society, the  expansion  of civic  education,  the
empowerment of women, and the creation of autonomous unions.
To some  extent, this expansion has  mirrored changes  in the  United
States  that  have  prompted  us  to  rethink  what  constitutes  democracy.
But perhaps  in even greater  measure, it has been a  response  to the re-
alization  by aid  providers that earlier, more  skeletal  exports  too  often
fell  short  of  fostering  democracy  (as,  indeed,  Carothers  suggests  has
been the situation in at least three of his case  studies).  Aiding Democ-
racy Abroad  does  not  indicate  whether  the  activities  that  currently
extralegal measures.  See William P.  Alford,  The More  Laws, the More...  ? Measuring Legal  Re-
form in China 14-24, 33-34 (Jan. 2000) (unpublished working paper of the Center for Research on
Econ.  Dev. and  Policy  Reform of Stanford  Univ.,  on file  with the  Harvard  Law  School Library)
[hereinafter Alford, The More  Laws, the More ...  ?].
Posner's work, incidentally, has been very  influential in post-Maoist  China, perhaps because
it rings of economic determinism purged of redistribution.
51  See  SEN,  supra note  32,  at 35-53.  Sen is  not  oblivious  to the  economic and social  accom-
plishments  of  authoritarian  regimes,  but  argues  that history bears  out that "the  process  of pre-
venting famines and other crises is significantly helped by the use of instrumental freedoms."  Id. at
188.
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constitute democracy promotion should  be read as a final list (in effect,
an  "end  of history" for  such  programs)  or whether  proponents  of de-
mocracy  promotion need  to anticipate  the prospect  of further, perhaps
ongoing, redefinition  of the models with which  they are working.  Ca-
rothers,  to  be  sure,  did not  intend  Aiding Democracy Abroad to  be  a
work  in political  philosophy, but  by  failing  to focus  more  extensively
on the conceptual  wellsprings of the models  of democracy and democ-
ratization  he would employ, he ultimately  leaves  the reader  wondering
about  their contours  and  base  of legitimacy.  If, as  one  suspects,  Ca-
rothers  believes  that  the  vision  of  democracy  that  should  inform
American  promotion  programs  is  one  principally grounded  in univer-
sal  norms  of human  rights  as  they have  come  to  be  articulated  since
World  War  II, it  would have  been  helpful  for  him  to  have  explained
that.  Aiding Democracy Abroad would  have  been  stronger  had  he
shown  how  the  intellectual  and  moral  climate  these  norms  have  fos-
tered or the set of practical  legal instruments  in which they have found
expression  buttress  his  call  for  democracy  promotion.S2  Carothers's
study,  however,  makes  scant  mention  of  universal  norms  of  human
rights  largely  because,  one  fears,  he  sensed  that  such  an  argument
might  have  undercut  support  in  some  Washington  circles  capable  of
exerting  considerable  influence  over  the  fate  of democracy  assistance
programs.
Greater scrutiny of the concepts  of democracy and democratization
at issue  might  also  have  led  Carothers  to  focus even  more  on  the  re-
cipients  of democracy  assistance.  Aiding Democracy Abroad implores
those  who  would  craft  such  programs  to  "give  people  and  organiza-
tions  of the  recipient  country  a  primary  role"  (p.  344),  but  this  call,
however forcefully  rendered, still leaves many important  questions  un-
answered.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  issue  of representation.  Who
speaks for  a society  that has yet  to undertake  serious political reform?
Who does so for a society that  is in the midst of rapid reform, but not
yet democratic  by any meaningful  definition?S3  What are  the implica-
52  Carothers might, for example,  have shown  how scholars  such as Henry Steiner and Thomas
Franck have advanced the argument that the chance  to participate  in one's own governance  is not
just a preference,  but a right.  See Henry J. Steiner, Political  Participation  as a Human Right, I
HARV.  HUM.  RTS. Y.B.  77  (1988); see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging  Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46,  46 (1992)  ("Democracy ...  is on the way to becoming a global
entitlement....').
53  At least by implication, Samuel Huntington  suggests that it is better to concentrate  attention
on political  elites, rather  than  the populace  more  generally.  The  rationale  for  this  focus,  he  be-
lieves, is that apart from  economic  development,  the key factor "affecting  the  future  stability and
expansion  of democracy [is]...  political leadership" whereas a society's culture itself changes much
more  slowly.  SAMUEL  P. HUNTINGTON,  THE  THIRD  WAVE:  DEMOCRATIZATION  IN THE  LATE
TWENTIETH  CENTURY  315-16  (iggi).  As  manifested in  USAID and other  American  democracy
promotion programs, legal assistance  has predominantly  taken the form of strengthening  state in-
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ing  party is  endeavoring  assiduously  to stay  involved  in all  social or-
ganizations  of  any  consequence  (including  unions,  churches,  media,
advocacy  groups,  and  the  professions)?
5 4   Does  attention  to  local
NGOs,  even  in  a  relatively  open  society,  run  the  risk  of diminishing
the  voices  of  official  representatives  of  the  full  populace  in  fledgling
democratic  institutions?  How  are  we  to  treat a  state  that disenfran-
chises  ethnic  minorities  as  it embraces  majority rule?
5 5  To  his  credit,
Carothers recognizes the danger that aid programs may be captured  by
members  of  local  elites  adept  at  interfacing  with  foreign  donors.
Nonetheless,  one  longs  for  a  further  consideration  of  such  questions,
informed  by  an engagement  of the  work of scholars,  survey  research-
ers, and other observers  from recipient countries that is more extensive
than Carothers's  bibliography  suggests,  even recognizing  the  limits on
expression that typically exist in nondemocratic  states.
C.  What Are  We Measuring and How?
Carothers  writes  insightfully  about  the  challenges  that  efforts  to
evaluate  democracy  promotion  programs  present.  He  is  especially
critical  of USAID's  espousal,  growing  out of the  Clinton  administra-
tion's  "reinventing  government  initiative,"  of a  "corporate-style  man-
aging  for  results  system"  (p.  288).  This  system  presumes  that  "large
elements  of democracy, such as a well-functioning  local  government  or
an  active  civil  society  ...  [can  be  reduced]  down  to  two  or three  ex-
tremely  narrow  quantitative  indicators"  (p.  293).  When  compounded
by "evaluators  [who] rarely have  in-depth experience  in the  country  in
which  they are doing evaluations,"  this methodology  generates  a "false
dream  of science"  that is  the  evaluative  counterpart  to  the  rigid  de-
stitutions and associated elites (even if with a longer term  objective  of facilitating the  empower-
ment of the populace).
54  For example,  my  research  regarding  lawyers  in the  PRC (whose  ranks have  swelled  from
3,000 in  1979  to approximately  175,000 in 2000)  suggests that  the national lawyers'  association,  if
not the bar  more generally,  is appreciably  less autonomous  than  most  observers  would indicate.
American and other  foreign actors seem all too  ready to embrace putative counterparts  in  China,
little recognizing  how  closely tied  some  such entities remain  in a corporatist  fashion to  state  and
Communist Party authorities.  See infra pp.  17o6-o8.  The  dilemma  of the  Chinese  bar and  the
reasons it has  not been  better  understood in this  country are  the subject of William  P Alford,  Of
Lawyers Lost and Found:  Liberal Legal Professionalism  and  the People's Republic  of China (De-
cember, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School  Library) [hereinafter
Alford, Of Lawyers  Lost and  Found].  For an analysis  of the ways in  which the  PRC's emerging
business  community  has  remained  linked  to  the  party, see  MARGARET  M.  PEARSON,  CHINA'S
NEW BUSINESS ELITE: THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC REFORM  100-15  (1997).
55  See generally Amy  L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New  Paradigm
for Law and Development, io8 YALE L.J.  1 (1998) (discussing the difficulties  that ethnic  resentment
may  pose  for  efforts to  foster  democratic  and  market-oriented  institutions).  The  capacity  of a
democratic  majority  to inflict harm  on a minority  should  remind persons  engaged  in  democracy
promotion of the potential for tension between democracy and other values.
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mocracy templates  used  by USAID  and others  in program  design, and
that is also  enormously  wasteful  and potentially  highly misleading  (p.
287).
The  question  of assessment,  however,  poses  a  number  of difficult
practical  challenges  that Aiding Democracy Abroad might  have  exam-
ined more fully. 5 6  How are  we to attribute  success  or failure  to a par-
ticular democracy  promotion  effort, given  that few  foreign  actors  (be-
yond the aid community) experience such projects directly and that the
more  general  impact  of  these  programs  is  likely  to  be  inextricably
linked  with a host  of other influences?  For example,  it seems reason-
able  to think  that factors such  as  the  expectations  of a  populace  that
has long suffered under nondemocratic  regimes, the collapse  of the So-
viet  Union  (as  the  chief provider  of financial  and  ideological  support
for  certain nondemocratic  regimes), the  behavior of neighboring  states,
and multilateral  assistance  or private  philanthropy  of the  type  repre-
sented by  George  Soros,' 7  would  be  more  likely  to explain  moves  to-
ward  democracy  than  a  modestly  funded,  fairly  bureaucratized  U.S.
governmental  undertaking.  Indeed, it could be that such factors might
even be strong enough  to overcome  an ill-conceived or poorly  executed
democracy  promotion  program;  or  perhaps  that American  and other
bilateral  assistance is more likely to flow to projects  with a good possi-
bility  of success,  rather  than  those  with  limited  prospects,  no  matter
how  worthy the latter  may be relative  to the former.  Conversely, one
could  imagine  a  well-designed,  competently  executed  program  of de-
mocracy  assistance failing  for a myriad of reasons, including local eth-
nic tensions,  distrust of the United States  resulting from support of the
previous (or current) authoritarian  regime,58  the unwillingness  of other
56  Elsewhere  I discuss  the difficulties  of measuring  legal  development  and  its relationship  to
economic development, noting what I understand to be limitations in the work of economists such as Andrei Shleifer and  Robert Vishny.  See Alford, The More  Laws, the More ...  ?, supra note 5o, at 6-14.  The question  of how best to quantify the interplay between  legal and economic develop-
ment  is a topic  garnering increasing  attention among  from  lawyers  and  economists.  Two  recent
noteworthy studies are  Katharina Pistor & Philip A. Wellons, THE ROLE OF  LAW AND  LEGAL IN- STITUTIONS  IN  ASIAN  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  i96o-z995  ('999);  and  Daniel  Berkowitz,
Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois  Richard, Economic Development,  Legality, and  the Transplant
Effect (February 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on  file with  the Harvard  Law  School Library).
For a thoughtful essay on the challenges posed by efforts to measure  legal development empirically,
see  Matthew  Stephenson,  The Rule  of Law:  Toward  a Definition  for  Political  Scientists  (Spring
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
57  The  massive involvement of donors  beyond the  U.S.  government (including private philan-
thropists,  foreign  governments, and  multilateral  organizations) counsels  caution  in attempting  to
distinguish  the  impact  of official  programs.  Indeed,  donor  competition,  which  some  recipients
work to great advantage,  has become  a problem.  For a biting critique of the ways in  which some aid recipients manipulate donors,  see  Andris Saj6,  Universal Rights, Missionaries,  Converts, and
"Local Savages", 6  EAST EUR.  CONST. REV. 44, 48-49 (1997).
Ss  Witness, for instance,  the complex  feelings toward the United States in South  Korea, where considerable good will is tempered in  some circles  by memories of American  support for the Chun
1704 [Vol. 113:1677
HeinOnline -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1704 1999-2000BOOK REVIEWS
important  democratic  states  to support  a  principled American  call  for
sanctions, and the  sheer frustration of a newly liberated populace  with
the  adjustments  and delay occasioned  by  any serious effort  at democ-
ratization.59  Moreover,  there  is  the  important  question  of the  appro-
priate  time  frame for judging  the  effectiveness  of the  democracy  pro-
motion  program  in  question.  Although  Brian  Tamanaha  may  well
have  been  correct  in  chastising  Trubek  and  Galanter  for  their  impa-
tience  in writing off earlier rule of law  programs  as a  failure after less
than a  decade, 6 0 we  might  nonetheless  be  reluctant  to  adopt the  per-
spective attributed to the late Chinese  premier  Zhou Enlai (1899-1976)
who  purportedly  replied  to  a  question  about  the  significance  of  the
French Revolution  with the answer  that "it is too early to say."61
The  point here  is  neither  to  expect  of Carothers  a comprehensive
history  of  the  world  nor  to  belittle  the  potential  contribution  that
skilled  social  scientists  highly  knowledgeable  about  the  societies  in
question might make.  Rather, it is first to underscore the practical  dif-
ficulties  of isolating  the  impact  of  U.S.  governmental  democracy  pro-
motion programs.  After  all, as Adam  Przeworski  of the  University  of
Chicago, a prominent scholar of democratic  transitions,  concluded in  a
review  of eighteen  major studies  concerning  the  relationship  between
regime  type  and  growth:  "The  simple  answer  to  the  question  with
which we  began is that we do  not know  whether  democracy fosters  or
hinders  economic  growth.  All  we can  offer  at this  moment  are  some
educated  guesses. '62  And  it is  secondly to raise  the  possibility that  in
seeking  to  aid  democracy  abroad  we  may need  to  remain  as  vigilant
about what our country does as what we  would urge others to do.
Efforts  at  measuring  democracy  promotion  programs  also  require
recognizing  that  even  the  best delivered  message  will  not  necessarily
ensure  comparable  results  in different  settings.  Notwithstanding  Ne-
braska  Senator  Kenneth  Wherry's  famous  declaration  that  "[w]ith
God's  help,  we  will  lift Shanghai  up  and  ever  up  until  it is  just  like
Doo-Hwan regime.  See Heng Lee,  Uncertain  Promise: Democratic Consolidation  in South Korea,
in  THE  POLITICS  OF  DEMOCRATIZATION:  GENERALIZING  EAST  ASIAN  EXPERIENCES  148,  I5o
(Edward Friedman ed.,  i994).
59  See generally JON  ELSTER,  CLAUS  OFFE & ULRICH  K.  PREUSS  with  FRANK  BOENKER,
ULRIKE GOETTING & FRIEDBERT W. RUEB,  INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN  IN POST-COMMUNIST  SO-
CIETIES:  REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA (1998).
60  See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM.  J. INT'L. L. 470,
473 (i995)  (reviewing LAW AND  CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala
eds.,  1992);  and LAW AND  DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty ed.,  i993)).
61  David Wallen, Heseltine Is at the Centre of Power,  S.  CHINA MORNING  POST (Hong  Kong),
July 8, x995,  available  in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File (quoting Zhou Enlai).  For more  on
the issue of time, see Alford, The More Laws, the More...  ?,  supra note 5o,  at 1o-x.
62  Adam  Przeworski  & Fernando  Limongi, Political Regimes  and Economic  Growth,  7 J.
ECON.  PERSPECTIVES  5  1, 64 (1993).
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Kansas City,' 63 the jazz band at Shanghai's  Heping Hotel still leaves  a
good  deal  to  be  desired even  before  we  get  to  the  question  of  barbe-
cue.64  To make this point is not  to lose sight  of the good  in search  of
the perfect.  As Alan Watson has  nicely chronicled, for centuries  we le-
gal  types  have  been  lifting  ideas  from  our  foreign  compatriots,  often
benefiting from such legal transplantation  even in the face of imperfect
understanding, incomplete  replication, and inapt application.6
1
To  be  sure,  Carothers  writes  about  the  aberrant  results  generated
by both  the  too  rigid application  of an  American-derived  template  of
success  and the  out-and-out  misuse by  some aid recipients  of the tools
we  have put in their hands.  His  discussion  is  thoughtful, but he ulti-
mately treats these problems  as technical ones that could largely be  re-
solved with  more care (for example,  through  building  more  flexibility
into  one's  template  or  selecting  a  nicer  class  of aid  recipients),  when
such  difficulties  may  well  be  endemic  to  the  enterprise  and  require
more attention,  both for practical  and normative  purposes, to the  pos-
sibility of unintended consequences.
Consider,  for  example,  the case  of the  People's  Republic  of China
(PRC),66  although  one  could just  as  well  substitute  that  of  Russia,67
63  Dealing with China: The Barbarians  at the Gate, ECONOMIST,  Nov.  27,  1993,  at 21  (quoting
Senator Kenneth Wherry).  Wherry  is the  Senator who once referred to another part of Asia as "In-
digo  China."  MARVIN  E.  STROMER,  THE  MAKING  OF  A POLITICAL  LEADER:  KENNETH  S.
WHERRY AND  THE UNITED STATES SENATE  150 (1969).
64  For an  overarching  account  of how seemingly  constant  an  expression  of American  life  as
McDonald's  adapts  to  local  conditions  even  as  it  shapes  them,  see  GOLDEN  ARCHES  EAST:
MCDONALD'S  IN  EAST  ASIA  (James  L.  Watson  ed.,  1997)  (discussing  the  cultural  impact  of
McDonald's  in Beijing, Hong  Kong, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo).  Would that we  had as nuanced a
multijurisdictional  study of legal transplantation.
65  See  ALAN  WATSON,  LEGAL TRANSPLANTS:  AN  APPROACH TO  COMPARATIVE  LAW (2d  ed.
1993).
66  Carothers  perceptively  notes  elsewhere  the  importance  of  applying  lessons  learned  about
democracy promotion to China:
These  lessons [about  democracy  promotion programs focused  on  law] are  of particular
importance  concerning  China,  where  some  U.S.  policymakers  and  commentators  have
begun  pinning  hope  on  the idea  that promoting  the  rule  of law  will  allow  the  United
States to support positive  economic  and political change without taking a confrontational
approach on human rights issues....  Rule-of-law  promotion should be part of U.S. policy
toward China, but it will not..,  eliminate the hard choices  between  the ideals and inter-
ests that have plagued America's foreign policy for more than two centuries.
Carothers,  The Rule of Law Revival, supra note  17,  at io6.  Unfortunately, his case  studies in Aid-
ing Democracy Abroad are limited  to nations  that are  of relatively  modest size and  international
political  power.  His  choice  may be  understandable  for reasons  of feasibility, but it leads him  to
exclude what may be some of the most important test cases for the propositions he advances.
67  See generally KATHRYN  HENDLEY, TRYING  TO MAKE LAW MATTER:  LEGAL REFORM  AND
LABOR  LAW IN  THE  SOVIET  UNION  (1996);  STEVEN  L.  SOLNICK,  STEALING  THE  STATE:  CON-
TROL AND  COLLAPSE  IN SOVIET INSTITUTIONS  (1998);  Robert Sharlet, Legal Transplants and Po-
litical Mutations, 7 EAST EUR. CONST.  REV. 59 (1998).
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8  or several  African69 or  Eastern  European
7 0  states.  Since
the  end of the Great  Proletarian Cultural Revolution  in the mid-1970s,
the  PRC has  been  engaged in  the  most concerted  effort  in world  his-
tory to construct a legal system, with assistance  from the U.S.  govern-
ment  and  a  veritable  cavalcade  of  other  governments,  multilateral
bodies,  foundations,  universities,  and  individuals.  Thousands  of laws
and other legal measures  have been enacted;  the court system has been
revamped;  a host of new regulatory  bodies has been  established; and a
bar  that  numbered  3000  in  1979  has  already  multiplied  more  than
fifty-fold (with plans to expand to 300,000 over the next decade), facili-
tating citizen use  of the legal system in unprecedented  numbers.' 1
The  conventional  wisdom  portrays  such  developments  as  bearing
out  the  PRC's  convergence,  importantly  influenced  by  the  United
States,  toward  the  rule  of  law.7 2  Such  accounts,  however,  fail  ade-
quately  to  heed  the  ways  in  which  these  very  developments  may  ar-
guably be  impeding,  as  well  as  advancing,  liberal  legality.  The Chi-
nese state,  for example,  is increasingly invoking the law to justify both
at home  and abroad  its harsh treatment of dissidents and  autonomous
spiritual  groups.' 3  Corruption  has mushroomed,  facilitated  by  oppor-
tunities  for rent  seeking made  possible  by  the  bevy of new  regulatory
and licensing measures.'
4  And evidence  suggests that some among  the
68  See generally ADAM SCHWARZ, A NATION IN WAITING:  INDONESIA IN THE I99OS (1994).
69  See  generally MICHAEL  BRATTON &  NICOLAS  VAN  DE  WALLE,  DEMOCRATIC  EXPERI-
MENTS  IN  AFRICA:  REGIME  TRANSITIONS  IN  COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVE  (1997); Claude  Ak,
The Democratisation  of Disempowerment in Africa, in THE DEMOCRATISATION  OF DISEMPOWER-
MENT: THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRD WORLD 70 (Jochen Hippler ed.,  1995).
70  See generally Saj6,  supra note 57.
71 These developments are discussed in William  P. Alford, A Second Great Wall?  China's  Post-
Cultural  Revolution Project of Legal Construction,  i  i  CULTURAL DYNAMICS  193  (1999). The  best
overall  study  of contemporary  Chinese  legal  development  in  English  is  STANLEY  B.  LUBMAN,
BIRD IN A CAGE:  LEGAL REFORM  IN  CHINA AFTER  MAO  (I999). For a fine  study of the PRC's
court system,  see  Donald  C.  Clarke,  Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System:  The En-
forcement of Civil Judgments, Io  COLUM. J. ASIAN L. i (1996).
72  See, e.g.,  SHIPING  ZHENG,  PARTY  VS.  STATE  IN  POST-1949  CHINA:  THE INSTITUTIONAL
DILEMMA  189  (1997);  Harry Harding, The Halting  Advance of Pluralism,  9 J. DEMOCRACY  11,  12
(1998); Minxin Pei, "Creeping  Democratization" in China,  6 J. DEMOCRACY  65,  68-71  (995).
73 See, e.g., Abusing Rights According to Law, CHINA RIGHTS  FORUM, Winter  1999-2ooo, at 4;
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Spring Turns to Winter in Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,  1998, § 4, at 5.  Some
Chinese citizens have  also begun to express concern about the Communist Party's use  of legal re-
form to "maintain and safeguard its grip on power."  Ding Zilin, Lin Mu, Jiang Qisheng, Jiang Pei-
kun & Wei Xiaotao, Declaration  on Civil Rights and Freedom (Sept.  28,  1998)  (visited Apr. 21,
2000) <http://www.hrichina.org/documents/english/freedom.html>  (on  file with the  Harvard  Law
School Library).
74 See Jasper  Becker, Money Burns as Party Fiddles, S.  CHINA MORNING  POST (Hong Kong),
Aug. 21,  1999, at i5,  available in 1999 WL 21937237 (reporting that China's Auditor General found
that for the first six months of 1999, more  than 117 billion yuan (roughly $14  billion) in state funds,
which is greater than the entire national economic stimulus package for that period, had been mis-
used).
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PRC's  burgeoning  corps  of legal  professionals,  far  from  serving  as  a
vanguard  of  legal  and  political  reform,  have  much  to  gain  from  an
economy  that  remains  perched  between  plan  and  market,  subject  to
the discipline of neither.
75
To  acknowledge  the  underside  of legal  reform  is  neither  to  be  dis-
missive  of the  way in  which  Chinese  legal  development  may  be  em-
powering  the  citizenry,  irrespective  of  the  Communist  Party's  inten-
tions,76 nor to make a blanket argument against foreign efforts  to assist
that development.  Rather, it is  to contend that serious attempts  to as-
sess democracy promotion must account  for unintended  and undesired
consequences  far more than they have.  In the case of law, such an ac-
counting  would  require  that those  shaping  and executing  democracy
promotion  programs  embrace a more nuanced appreciation  of the uses
to which law may be put.  Law has, in recent years, come to occupy an
increasing role in democracy assistance  because  some proponents see  it
as  promoting  liberal  values (at least  in the  minimal  sense  of fostering
regularity, predictability,  and  constraints  on  the  arbitrary  exercise  of
state  power).  Paradoxically,  however,  a  considerable  number  of de-
mocracy promotion  advocates  also tend  to portray  law as  neutral  and
hence capable  of being effectively  deployed  by a range  of different  re-
gimes to  achieve  a broad spectrum  of developmental  ends. 7 7  This  in-
consistency  may in  part be  due  to the  awkwardness  of raising  certain
sensitive  issues,  or  to  the  formal  prohibition  in  the  charters  of some
multilateral  bodies on  dealing in the  political realm,  but it also,  I sug-
gest, is  indicative  of a  serious  and largely  unacknowledged  tension  in
our thinking  regarding democracy  promotion.  We are,  in effect, extol-
ling  law  as  distinguishable  from  politics in  that it  rises  above  the  in-
strumental  at the  same  time  that  we  are  proclaiming  its  utility as  an
instrument  for  development  (through  promotion  efforts  that  them-
75  See William P. Alford, Tasselled Loafers  for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in
the  World of Chinese Legal Workers, 141 CHINA Q.  22,  32-34  (1995); Alford,  Of Lawyers Lost and
Found, supra note  54,  at I9-2o.  As Joel  Hellman  of the European  Bank for  Reconstruction and
Development has observed with respect to economic  reform in the former  Soviet Union and  East-
ern Europe:  "[T]he winners can do  far more damage  to the progress of economic  reform  than the
losers.  As a result, the success of economic reform  depends on creating winners and  on constrain-
ing them."  Joel  S.  Hellman,  Winners Take All:  The Politics of Partial  Reform in Postcommunist
Transitions,  50  WORLD POL. 203,  234 (1998).  Of course, if legal professionals themselves exemplify
this phenomenon, the utility  of the legal system as a major potential  source of constraints on win-
ners in general may be impaired.
76  Ways in  which  the  law has been  empowering  are  discussed  in  William P. Alford,  Double-
Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and Legitimacy in the People's Republic of China,  DAEDALUS,
Spring  1993, at 45.
77  For a masterful  treatment  of the  ways in which  competing conceptions  of the  rule  of law
have  been  deployed  in international  development,  see  John  K.M.  Ohnesorge,  The  Rule  of Law,
Economic Development, and the Developmental States of Northeast Asia, in LAW  AND  DEVELOP-
MENT IN  EAST AND  SOUTHEAST  ASIA (Christoph Antons ed.,  forthcoming  2000) (on file  with the
Harvard Law School Library).
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selves  might  be  described  by  some  as  highly  instrumental).  Perhaps
we  ought, therefore,  not  be surprised that political  figures  facing  fun-
damental  issues  of  power  and  state  building,  if  not  survival  itself,
would  utilize  law  in ways  other  than  those  we  might  have  hoped  or
envisioned.
D.  What Are the Ethical Implications of Democracy Promotion?
As  the  foregoing  suggests,  embedded  in  democracy  promotion  are
difficult ethical questions.  Carothers does  not raise them  as such,  per-
haps because  he  is concerned  that to do  so might diminish  receptivity
to his  recommendations  in  practical  policy  circles,  but he  is  certainly
cognizant  of the  gravity  of  the  undertaking  about  which  he  writes.
Even  in  the  most  practical  of policy  terms,  however, Aiding Democ-
racy Abroad would  have  been  a  more  powerful  and  enduring  work
had Carothers  more directly  addressed  ethical  considerations  that per-
vade  the  very enterprise  of democracy  promotion and  that will,  if his
policy  recommendations  are adopted,  move even  more  prominently to
the  forefront.  For  example,  how  does  one  weigh  the  introduction  of
what may be  useful new  notions of democracy to a people living under
a repressive  regime against the possible  perpetuation  of that regime  by
virtue of legitimating its rule and providing it with instruments  that it
might  employ  toward  a  repressive  end?  Without  romanticizing  the
past,  what  are  the  implications,  in  terms  of "traditional"  social  ar-
rangements,  of the  introduction  of a more  rights-focused,  marketized
approach  to life?78  Are we proposing  legal solutions to  problems that
might  be better  addressed  through  politics  or other  means?79  Is  our
faith  in highly  rational,  carefully  sequenced  evolutionary  change  ulti-
mately  so  illusory  as  to  be  misleading,  particularly  for  societies
emerging  from and  needing  to  cope  with  searing  national  trauma? 80
78  Although he does not focus on developing nations, Richard Pildes explores the costs of legali-
zation in Laws and Norms: The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law,  144  U.  PA.  L. REV.
2055  (1996).
79  The accentuation of law to the possible  detriment of other concerns might take many forms.
For example, Carol Jones argues that in Hong Kong, both British and Chinese  rulers have sought
to emphasize what each has described  as  the rule of law in lieu of allowing the populace more  in
the  way of political outlets typically found in democratic  states.  See Carol  Jones, Politics Post-
poned: Law as a Substitute for Politics in Hong Kong and China, in LAW,  CAPITALISM  AND  POW-
ER IN  ASIA:  THE RULE  OF  LAW AND  LEGAL  INSTITUTIONS  45,  46-48,  53-54, 56-62  (Kanishka
Jayasuriya ed.,  1999).  Or, to take a different tack, literacy might  need to be  fostered as a precondi-
tion to the populace reasonably availing itself of its legal rights.  See SUSMITA DASGUPTA  & DAVID
WHEELER,  CITIZEN  COMPLAINTS  AS  ENVIRONMENTAL  INDICATORS:  EVIDENCE  FROM  CHINA
14,  21 tbl.5,  22  tbl.6 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1704,  1997).
80  The  dilemma  of  achieving justice  while  fostering  reconciliation  is  treated  eloquently  in
MARTHA  MINOW,  BETWEEN  VENGEANCE  AND  FORGIVENESS:  FACING  HISTORY  AFTER GENO-
CIDE AND  MASS VIOLENCE (x998).  Ruti Teitel has also written with insight about the place of law
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What degree  of disclosure  of our  aspirations for  the programs  we pro-
mote  do we owe to recipient regimes  or their broader  populace?8'  Be-
fore  or  while  engaging  in  democracy  promotion  programs,  what  re-
sponsibility  do  we  have  to  address  other  American  governmental  or
private  activities  that  may  be  impeding  democratic  development
abroad?  What responsibility  do  we have  concurrently  to address seri-
ous impediments  to the fuller  realization  of our ideals at  home?  And,
ultimately,  no  matter  how  much  we  cherish  that  which  we  impart,
what  do  we  believe  entitles  us  to  interject  ourselves  into  the  lives  of
others,  especially  if  we  are  far  more  willing  to  provide  advice  than
funding  for  basic  needs?  These  and  many  other  questions  that  one
might  raise  defy ready answers,  but their  difficulty  arguably  makes  it
all  the  more  crucial that  they feature more  prominently  in the  debate
over democracy promotion.
The  need  for  more  open  discussion  of the  ethical  implications  of
democracy  promotion  is important,  of course,  not only because  of the
considerable  effect  such programs  may have  on  those  on  the receiving
end, but  also  because  of their  influence  on  those  providing  the  assis-
tance.  One major illustration of the hubris  that infuses the democracy
promotion effort has  been the near absence  of serious  scrutiny of what
such undertakings  mean for those on the transmitting end.
History suggests that the experience  of endeavoring  to shape  others
inevitably shapes  us, both  with respect  to our thinking  about our own
society,  the  complexity  of  legal  reform,  and  law  more  generally,  and
with respect  to our reaction to exercising  the quite  considerable  power
these  efforts  frequently  bestow.  To  take  one  cogent  example  from
American  legal  academe,  it is  no  exaggeration  to say  that  the  critical
legal  studies  movement  emerged  in  part  from  the  disillusionment  of
David Trubek and others who, in attempting to utilize American  mod-
els  of  liberal  legality  to  transform  Brazil  while  under  contract  to
USAID, became  profoundly  skeptical  about  the  claims  of those  mod-
els, even  on their home terrain.82  But the  impact might  well be felt in
very different  ways,  as borne  out, for instance,  by Roscoe  Pound who,
after serving as a key advisor on legal reform  to the government of the
Republic  of China  during  the  Chinese  civil  war of  the  late  1940s,  re-
acted  to the failure  of the measures  he proposed  to take hold  in China
by  embracing  the fervent  anti-communism  of Senator Joseph  McCar-
in building a new social order in Ruti Teitel, Transitional  Jurisprudence:  The Role of Law in Politi-
cal Transformation,  io6  YALE L.J. 2009 (1997).
81  As one could imagine, too candid a discussion of the presumed political  import of democracy
assistance  might  lead  some  governments  to decline  U.S.  support,  while  too  muted  a  treatment
would  raise  questions  both of duplicity  and  of a failure  properly  to  inform  the target  public  in
what, after all, are programs designed to promote democracy.
82  See Il'ubek & Galanter, supra  note  27,  at 1090-92.
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thy following  his return home.8 3  And as recent attempts by foreign  ac-
tors  to  influence  our  presidential  elections  suggest,  some  lessons,  in-
tended  or  otherwise,  of our  democracy promotion  programs  may have
been absorbed  only too well.
8 4
IV  CONCLUSION
One  response  to  the  type  of questions  posed  in  this  Review  might
be  that  practically  minded  people  - whether  situated  principally  in
the  public  arena  or  academe  - faced  with  what  may  be  a  narrow
window  of  opportunity  and  a  host  of difficult  real-world  obstacles,
simply do not have  the luxury of pondering so many open-ended  issues
if they wish to advance the cause  of democracy.  As a distinguished  le-
gal philosopher  now involved  with issues of international  development
recently informed  me, it is nice to play with different  definitions  of the
rule  of law,  but  at  some  point, one  needs  to  decide  what  constitutes
best practice  internationally  and to  act on it.  Indeed,  Carothers him-
self, notwithstanding  an  impressive  intellectual  pedigree  that  includes
service  as  an  editor  of this Law  Review, ever  so politely  evidences  a
touch  of this  impatience  when  he  sets  forth  reasons  for  what he  de-
scribes  as  the  "gap  between  theory  and  practice  on  democratization"
(P.94).
Understandable  though  the  desire  to just  get on  with  it  may  be,
such  a  stance  is  ultimately  no  less  problematic  than  the  comparably
understandable  impulse  of David  Trubek,  Marc  Galanter,  and  other
scholars  a quarter century ago  who chose to distance  themselves  from
law  and  development  studies  because  their  experience  with  USAID
and other government-funded  democracy  promotion  work raised  such
serious  questions  of hypocrisy  and  illegitimacy  as  to  leave  them  in  a
self-described  state  of "self-estrangement. 8 5  There  is  no single  easily
reducible  set of international  best practices  or  "killer  theorem"  (to use
the  term  that  Foreign Affairs  managing  editor  Fareed  Zakaria  em-
ployed in a recent review to describe  what he  finds lacking in Amartya
Sen's  book  Development as Freedom). 86  Nor, if  one  thinks  seriously
83  Pound  took  up  his  consultancy  in  China at age  77.  I  am  working  on  a  study, with  Dr.
Xingzhong Yu  of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, of Pound's experience in China, its impact
on him, and the ways in which his ideas have been used by Chinese scholars both in the Republic
of China and the PRC.
84  See, e.g., Marc  Lacey & William  C. Rempel,  Chinese Army Funds Went to Democrats, Donor
Says, L.A. TIMES, May  i6,  1998,  at  Ai; William  C.  Rempel & Alan C. Miller, Chung Details Al-
leged Chinese Funding  Scheme, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1999, at Ai.
85 See "1l"ubek & Galanter, supra note  27, at io63-64.
86  Fareed Zakaria, Beyond Money, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov.  28,  r999,  at  14.  If by  "killer theorem,"
Mr. Zakaria means  something akin  to the idea of "illiberal democracy" that  he has promoted,  the
absence of such in Development as Freedom may simply be  further evidence of Professor Sen's fine
judgment.  To take issue with the notion that there is such a thing as "illiberal democracy" is not to
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about it, could there be  such a clear-cut  answer regarding the fostering
of democracy, given the  broad spectrum  of actual  and potential  recipi-
ents and donors;  the  vast, dynamic,  and inherently disorderly array of
issues  encompassed  worldwide  under  the  fluid  heading of democracy
assistance;  and  the  normative  character  of so  much  of the  endeavor.
Self-estrangement  is,  alas, no  more  tenable  a position.  The  desire,  on
the  one hand, of individuals  living  in difficult  circumstances  to  trans-
form their  lives materially and politically and, on the other, of persons
with the  opportunity and  resources  to try to  transform other  societies,
surely  has  not  and  will  not  abate  merely  because  a  group  of  well-
intentioned  American  law  professors  have  withdrawn  in disgust  from
what they have  come to believe  are potentially  unsavory dimensions of
the effort.
87
The  foregoing  criticisms  may sound  as  if they  constitute  a  round-
about  endorsement  of a  substantial  role  for  academics  either  in  pro-
viding the  conceptual underpinnings  of democracy  assistance  or in fa-
cilitating its execution, as if that were some type  of panacea.  But, to a
considerably  greater  degree  than  Carothers  suggests,  that role  has  al-
ready been (and is still being) tried, with results that, in their own way,
are  not necessarily  more  attractive  than those  that (at least  some) bu-
reaucrats,  politicians, and policy  analysts have  been able to achieve  on
their own.88  More  than a few  exponents  of the  type  of totalizing  the-
ory now dominant in American  legal  academe,  whether from the  right
or the  left,  fail  to  appreciate  just how  much  of what  they present  as
universal,  upon closer  scrutiny, mirrors our own  quite distinctive  legal
and political institutions.  Consequently, they approach  legal reform  in
other societies as if the past were  little more than an encumbrance that
the  clear-minded  should  be  only too  ready  to discard  for  a future  re-
markably  akin to ours. 9  At times, even such basic differences  as those
between  common  and  civil  law  systems  are  slighted,  with  the  result
that the lawmaking  role of judges  in the former  system (who typically
argue that governance  in Asia need  inevitably converge  on an American  or European  model,  but
rather to underscore the conceptual and political danger of defining terms such as democracy in so
attenuated a manner as virtually to strip them of any reference  value.
87  In fairness, the  fTIubek and Galanter piece may have been as much a dramatic plea for atten-
tion to  an overlooked dilemma  as a sounding  of total retreat.  The  fate of subsequent law and  de-
velopment studies  is discussed  insightfully  in Carol  V  Rose,  The  "New"  Law and Development
Movement in the Post-Cold War Era:  A Vietnam Case Study, 32  L. & SOC'Y REV.  93 (1998).
88  See, e.g., deLisle, supra note i5, at 267.
89  See,  e.g.,  id. at  179  (discussing  the  phenomenon  of  the  myopic  American  legal  aca-
demic/consultant).  For an example  of sensitivity to the challenges that legal transplantation  poses,
see  Edward  L.  Rubin,  Administrative Law  and  the  Complexity of  Culture,  in  LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING  FOR MARKET REFORM:  SOME  LESSONS  FROM CHINA, supra note 45,  at 88.  Practical
difficulties of legal transplantation  are addressed in Linn  A. Hammergren, Code Reform and Law
Revision  (1998)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at <http://www.worldlearning.org/pidtdfpl
article5.html> (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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are drawn  from the  ranks  of accomplished  attorneys) is recommended
for  their foreign  counterparts  who,  in some  instances,  are  recent  uni-
versity graduates  with  limited  legal  experience  working  in  an  institu-
tional context  bearing  many of the  indicia  of a  civil service.90  But if
too  great a  distance  from other  societies  is  problematic,  immersion  in
the minutiae  of another society of the type that some  area studies spe-
cialists have  used to position themselves  as brokers is clearly no substi-
tute for a more richly theoretical, broadly comparative,  and historically
grounded  understanding  of  democracy  and  the  processes  of  political
change.91  Moreover, no  matter how  sound the  advice  academics  pro-
vide, it is not  necessarily  cost-free.  In  measuring  the  gains  registered
by scholars'  participation  in democracy  promotion (particularly if gov-
ernment-sponsored),  we  need  to  take  account  of  the  ways  in  which
such involvement  may color  their perspective  (by, for example,  giving
them a vested  interest  in a particular  position) or lead  others, even  er-
roneously,  to  question  the  motivations  behind  their scholarly  work.9 2
Indeed,  it may be that the most valuable  contribution  that academics,
both  in  the  United  States  and  in  recipient  nations,  have  to  make  is
their  somewhat singular  capacity  to see (and critique) democracy  pro-
motion  in  a  fuller  and  perhaps  more  detached  sense  than  those  who
are  more directly engaged  in it.
My  point here  has to do  with  the  ways  in  which  those  of us  con-
cerned  with  democracy  promotion  approach  the  endeavor.  If we  re-
main mindful both of the diverse challenges, intellectual and  practical,
that  democracy  promotion presents  and of at least  the stated  goals  of
the  enterprise  (emphasizing  such values  as  participation  and account-
ability),  the  challenge  for  scholar  and  active  promoter  alike  is  a
daunting  one  for which,  by  definition,  there  are  no  easy  answers.  In
this  context,  it  would,  of  course,  seem  vital  to  increase  our  under-
90  An analogous point might be made with  respect to  the legal  profession  (or, for that matter,
legal education  itself).  American-style lawyering has been a prominent element of U.S.  legal assist-
ance  projects, often  put forward with relatively  little attention to just  how rooted it may  be  in a
particular set of institutions, values, and practices and how its more adversarial mode of advocacy
and broad  definition of a lawyer's function may  fare  in a different  setting.  Without minimizing
American lawyers'  and legal academics'  self-interest in replicating  that with which  they are  famil-
iar, this phenomenon  also reflects the tendency of some of the most influential  American theoretical
writing about the sociology  of legal profession  to assume the backdrop of U.S.  context, even when
purporting to make  statements knowing no geographic  boundaries.  For a further  discussion,  see
Alford, Of Lawyers Lost and Found, supra note 54, at 5-15.
91  Area studies done well, presumably, facilitate just this type of understanding by enabling one
to move  beyond glib  generalities  to  an informed  sense of how such processes  have worked  in the
societies  under  study.  An additional,  perhaps  less  obvious  advantage  of an area  studies  back-
ground is the lesson of humility that the study of language may impart.  The memory of studying a
foreign language  under the tutelage  of a native speaker ought to be  a constant reminder  for those
who would transmit their institutions abroad that learning runs in both directions.
92  See generally UNIVERSITIES  AND  EMPIRE: MONEY AND  POLITICS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
DURING  THE COLD WAR (Christopher Simpson ed.,  1998).
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standing  of the  history  of those  we  aspire  to  assist  so  that  we  might
more fully discern their needs  and circumstances.  That, in turn, might
better equip us to avoid supporting parties  whose  desire for our finan-
cial and other assistance runs deeper  than their commitment to democ-
racy, minimize  unreasonable  expectations  both home  and abroad,  and
reduce the  likelihood that our involvement will lead  to the  type  of un-
desired  outcomes  that Sun  Yat-sen  (1866-1924),  the  father  of Nation-
alist China, bemoaned when he wrote:  "China, too, must have  a repre-
sentative  government!  But  the  fine  points  of Western  representative
government China  has not learned;  the  bad points she  has copied  ten-
fold,  a  hundredfold!  China  has  not  only  failed  to  learn  well  from
Western  democratic  government but has been corrupted by it. '
1
93
But  in  addition  to  examining  potential  recipients  more  fully,  the
thoughtful  study  and  practice  of democracy  promotion  requires  that
we  look  inward,  reflecting  far  more  than  has  been  the  case  both  on
prior efforts  at democracy  promotion (if not proselytizing  more  gener-
ally) and  on the nature of the democratic  experience  in our nation and
throughout  the world.  In reflecting  on our own  experience,  for exam-
ple,  consideration  of the  work of our  intellectual  and  practical  prede-
cessors  in  democracy  promotion  over  the  past  century  would  reveal
that a surprisingly large proportion of what is now being proposed has,
at least in its broad outlines,  already been tried - as evidenced  by the
experience  of legal  scholars  as  diverse  as  Pound  and  TIrubek,  among
many  others.94  Understanding  why  such  noteworthy  figures,  amply
funded, buttressed  by the reputations of leading American law  schools,
and with  ready access  to  important  governmental  circles  here  and  in
recipient nations,  found  success  elusive  and  were  themselves  molded
by those they  thought  they would  be molding  has the  potential  to  be
illuminating.  Indeed,  such  an  understanding  would  be  instructive
both for  us and  for those we  would assist, even  if we take  account  of
how  democracy  assistance programs  and the world  in which  they  op-
erate  have  changed.9 5  Further  reflection  on  our  own  history  might
lead  us, for example,  to present it less as  inevitably culminating  in the
finished product of our own current institutions and laws, and more as
the result of ongoing and often hotly contested  battles, the outcomes  of
which  have  by no means  been assured.  That reflection,  together with
93  SUN  VAT-SEN,  SAN  MIN  CHU  I:  THE THREE  PRINCIPLES  OF THE PEOPLE  I I  I  (Frank W.
Price trans., China Publ'g 1927) (1925).
94  See supra notes  12,  27.
95  For a brief sketch  of the  phases  through  which rule  of law  programs  have  proceeded,  see
HARRY  BLAIR  &  GARY  HANSEN,  WEIGHING  IN ON  THE  SCALES  OF JUSTICE:  STRATEGIC  AP-
PROACHES  FOR  DONOR-SUPPORTED  RULE  OF LAW  PROGRAMS  (U.S. Agency  for Int'l  Dev. Pro-
gram  &  Operations  Assessment  Report  No.  7,  1994),  available at  <http://www.info.usaid.gov/
democracy/techpubs/weighingin.pdf>  (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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more  concerted  consideration  of how  other  countries  have  dealt  with
such  issues,  might  not  only  provide  would-be  aid  recipients  with  a
broader  range  of potential  alternatives,  but might  also,  by  dispensing
with the notion  of a certain convergence  along American lines, be em-
powering  in the sense  of sending  the message that they might  develop
yet additional possibilities from which we,  too, might in time learn.96
The  foregoing  suggests  the  value  of  a  deep  humility  of  the  type
both that Carothers  expressly calls  for  and that nicely  informs Aiding
Democracy Abroad.  In the  end, this  may be  as  close  to a  watchword
for success  as  we can  reasonably  expect to identify  for so majestic  but
difficult a venture  as democracy promotion.
96  Professor Ackerman's recent essay in this Law Review, arguing that our thinking about con-
stitutional  arrangements  should  not be  bound  by the American  trinitarian  separation  of powers,
illustrates  well  the virtues  of engaging  systems  other  than  one's  own.  Interestingly,  one  of the
"modest  proposals"  he  advances  - that of an "integrity  branch"  that might  be  something  of a
watchdog over other branches of government, Ackerman, supra note  2o, at 694-96 - has a nearly
century-old antecedent in the Republic  of China.  In his Three People's Principles  (San Min Chu I),
Sun Yat-sen proposed  more than 75 years ago that China should adopt a five yuan (branch) system
of government comprised of three  borrowed from the West (the executive, legislative, and judicial)
and two from China's  past (an examination  branch and  a control or integrity  branch).  See  SUN
YAT-SEN,  supra  note 93, at 145-49.  The proposed control yuan drew on the imperial Chinese  insti-
tution known as the  Censorate (tu ch'a yuan), a collection  of well-trained,  relatively independent
officials outside of normal  bureaucratic  lines whose responsibility  was to point out abuses and cor-
ruption within officialdom,  even to the extent (at least in theory) of remonstrating  with the emperor
himself.  Questions remain even to this day in Taiwan as to the effectiveness of the control  yuan, its
interaction with the political and judicial  branches, and its larger implications for democratic  gov-
ernment.  See Control Yuan  Needs More Teeth - Departing  President Wang, CHINA  NEWS  (Tai-
pei), Feb. 2, i999, available in LEXIS, News Library, CHNWS  File.
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PLACE  IN CHILD WELFARE  POLICY
NOBODY'S  CHILDREN:  ABUSE  AND  NEGLECT,  FOSTER DRIFT, AND
THE  ADOPTION  ALTERNATIVE.  By  Elizabeth  Bartholet.  Boston:
Beacon  Press.  i999.  Pp. viii,  304.  $28.50.
Reviewed by Martin Guggenheim*
(Professor  Elizabeth Bartholet will respond to this Review in the June issue.)
Virtually  everyone  familiar  with  current  child  welfare  practice  in
the  United States agrees  that it is  in crisis.  In particular, most observ-
ers  of child welfare  complain  that too  many children  remain  in  foster
care  for  too long.'  Those hoping  to reform  the  system  approach  this
task  from  many  different  directions.  Some  propose  vastly  increasing
the state's  role  in assisting  families.2  Others recommend  sharply lim-
iting the state's role to save scarce  resources for those most in need.3
In  Nobody's Children, Professor  Elizabeth  Bartholet  articulates  a
different premise from which to examine why the child welfare system
is  in crisis.  She  asserts  that  current  practice  fails  to  protect children
from parental  abuse  and neglect.  As this  Review  elaborates,  she  rec-
ommends  an aggressive  policy  of removing  children  from their biologi-
cal  families  and  placing them  for  adoption.  The principal  question  I
address  is whether  Bartholet's definition  of the  problem  and her pro-
posals  for  change  are  appropriate  for  the  children  whose  lives  are  at
stake.  Although  I agree  with  Bartholet's  contention  that  aggressive
measures  are needed  to serve  children  at risk  of entering foster care, I
believe  her  proposals  would  gravely  harm  these  children  and  their
*  Professor of Clinical  Law, New  York  University School  of Law.  I am  grateful  for the  en-
couragement, comments, and suggestions of Linda Mills, Randy Hertz,  Gerald L6pez, and Michael
Wald.  I would also like to thank Jessica Marcus for research assistance. I  As of 1998,  between 500,000  and 600,0o0  children were in foster  care, the highest number in
American history.  See Kathleen  A.  Bailie, The Other "Neglected" Parties  in Child Protective Pro-
ceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them,  66  FORDHAM L.
REV.  2285,  2291  (1998);  Mary O'Flynn,  The Adoption and Safe  Families Act  of r997: Changing
Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing  Parental  Substance Abuse, x6 J. CONTEMP.  HEALTH L.
& POL'V  243,  244  &  n.6  (1999)  (citing  U.S.  GEN.  ACCOUNTING  OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-i8 2,
FOSTER  CARE:  AGENCIES  FACE  CHALLENGES  SECURING  STABLE  HOMES  FOR  CHILDREN  OF
SUBSTANCE  ABUSERS  1 (i998)).
2  See, e.g.,  Sheila B.  Kamerman  & Alfred J. Kahan, Social Services for Children, Youth and
Families in the United States, 12  CHILDREN  &  YOUTH  SERVICES REV.  I,  145-67 (1990).
3 See, e.g.,  Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The  Need to Narrow
the Grounds  for State Intervention, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 554-56 (r985).
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for children  so that their own  families may successfully raise them.
Part  I  of  this  Review  sets  forth  the  core  proposals  in  Nobody's
Children.  Part  II  examines  the  underlying  premises  of  Bartholet's
proposals: that the goal of family  preservation is fundamentally flawed
because  keeping children with their families  or returning them to their
families  after  they have  been  in foster care  is futile; that society  is un-
willing  to  commit  sufficient  resources  to  help  families  of children  in
foster care; and that families of children in foster care are so inherently
inadequate  that  it is  unwise  to  strive  to  fix  them.  Part  III examines
the  validity  of  Bartholet's  assumptions  and  concludes  that  although
Bartholet  is  undoubtedly  correct  in  her  bleak  assessment  of our  soci-
ety's unwillingness  to invest in families of children in foster care, she is
unjustifiably  dismissive  of  the  potential  for  preserving  and  restoring
such  families  in  the  event  that  the  appropriate  resources  were  to  be
made  available.  This  Part  also challenges  Bartholet's  formulation  of
the  problem with child welfare.  Part IV sets forth an  alternative defi-
nition  of the  problem  by arguing  that the  key  issue  is  not  the  abuse
and neglect of children, but rather the underlying  social conditions en-
demic  in these  children's  lives.  In  this Part, I also provide  some  pro-
posals  that  seek  to  address  the  complex  needs  of  the  children  and
families who are the victims of a child welfare  policy gone awry.
I.  THE PROPOSALS  IN NOBODY'S CHILDREN
Nobody's Children is  an  unprecedented  and  extremely  radical  cri-
tique  of child  welfare  practice.  The  book  takes  issue  with  the  first
principle  of child  welfare  - that children  should,  whenever  possible,
remain  with  their  biological  families.  According  to  Professor  Bar-
tholet, caseworkers and judges subject children to extreme  hardship by
choosing too frequently to leave  them with their  families rather  than to
place  them  in foster  care.4  She  criticizes  current  child welfare  policy
for  focusing  on physical  abuse  or life-threatening  neglect  of children,5
while  disregarding  other  significant  harms  that children  suffer  by re-
maining with their families.6  Current child welfare  practice, Bartholet
4 According  to  Bartholet, "we  try to avoid  removing  children  from  their  families  at all  costs
and to return children who are removed  as quickly as possible" (p.  24).  Near the conclusion of No-
body's Children, she expresses broad agreement with critics of family preservation,  who argue  that
"the state  [is] too reluctant to respond to serious child maltreatment  with coercive  measures, to re-
move children from harm's way, and to terminate parental  rights so that children can  be moved on
to safe,  nurturing families" (p. 235).
5  Bartholet asserts  that "[o]nly in  the most  serious of the serious  maltreatment cases  is there
any reasonable  likelihood that children will be removed to foster care" (p.  103).
6  According  to Bartholet,  child  protection  investigators  "will  often  simply  not  substantiate
cases unless  the  maltreatment  is particularly egregious  or immediately  threatening  to  the child's
safety" (p. 62).
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contends,  "holds  that so  long  as  the  parent  is  guilty of nothing  more
than poverty, or homelessness,  or other victimization  by societal  injus-
tice, they will  not be found in  violation  of the abuse  and neglect  laws"
(p.  234).  This reasoning leads Bartholet to conclude  that most children
need  to be  in the  foster  care  system  to avoid  serious maltreatment  (p.
81).  Believing  that  children  deserve  to  be  raised  in  conditions  that
many  families  currently  cannot  provide,  Bartholet  recommends  that
public officials  "remove  children even  if physical  safety is not at issue"
(p.  204).
In addition  to challenging  the principle that children should remain
with their  biological  parents, Bartholet questions  the  current  system's
presumption  that children  who are removed from  their homes  should
be  reunited  with  their  biological  families  whenever  possible.7  She
criticizes child welfare officials  for allowing children  to languish in fos-
ter care  for  long periods  of time  because  of a  reluctance  to  terminate
parental  rights.8  This  unsatisfactory  situation,  Bartholet  asserts,  de-
rives from the current system's flawed "blood  bias" (p.  7),  which  mani-
fests itself in an unwillingness  to remove children  from palpably  unfit
homes and to sever familial ties so that children  may be adopted.9
As  the  country's  leading champion  of transracial  adoption,10  Bar-
tholet  proposes  a  "simple"  solution  to  these  child  welfare  problems.
Recognizing  that the children  in foster care (and those  who  would be  if
child welfare officials were  appropriately vigilant) are overwhelmingly
non-white,"  Bartholet  advocates  abolishing  all  barriers  to  the  adop-
7  "Many children  are  being  kept  in their  families  and  in  foster  care, and  shuffled  back  and
forth  between the  two, for whom  adoption  should be  considered,  but is not.  The  claim  has  been
that adoption  wouldn't  be  good for  them  - that children  are almost  always  best off with their
parents" (p. 177).
8  According  to  Bartholet, the reason  so many  children  in foster  care  are  not adopted  "is  be-
cause we  have a system  that holds  children too  long in  their  homes of origin  and  in out-of-home
care until they have suffered the kind of damage  that makes it hard for them to adjust and to bond
in a new family" (p.  241).
9 See infra pp. 1721,  1742.
10  See,  e.g.,  ELIZABETH  BARTHOLET,  FAMILY  BONDS:  ADOPTION  AND  THE  POLITICS  OF
PARENTING  86-117  (993);  Elizabeth  Bartholet, Private Race Preferences in  Family Formation,
107  YALE L.J. 2351  (1998); Elizabeth Bartholet,  Where Do Black Children Belong?  The Politics of
Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV.  1163 (i99i).
11 In New York City, for example, the disparity  between the probability  of a child  of color en-
tering foster care and  the probability of a white  child entering  foster  care  is  staggering.  One  in
every  29 children of color is in foster care, whereas only one in every 384 white children is in foster
care.  Of the 42,000 children in foster care in December  1997,  only 3.1%, or 1300,  were categorized
as "white" (not including children of Hispanic origin) by New  York City officials.  See NEW YORK
CITY ADMIN.  FOR CHILDREN'S  SERVS.,  SELECTED CHILD WELFARE  TRENDS  81  (1998).  Accord-
ing to the  199o  census, of the  1,686,718 children in  New York  City, 29%,  or 490,346, were  "white"
(not including children of Hispanic  origin).  Thus, of the white children in New  York City, the per-
centage of children in  foster  care is  0.26%.  In contrast, there  were  1,196,372  children  of color  in
New York City according  to the 199o census.  Of this number, 40,700 were  in foster  care  in  1997.
Thus, the percentage  of children of color in foster  care  was 3.4%.  Children  of color  are  13  times
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tice, Bartholet  argues,  there is  a surplus  of both children  of color who
need adoptive  homes  and infertile white  couples  who are desperate  to
adopt.1 3  Her  solution  is  to join  these  two  groups.  This  radical  pro-
posal  would  facilitate  the  immediate  adoption  of  as  many as  200,000
children.
14
It  is  important  to clarify  the  meaning  of adoption  in  this  context.
None  of the  children  encompassed  by  Bartholet's  proposals  is  an  or-
phan.  They  all  have  living parents,  but their  parents  have  often  ne-
glected or abused them, often in very serious  ways.  Despite the book's
title, all of the children that Bartholet's  book addresses  are somebody's
children. 5  In addition, the parents of these  children would not  volun-
tarily  give  them  up  for  adoption.  Although  a  significant  number  of
children  are adopted each  year in the United States  when parents  vol-
untarily  surrender  their  rights,  Nobody's  Children does  not  address
these privately  arranged  adoptions occurring  outside of the  child wel-
fare  context.  Instead, the  children  in Nobody's Children have  parents
who do not want to lose their relationship with their children.
Consequently,  adopting  these  children  entails  many  necessary  ele-
ments.  First, the state  must remove  these children  from their biologi-
cal  families by coercive  means, typically through  civil lawsuits alleging
parental unfitness.  Then, judges  must enter orders  to place these  chil-
dren  with  non-parents  over  the  objection  of their  parents.  Finally,
proceedings to terminate  parental  rights must be  successfully  litigated.
Termination  eliminates parental input in adoption procedures  and  also
permanently banishes  the parents  from the  child's life.  Bartholet  rec-
ognizes  the  radical  nature  of  these  proposals.  In  her  own  words:
"Taking adoption seriously  would involve a revolution in thinking  and
more likely  to be placed in foster  care  in New York City than  white children.  See  U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,  199o  CENSUS  OF  POPULATION  AND  HOUSING:  PUBLIC  LAW  94-171  DATA  - AGE  BY
RACE AND HISPANIC  ORIGIN  (i993), available at http://tier2.census.gov/  (on file  with the Harvard
Law School Library).
12  See infra note  i9.
13  "The potential pool of adoptive parents is enormous - it dwarfs the pool of waiting children.
About 1.2  million women are infertile and  7.1 percent of married couples, or 2.1  million" (p.  181).
14  Bartholet cites official estimates that as of  1998, about ilo,ooo of the nearly 5oo,ooo children
in foster care had been  freed for adoption  (pp. 82,  176).  To  this number, Bartholet would  not only
add the "[m]any children [who] are being kept in their families and in foster care, and shuffled back
and forth  between  the two,  for whom  adoption should  be considered,  but is not" (p. 177),  but she
would  also add  a significant  number of children  who should  be,  but currently  are  not,  in  foster
care.  By way of contrast, the number of children  in foster care adopted in  i995 was 20,000.  See
Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's  Rights?: The Critique  of Federal  Family Preser-
vation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.  112,  112  n.2 (1999).
Is  Bartholet acknowledges  that "[m]ost  of [the  children she  is writing about]  have parents in  a
technical sense, since their original parents'  rights have not been terminated" (p. 81).
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practice.  It's a revolution  that  is  needed  if  we  care  about  children's
well-being, rather than simply about their survival" (p. 203).
To  those  familiar  with  the  demographics  of the  child  welfare  sys-
tem,  the  racial  and  class  implications  of Bartholet's  proposals  are  im-
mediately  apparent.  Bartholet  herself  acknowledges  these  implica-
tions.16  The children  who are currently  removed from their  biological
families - and those who  would  likely  be removed  under Bartholet's
expansive  vision  - are  disproportionately  poor  and  non-white.'7
Most of the individuals who seek to adopt children are upper-class  and
white.'8  Not only does  Bartholet accept  the result of placing indigent
children  of color with white, wealthy  families,  but she would  also take
affirmative  steps to facilitate  this outcome  by eliminating  all  systemic
preferences for placing children  with parents of their own  race.' 9
Bartholet  recognizes  that  her  "positions  [will]  trigger  claims  that
[she is] promoting  racial genocide" (p.  5).20  It is  important to  appreci-
ate, however, as she  herself points  out, that Bartholet has devoted  her
career  to civil  rights  work  (p.  5).  Of  course,  the  author's  impressive
progressive  credentials  do not alter the racial  and class  implications  of
the proposals  she advances  in Nobody's Children.
16  Bartholet  recognizes  the  centrality  of race  to  a discussion  of child  welfare  in  the  United
States, and she insists on discussing the issue directly, even when it is difficult to do so:
Race  and class  issues  dominate  policy  in  this  area,  although  the  issues  are  rarely  ad-
dressed honestly in a way that illuminates for onlookers their power.  Change  is impossi-
ble unless we can  face up to the issues.  Debate  has been silenced  ...  by fear of opening
up wounds and triggering  rage, fear of proposing or taking action which would victimize
already victimized  groups, and fear of being accused of racism and classism. (p. 5)
17  "The families in trouble, in  which children  are threatened  with abuse and  neglect, and  from
which children are  removed to foster  care, are disproportionately  poor, and they  come dispropor-
tionately  from racial  minority  groups"  (p. 4).  Bartholet  estimates that  of the  i  io,ooo children  in
foster care  for  whom  adoption  is planned,  "[f]ifty-nine  percent ...  are African-American,  29  per-
cent are white,  io percent are Hispanic, and 2 percent are of other races or ethnicities" (p.  177).
18  Although  Bartholet recognizes  that  "[tihere  are  good  reasons  to  worry  about  transferring
children in large numbers from relatively victimized groups to more privileged groups" (p.  236),  she
advocates that we "reach out to the entire  community for adoptive  homes" (p.  242).  In this larger
community,  which  includes  financially successful  individuals  interested  in  becoming  parents  or
expanding their families, "[m]ore than two  million married couples are infertile, and most  of them
desperately want to be parents.  Millions more are fertile, and most of them want to be parents too"
(p. 242).
19  "It is obvious  that many  whites  would  adopt from  the  foster care  system  if only  we would
eliminate the racial  barriers ....  If we were  to affirmatively socialize  whites to  believe  that they
should consider  adopting  children of color  we could  expect  to increase  the  numbers of potential
adopters exponentially" (p. 182).
20  In Bartholet's words:
Coercive intervention will predictably  have more  impact on poor and minority race  par-
ents  than on  more privileged  parents.  There are good reasons  to limit state  intervention
in the family generally, and to worry in particular about intervening disproportionately  in
the families of the least powerful  groups in the society.  There are good reasons  to worry
about  transferring  children in  large numbers  from  relatively  victimized  groups  to  more
privileged groups. (p.  236)
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II.  THE ANALYSIS IN NOBODY'S CHILDREN AND  ITS
UNDERLYING  PREMISES
Given the  drastic implications of permitting the  adoption of several
hundred  thousand  children over  their parents'  objections,  it is impor-
tant  to  recognize  that Professor  Bartholet  makes  contradictory  asser-
tions  about current  child welfare  practices.  The principal  underlying
premise of Nobody's Children is that the current child welfare  policy of
family  preservation  is  flawed  because,  in  spite  of  our  best  efforts  to
keep  children  with their families  or  to return them  promptly from fos-
ter  care,  family  preservation  has  proved  to be  futile.  This  empirical
claim  assumes either that current  family preservation  efforts have only
a limited  capacity  to  aid  families,21  or that  families  are  so  hopelessly
dysfunctional  that no amount of governmental  assistance is sufficient.
All of the above  supposes  that after child welfare officials  establish
an allegation  of child abuse,  those officials  put forth their best  efforts
to  prevent the  unnecessary placement  of children in foster care  and to
reunify  children  with  their  biological  families.  Bartholet  asserts  that
we must abandon  futile family preservation  efforts  and  attempt some-
thing radically different.  In her view, we waste  time, money, and most
significantly, the  lives  and well-being  of children  by  continuing  to  ad-
vance an agenda that has proved to be a failure.
Our tenacious commitment to "blood bias," Bartholet argues, drives
us  to  persist  in  the  futile  policy  of  family  preservation.22  There  are
two  principal  manifestations  of this  bias  in  the  context  of child  wel-
fare.  First, an  extraordinary  number of children  who should  be  sepa-
rated  from  their  abusive  or  neglectful  families  are  not  removed.  Ac-
cording  to  Bartholet,  about  three  million  children  are  subjected  to
"serious  maltreatment"  each  year  in  the  United  States  (pp.  25,  61).
Second,  even  when  children  are  removed  from  their  families,  the
"blood bias"  still influences  child  welfare  agencies  to  provide  services
to  patently  unfit  and  unsalvageable  families  even  though  it  is  clear
that  these  families  do  not  deserve  the  privilege  of  having  children:
"[W]e  try  to  avoid  removing  children  from  their  families  at  all  costs
and  to  return  children  who  are  removed  as  quickly  as  possible"  (p.
24).23
21  "Family  preservation"  refers  to systematic  efforts  to assist families  who  have  lost or are  at
risk of losing children to foster care  so that children can quickly reunite or remain with their  fami-
lies.
22  See infra p.  1742.
23  In particular, according  to Bartholet, at least through 1997,  child welfare operated  under the
understanding that federal  law  "requir[ed]  efforts  to  preserve  families  at all  costs,  regardless  of
whether the efforts were 'reasonable"'  (pp. 25-26).  Regrettably, Bartholet often caricatures  efforts
to preserve  families by describing  these efforts as occurring "at all costs"  - implying that they are
used even when no reasonable person would employ them.
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Bartholet,  however,  contradicts  her  assumption  that child  welfare
officials  make  their  best  efforts  by  articulating  two  additional  prem-
ises.  First, Bartholet reasons that, even if society has not given its best
efforts  to assist marginal  families, we cannot reasonably  expect signifi-
cant  change  in  the  foreseeable  future.2 4   Bartholet  thus  occasionally
acknowledges  the inadequacy  of society's  efforts  to change  the terrible
conditions in which poor children  are raised:2"
While our society espouses family preservation  as  the  goal, we  have  failed
to provide the resources to really make it work.  We don't support  families
up  front  in  ways  designed  to  ensure  their  success,  waiting  instead  until
families  are  in  such  trouble  that preservation  efforts  are  often  doomed.
We  are  more  generous  by  far in  our talk  about family preservation  serv-
ices  than we are  in the funding (p. 41).
The  problem  is that the  state  typically  does  not  provide  adequate  and
timely reunification  services.  Child welfare  agencies  are  notoriously  un-
derfunded  and overburdened.  Appropriate  services  are  often unavailable
....  (p.  195)
These statements  contradict  Bartholet's  earlier  assumptions  that  soci-
ety  has  tried  everything  possible  to  improve  the  conditions  of  poor
children who become victims of a dysfunctional  foster  care system.2 6
Indeed, Bartholet  lacks confidence  that the  situation  will  improve:
"Sadly we can predict that profound social  and economic reform  is not
on  the horizon,  and  we can  also predict  that our society will  continue
to scrimp  on the  support  services that it makes  available  to poor peo-
ple  ..  ."  (p.  238).
This, then, is a very different  claim of futility.  It is fundamentally
a skeptical  (although  not necessarily  false)  claim; but it  is not  an  em-
pirical one.  At its core, it is predictive.  It suggests that foster children
should not be held hostage  to the  fantasy that society will  marshal  the
will or the resources  to assist their families  in meaningful ways.
Bartholet's  third premise  is  that  the  families  of children  who  end
up  in  foster  care  are  so  inadequate  that  it  is  unwise  to  strive  to  fix
them.  Like  her second  premise,  this position  rests on  the  implicit  as-
sumption that  child welfare  has  not  done everything  possible  to  keep
24  In Bartholet's words, "whether or not increased support services are forthcoming..,  we  need
to act" (p. 239).
25  "[W]e continue  with the policy of doing 'too  little too late,'  providing only  very limited  sup-
port to families up  front, and  waiting to  provide more until  after children  have  been  abused and
neglected,  when  the still  relatively limited  services made  available  will  be inadequate  to  what is
now a far more overwhelming task" (p. 37).  Bartholet makes similar observations  at pages 99-1oo
and 238.
26  Bartholet identifies  "[t]he  most effective  prevention  program"  as "eliminating  the social and
economic  conditions  of poverty, unemployment,  homelessness,  and deprivation  that produce  dys-
functional families" (pp. 99-1oo).
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children  in foster  care  need  such  care to protect  them  from dangerous
parents.27  In  addition  to  her  negative  assessment  of  the  parents  of
children in foster  care, Bartholet also criticizes  the reliance  of the child
welfare  system  on  "kinship  foster  care,"  whereby  foster  children  are
placed with their parents'  relatives:
We should be  willing to face  up to the fact that child maltreatment is only
rarely  aberrational.  It ordinarily  grows  out of a  family  and community
context.  Keeping  the child in that same  context will  often  serve the child
no better than keeping  him or her with the maltreating parent (p. 93).
Like  the  second  premise,  this  claim  about  the  families  of foster  chil-
dren  is  both pessimistic  and  predictive:  try  as  we might  to help  those
families, we will fail.
It  matters  a  great  deal  upon  which  of  these  premises  Nobody's
Children is actually  based.  Of the three, Bartholet spends the  greatest
portion  of her  book discussing the  first, namely that the  current crisis
in  child  welfare  is  the product  of an  overzealous  commitment  to pre-
venting the placement  of children  in foster  care and to reunifying  chil-
dren  with  their  biological  families  after  an  allegation  of child  abuse
has been established.  To the degree that Bartholet's adoption proposal
is based on the premise that despite our best efforts, the families of fos-
ter children have  proved themselves  unfit to raise children,  it is crucial
to  evaluate this  premise.  Because  of the  centrality  of this premise  to
Bartholet's argument,  I examine it thoroughly  in Part III.  In Part IV,
I  discuss  Bartholet's  proposed  solutions  to  the  current  child  welfare
crisis and present an alternative  that may more effectively  advance the
goal of bettering the lives of children who enter the foster care system.
III.  BARTHOLET'S CLAIMS REGARDING  THE ENFORCEMENT  OF
CHILD PROTECTION MANDATES
If child welfare  policy  has failed  to  keep children  safely  with their
families, despite valiant efforts  to improve the conditions  in which  the
children were being raised at home, then Bartholet's  claim for preemp-
tive adoption would have  strong support.  Though there  still would be
voices  of concern about  the  propriety  of advancing  a  program  of "ra-
cial  genocide,"  (p.  5) many  would  agree  with  Bartholet  that  children
should not be held hostage  to a fantasy that their  families can be  pro-
vided with adequate  resources to rear them.  To better understand  and
evaluate  Bartholet's  assumption,  it  is  useful  to examine  the  empirical
data concerning child abuse and neglect.
27  "It is not at all clear that increased  reunification rates benefit children overall.  These are the
parents who originally subjected the children to abuse  and neglect" (pp. 82-83) (emphasis omitted).
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A.  Low Rates of Maltreatment of Children in Foster  Care
Contrary  to  Bartholet's  assertion,  studies  have  consistently  found
that the great majority of children  in foster  care could remain safely at
home.28  Professor Duncan Lindsey, a leading child welfare  researcher,
concluded  that "studies clearly  demonstrate  that child abuse  is not the
major  reason  children  are  removed  from  their parents";  he found  in-
stead  that "inadequacy  of income,  more  than any other  factor, consti-
tutes  the reason  that children  are  removed. '29  In fact,  when  Lindsey
evaluated  placements  of children  in foster  care,  he found  that 48%  of
the children did not require placement.30
A study of Boston  placement decisions  led one  team of researchers
to conclude  that:
[A]mong a group of children referred  for suspected abuse in  the emergency
and surgical  units of a hospital,  the best predictor of removal of the  child
from  the  family was not severity  of abuse,  but Medicaid  eligibility, which
we  might interpret  as  a  proxy variable  for  the  income  status of the  fam-
ily.31
Likewise, Lindsey found that "inadequacy  of income increased  the
odds for placement by more than  120 times.132
The  evidence  also clearly  suggests that many children  regularly re-
main  in  foster  care  merely  because  their  parents are  unable  to  secure
adequate  housing without assistance  from the  state.  This seems  to  be
a  regular  practice  in  Chicago33  and  New  York  City.34   The  court-
appointed  administrator  of the District  of Columbia's  foster  care  sys-
tem also found  that between one-third  and  one-half of the  children  in
foster  care could  have  been  returned  immediately  to their parents  but
for a lack of adequate housing.31
In  her  recent  book, Jane  Waldfogel  asserts  that  the  current  foster
care population  may be grouped  into three categories.  First, the most
serious category, constituting about io% of current  caseloads, includes "serious and criminal  cases." 3 6  The  second group  encompasses  serious
28  See infra p.  1730.
29  DUNCAN  LINDSEY,  THE WELFARE  OF CHILDREN  155  (1994).
30  See id.  at 141.
31  Mitchell  H. Katz, Robert L. Hampton, Eli H. Newberger, Roy T. Bowles & Jane  C. Snyder,
Returning Children Home: Clinical  Decision Making in Cases of Child Abuse and Neglect, 56  AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY  253,  253  (1986).
32  LINDSEY,  supra note 29, at 153.
33  See Rob  Karwath,  DCFS  Hit on Family Separation,  CHI.  TRIB.,  Jan.  19,  1990,  §  2,  at 2;
Janita Poe & Peter Kendall,  Cases of Neglect May Be  Only Poverty in Disguise, CHI.  TRIB.,  Dec.
24,  1995,  §  i,  at i.
34  See Martin A.  v. Gross, 546 N.Y.S.2d  75,  77  (App. Div. 1989).
35  See Tamar Lewin, Child Welfare Is Slow to Improve Despite Court Order, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30,  1995, at A6.
36  JANE WALDFOGEL,  THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION  124 (1998).
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cases  that  do  not  require  criminal  justice  intervention.37   The  final
group of cases are those in which a child  is at a relatively lower risk of
serious harm,  and the  parents may be  willing to work with  an agency
to secure  needed  services.38  Together, the  latter two  groups  comprise
9o%  of the caseload.  Typically, these cases involve less serious physical
abuse (for example, a single, minor injury such as  a bruise or a scratch)
or less  severe  neglect  (such  as  parental drug or alcohol  abuse  with  no
other  apparent  protective  issues, dirty  clothes  or a  dirty home, lack  of
supervision  of  a  school-age  child,  or  missed  school  or  medical  ap-
pointments).  Many  of  these  lower-risk  neglect  cases  are  poverty-
related,  resulting  from inadequate  housing  or  inappropriate child-care
arrangements  while a parent works.3 9
Other  data on  entry  into foster  care are  also  inconsistent with  the
notion that our child welfare system carefully  monitors  foster children
and insists upon a compelling reason  to remove a child from his or her
family.  Specifically, placement  rates vary widely from one state  to an-
other even  in  the  absence  of any material  difference  between  known
rates  of abuse  or neglect.  For example,  "[a]  child is twice  as  likely to
be placed  in  foster  care  in Vermont  as  in  New Hampshire  [and]  [t]he
placement rate in Minnesota  is double the rate in Wisconsin.' "4  There
is  also  significant  evidence  to  suggest that  placements  can  reflect  the
politics  of particular  administrations  and  have  little  to  do with  child
safety.  States  appear  to use very  flexible  standards  depending  on the
policy  of local  child  welfare  officials,  which can  change  dramatically
from one administration to the next.
For example,  New  York City's foster  care population  soared  in the
aftermath  of a  notorious  and  highly  publicized  case  of child  abuse.41
In  the  four-year  period  from  1995  to  1998,  the  number  of new  child
abuse  and  neglect  petitions  filed  rose  fifty-five  percent,  from  6658  to
10,395.42  Even  more  significantly,  the  number  of  children  removed
from  their  families  and  placed  in  foster  care  over  parental  objection
rose  by  nearly  fifty  percent  between  1995  and  1997. 43   During  this
37  See id.
38  See id. at 125.
39  See  id.
40  Richard Wexler, Spies in the Living Room  (and Other Problems  with the Recommendations
in "Nobody's Children: Abuse  and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption  Alternative")  16  (1999)
(unpublished manuscript,  on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (citing CONNA  CRAIG  &
DEREK HERBERT,  THE STATE OF CHILDREN: AN EXAMINATION  OF GOVERNMENT-RUN  FOSTER
CARE 9 (1997)).
41  The  New York press's prominent  reporting of the death  of Elisa Izquierdo  dramatically af-
fected  placement  rates.  See Nina  Bernstein  & Frank  Bruni,  She Suffered  in Plain Sight but
Alarms Were Ignored, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec. 24,  1995, at Ai.
42  See Aggressive Prosecutions  Flooding the  System,  CHILD  WELFARE  WATCH,  Winter  1q99,
at 4.
43  Removals rose from 8ooo in 1995  to 11,958 in 1997.  See id.
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same  period, however, there  was no known change  in the  base  rate of
child abuse.  This striking  rise in prosecution  suggests a change  in  the
philosophy of the prosecutors  rather than a change in the conditions  of
children's homes.  One  study found, for example, that "[i]ncreasingly  in
New  York  City,  abuse  and  neglect  proceedings  are  brought  against
battered  mothers  whose  children  are  removed -from them  where  the
only  allegation  is  their  children's  exposure  to  domestic  violence."44
This  also  suggests  that  family  and  juvenile  courts  "rubber  stamp"
agency  recommendations  to remove  children  from  their  parents,  even
in circumstances that do not constitute true emergencies. 45
Further circumstantial proof that foster  care has not  been reserved
for  those  cases in  which children  suffer  extreme  forms  of abuse  is the
dramatic  underutilization  of the  services  established  to  prevent  foster
care  placement.  Studies consistently  find that preventive  and reunifi-
cation services - services designed specifically  to keep  children out of
foster care  or to return  them  promptly to their homes  after  placement
- are underused  by child welfare agencies. 46
B.  Child Welfare System Emphasis on Family Preservation
Bartholet  claims  that  the  family  preservation  bias  in  foster  care
runs  so deep  that agencies  waste  time  and money trying  to keep  chil-
dren with unsafe  families.47  In  assessing any  claim  that child welfare
is  overly committed  to family preservation,  it  is helpful  to  place child
welfare in historical  perspective.  In the late  197Os,  for the first time in
American  history, federal  legislators became  deeply concerned  that too
many  children  ended  up  in  foster  care  and  that  many  children  re-
mained  in  foster  care  for  too  long.48  Once  these  legislators  realized
that  the  government's  own  spending  formula  was  partly  responsible
for  the  high  rate  of  out-of-home  placement,49  Congress  passed  the
44  Karen Houppert, Victimizing the Victims, VILLAGE VOICE, June 15,  1999, at 42.
45  See NAT'L COUNCIL  OF JUVENILE AND  FAMILY  COURT JUDGES,  CHILD WELFARE  LEAGUE
OF  AM.,  YOUTH  LAW  CTR.  & NAT'L  CTR.  FOR  YOUTH  LAW,  MAKING  REASONABLE  EFFORTS:
STEPS  FOR  KEEPING  FAMILIES  TOGETHER  8  (1987)  [hereinafter  MAKING  REASONABLE
EFFORTS].
46  See infra pp.  1728-30.
47  Seesuprap.  1721.
48  See Public Assistance Amendments of 2977: Hearings on H.R. 72oo Before the Subcomm. on
Public Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th  Cong. 59 (1977)  (statement  of Joseph A.
Califano Jr.,  Secretary, Dep't of Health, Education  and Welfare);  Proposals  Related to  Social and
Child Welfare Services, Adoption Assistance, and Foster Care: Hearings on H.R. 34.34  Before the
Subcomm. on Public Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Finance,  96th  Cong. 56  (1979) (statement
of Sen. Cranston).  Congress  found that upwards of Soo,ooo  children were in some  form of out-of-
home  care  in  1977.  See  S.  REP.  NO.  96-336,  at  ii  (198o),  reprinted in 198o  U.S.C.C.A.N.  1448,
146o.
49  The government's spending formula allocated  federal  child welfare money to the  states only
for  out-of-home  placement.  See  generally Public Assistance Amendments  of 2977: Hearings on
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Adoption  Assistance  and  Child  Welfare  Act  of  J980,50  which  drasti-
cally changed  the  formula.  In  particular,  the Act  allocated  money for
services  aimed at preventing  the separation  of children  from their par-
ents  and  at  speeding  the  return  of children  to  their  parents.5'  Fur-
thermore,  the  Act required  states  to make  "reasonable  efforts" toward
these same goals.5 2
This transformative  plan required retooling the child welfare appa-
ratus  at  the  local  level.  In  particular,  the  newly  available  federal
money was supplied  directly to at-risk families for the specific  purpose
of improving  the living conditions  of their  children.  The  new  scheme
attempted  to  assess  carefully  which  particular  services  and  improve-
ments  in  the  home  would  obviate  the  need  for  out-of-home  place-
ment. 5 3   Despite  the  legislation,  however,  foster  care  populations
soared  from  273,000  in 1986  to more  than 429,000  in  I99i.5
4  Nation-
ally,  the  median  length  of  stay  in  foster  care  increased  to  over  two
years, and more children than ever experienced  multiple placements.55
H.R. 7200 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong.
59 (1977)  (statement of Joseph A. Califano Jr., Secretary, Dep't of Health, Education and  Welfare);
Proposals Related to  Social and Child Welfare  Services, Adoption Assistance,  and Foster Care:
Hearings on H.R. 3434 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 96th Cong. 8o (1979)  (statement of Sen. Cranston).
so  Pub. L. No. 96-272,  94 Stat. 500 (codified at 42  U.S.C. §  602  (1982)).
51  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Act of  1981,  Pub. L. No. 97-35,  §§ 2301-2321,  95  Stat.
357,843-60.
52  42 U.S.C.  §§ 671(a)(I5), 672(a)(I)(1994).
s3  The Act required that states take specific steps to prevent unnecessary separation  of children
from  their  parents, to  ensure  careful monitoring  of children  who  are  separated,  and  to  provide
services to  the family so that it can  more  quickly meet  the government's  standards  for  returning
children.  First, the  Act set strict conditions  for  removing children  from  their  homes.  Once chil-
dren entered  foster  care,  the Act  required states to  develop a  state-wide  information  system  (in-
cluding the status, demographic characteristics,  location,  and goals  for placement  of every child)
and to maintain a case review  system for each child receiving state-supervised foster care.
Although  the law aimed at reuniting children  with families when possible,  it also expressly
provided  for  adoption  if those  efforts  failed.  If foster  children  could  not be  reunited  with their
families in  18 or 24 months, despite diligent efforts to bolster the  family with appropriate  services,
the  law called  for freeing  foster  children for adoption  while they  were still young enough  for their
custodial  arrangements  to  become  permanent.  In  the  words  of the  drafters,  the Act  sought "to
lessen  the  emphasis on foster  care  placement  and  to encourage  greater  efforts  to  find permanent
homes for children either by  making it possible for them to return to their own families or by plac-
ing them in adoptive  homes."  S.  REP. No.  96-336,  at i  (I98O),  reprinted in  198o  U.S.C.C.A.N.
1448,  1450.
54  See Toshio Tatara, Some Additional Explanations  for the Recent Rise in the U.S. Child Sub-
stitute Care Population:  An Analysis of National Child Substitute Care Flow Data and Future Re-
search Questions, in I  CHILD WELFARE  RESEARCH  REVIEW  126,  130  tbl.6.I  (Richard Barth, Jill
Duerr Berrick & Neil Gilbert eds.,  1994).
55  See Robert M.  Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure  of the Adop-
tion and Safe Families  Act  of 1997, 83  MINN.  L.  REV.  637,  648  & n.64  (1999)  (citing a California
study that shows that  "[forty-six  percent]  of infants  living in  nonkinship  care  will  have  four  or
more homes in six years").
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A  number  of  explanations  exist  for  the  increase  in  foster  care
placements  in  the  late  198os.  One  prominent  explanation,  suggested
by Bartholet,  is the rise  of crack  cocaine  use by young mothers  in the
inner  city  (p. 207).  But Lindsey suggests  a  more compelling  explana-
tion for the failure of the 1980 Act:
[T]he  actual  funds  to  achieve  these  reforms  were  never  provided.  Under
the  Reagan  Administration,  the  ig8os  were  characterized  by  broad  scale
reductions  in  federal  spending  for  social  programs ....  Child  welfare
services  saw  a virtual  end  to support  for major  demonstration  programs,
even  though  these  represented  a  proven  technology  to  facilitate  perma-
nency planning and reduce the number of children in foster care.56
Out-of-home  placement continued  to be  the principal  child welfare
policy  in  the  United  States  through  the  I98os.  Between  1981  and
1983,  federal  foster  care  spending  grew  by  more  than  400%  in  real
terms,  while preventive  and reunification  spending  grew  by only  14%,
and all other funds available for social services to the poor declined.'7
Nobody's Children ignores  the  numerous  studies  that  have  found
state  efforts  to keep  families together  to be inadequate.58  Three  stud-
ies indicate that the  1980 Act was unsuccessful  in reducing  the number
of placements.  A  1987  study of foster care  in New  York conducted  by
the Child  Welfare  League  of America  found that, in  52%  of the cases
studied,  the  most  pressing  need  was  for  day  care  or  babysitting,  but
56  LINDSEY,  supra  note  29,  at  65-66;  see  also  U.S.  GEN.  ACCOUNTING  OFFICE,  CHILD
WELFARE:  STATES'  PROGRESS  IN  IMPLEMENTING  FAMILY  PRESERVATION  AND  SUPPORT
SERVICES  3 (1997)  ("By  the early  199o's, over  half the [child  services]  programs  we surveyed  re-
ported that they were  not able to serve all families who needed services primarily due to the lack of
funds and staff.").
57  See MARK E. COURTNEY,  THE FOSTER CARE CRISIS 8 (Univ. of Wis. Madison Inst. for Re-
search  on Poverty Discussion  Paper  No. 1048-94,  1994).  Bartholet criticizes  reunification efforts,
complaining  that close  to one-third of foster children  reunited with their  families will  be removed
again (p. 83).  The actual rate  of removal from  families after reunification  generally  runs between
20% and  25%.  See  Richard  P.  Barth,  Family Reunification, in  2 CHILD  WELFARE RESEARCH
REVIEW,  supra note 54,  at 219,  221-22,  225; Kathleen Wells & Shenyang  Guo, Reunification and
Reentry of Foster  Children, 21 CHILDREN&  YOUTH  SERVICES REV.  273,  292  (i999). Itis unclear,
however, whether  this  re-entry  rate  proves  that  the  reunification  efforts  are  doomed  to  fail  or
whether they involve  insufficient efforts to help a family meaningfully.  As Dorothy Roberts points
out, given the limited time and effort spent on family reunification, "[i]t is not surprising that  20 to
32%  of children returned  home in connection with family preservation  plans end up back in foster
care....  The ideology of family preservation  is then blamed  when inadequate efforts  result in" a
failed  reunification.  Roberts, supra note  14,  at 123.  Other studies support the conclusion  that the
need to replace  children in  foster  care  after  they  were  returned  home is  highest when  there has
been  a quick reunification  and when few  services  have  been provided.  See Barth, supra, at 221-
22; Wells & Guo, supra,  at 29o.
58  Bartholet  offers  inadequate  support  for  her  claim  that all  children  in foster  care  are  there
because  no less restrictive measure  was available to protect them.  She cites one unpublished  paper
in which  the author  asserts that  most removals involve  "such serious  threats to  children's safety
that one  cannot risk  leaving children in the home,  even if intensive  services  were  to  be provided"
and an early  iggos study in New Jersey finding that "there was almost no unnecessary  placement"
(p.  103).
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the "service"  offered most was foster care.59  In the  same year, the Na-
tional Council of Juvenile  and Family Court Judges concluded  that far
too  many judges  "remain  unaware of their  obligation  to  determine  if
reasonable  efforts  to preserve  families were made" and that those who
are aware  "routinely  'rubber  stamp'  assertions  by  social service  agen-
cies  ....  "6o  In  1989,  a  third study  concluded  that  courts  make  no
"reasonable  efforts" determination  in 44%  of cases.61
Thus,  throughout  the  I98Os,  researchers  uniformly  concluded:
"[T]reatment  services  for  the  parents  of  children  in  foster  care  are
largely nonexistent.  In fact, the child's  placement  usually results  in  a
reduction  in the level of services parents  receive."62  Indeed, the  I98os
can  be  characterized  as  a decade  in  which "the  mood  in  society  and
government  was  turning  increasingly  skeptical  toward  social  pro-
grams"  and  in  which  "expenditures  for  social  programs  were  repeat-
edly  cut. '63  These trends  continued  into the  199os.  One of the  most
prestigious  child  welfare  study  groups  ever  assembled,  the  National
Commission  on  Children,  came  to  the  disturbing  conclusion  that  de-
spite the  198o  Act,  as  of  I99I,  children  continued  regularly  to  be  re-
moved from their families "prematurely  or unnecessarily"  because fed-
eral  aid  formulas  give  states  "a  strong financial  incentive"  to  remove
children  rather than provide services to keep families together.64
This  failure  to  implement  meaningfully  the  "family  preservation"
requirements  of the  i98O Act  is  even more disturbing  considering that
59  See  MARY  ANN  JONES,  PARENTAL  LACK  OF  SUPERVISION:  NATURE  AND  CONSEQUENCE
OF A MAJOR CHILD NEGLECT PROBLEM  29, 64 (1987).
60  MAKING REASONABLE  EFFORTS, supra note 45,  at 8.
61  Wexler,  supra note  40,  at  4  (citing  NATIONAL  CHILD  WELFARE  RESOURCE  CTR.  FOR
MANAGEMENT  AND  ADMIN.,  UNIV.  OF  SOUTHERN  MAINE,  PILOT  EARLY  REVIEW  PROJECT,
PRELIMINARY  DATA  ANALYSIS  (Mar. I989)).
62  Douglas J. Besharov, The Misuse of Foster  Care: When the Desire to Help Children Outruns
the  Ability  to  Improve  Parental Functioning, in  PROTECTING  CHILDREN  FROM  ABUSE  AND
NEGLECT:  POLICY  AND  PRACTICE  i85,  198  (Douglas  J.  Besharov  ed.,  1988)  [hereinafter
PROTECTING CHILDREN].
63  LINDSEY,  supra note  29, at 97.
64  NATIONAL  COMM'N ON CHILDREN,  BEYOND RHETORIC:  A NEW AMERICAN  AGENDA  FOR
CHILDREN AND  FAMILIES 290 (199I). According to Dorothy Roberts, for example,  during the very
period that  Bartholet  characterizes  as the  height  of family  preservation  emphasis  (p.  25),  such
"[s]ervices for families in California...  [we]re  permitted to continue for a maximum  of six months
and, on average, end[ed] after only half this time."  Roberts, supra note  14, at  124; see also Richard
P. Barth  & Marianne  Berry, Implications of Research on the Welfare of Children Under Perma-
nency Planning,  in  i  CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH  REVIEW,  supra note 54, at 323,  325 ("[F]amily
preservation  services  are  still not available  for  the  vast majority  of families in  need.");  Jennifer
Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations:  A  Critical Evaluation of the Length-of-Time-
Out-of-Custody Ground  for Termination of Parental  Rights, 71  N.Y.U.  L. REV.  1251,  128o  (1996)
("Caseworkers have  been known  to fail to assist parents  in obtaining housing, to unreasonably  op-
pose visitation of the child by the parent, to place children in homes that are not easily accessible to
the parent, to fail to tailor the  reasonable efforts to the specific problems facing the family, and, in
some instances, to not do much of anything at all." (citations omitted)).
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experimental  family  preservation  efforts,  initiated  in  the  197os,  have
shown  real  promise.  Bartholet  harshly  criticizes  these  efforts,6  even
though  there  is  significant  evidence  to  demonstrate  that  these  pro-
grams  are  valuable.  For  example,  Alabama,66  California,67  Michi-
gan,68 Minnesota, 69 Oregon,70  Tennessee,71  Utah,72 and  Washington,73
among  other  states,  have  undertaken  numerous  family  preservation
initiatives.  Although  the findings are  mixed, these  programs  achieved
reductions  in the need for  placement of children  in foster  care without
any  increase  in  rates  of maltreatment. 74  Despite  this  evidence,  how-
ever, funding for these programs  has ceased.
65  Bartholet writes: "[Tihere is obvious reason for concern that the more IFPS [Intensive Fam-
ily Preservation  Services]  programs  'succeed'  . . .the  more children  will  suffer.  IFPS  advocates
regularly talk of children in  these programs  as 'at  risk of placement,'  yet placement is what many
of these  children desperately  need" (p.  12 1).
66  The Alabama approach  calls for gradual, county-by-county  change.  In counties adopting a
family preservation approach, foster care placements  have declined by 30%.  More importantly, an
independent, court-appointed monitor concluded that children in Alabama are safer now than they
were  before the system switched to a family preservation model.  The monitor wrote that "the  data
strongly  support the  conclusion that children and  families  are safer in  counties  that have  imple-
mented [these]  reforms."  Wexler, supra note 40,  at 9  (citing IVOR  D. GROVES,  SYSTEM  OF CARE
IMPLEMENTATION:  PERFORMANCE,  OUTCOMES,  AND  COMPLIANCE  3  (I996));  see also BAZELON
CTR.  FOR MENTAL  HEALTH LAW,  MAKING  CHILD WELFARE WORK 51-59  (1998) (explaining the
way in  which "partnerships" between Alabama  departments  of human  resources  and  parents are
aimed at preserving family relationships).
67  A  study  in California  found that  55%  of children  who  did not receive  family  preservation
services were  placed in  out-of-home  care,  compared  to only  26%  of the children  who did receive
such services.  See LINDSEY,  supra note  29, at 55; Sally Wood,  Keith Barton & Carroll  Schroeder,
In-Home Treatment of Abusive  Families: Cost and Placement at One  Year,  25  PSYCHOTHERAPY
409, 411  (1988).
68  Michigan's Families First program was evaluated  by comparing  children who received fam-
ily preservation services to a "control group" that did not.  Of children  referred because of abuse  or
neglect, 36%  in the control  group were  placed in  foster care compared  to only  19.4%  in the  Fami-
lies  First program.  See  Wexler, supra note  40,  at  19  (citing  CAROL  BERGQUIST &  GERALD  H.
MILLER,  EVALUATION  OF MICHIGAN'S  FAMILIES FIRST PROGRAM  (1993)).
69  A study of Minnesota's program found that, in dealing with troubled adolescents,  go% of the
control  group children were  placed, compared  to only 56% of those who received  intensive family
preservation services.  See Ira M. Schwartz, Philip AuClaire & Linda J. Harris, Family Preserva-
tion  Services as an  Alternative to  the  Out-of-Home Placement of Adolescents:  The  Hennepin
County Experience, in  FAMILY  PRESERVATION  SERVICES:  RESEARCH  AND  EVALUATION  33-46
(Kathleen Wells & David E. Biegel eds.,  i9gi).
70  See LINDSEY, supra note 29, at 64.
71 See id. at53.
72  An  experiment in  Utah  and  Washington  also  used a  comparison  group.  After  one  year,
85.2%  of the children in the comparison group were  placed in foster care, compared  to only 44.4%
of the children who received  intensive  family preservation  services.  See Peter J. Pecora, Mark W.
Fraser, Robert B. Bennett & David A. Haapala, Placement Rates of Children  and Families  Served
by  Intensive Family Preservation Services Programs, in  FAMILIES  IN CRISIS:  THE  IMPACT  OF
INTENSIVE  FAMILY  PRESERVATION  SERVICES  149,  i68 (Mark W. Fraser, Peter J. Pecora & David
A.  Haapala eds.,  1991).
73  See id.
74  Bartholet's  condemnation  of these programs  is  particularly  disturbing.  Citing  an  unpub-
lished paper  prepared for  the Kennedy  School  of Government, Julie  B.  Wilson, Abused  and Ne-
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The  overwhelming  conclusion  in  the  scholarly  literature  is  that
family  reunification  efforts  have  never  been  adequate. 7  Although
Congress  concluded  in  1997  that states  were  applying  the "reasonable
efforts" requirement in the  I98O Act too strictly,76 this conclusion  must
be  understood in context.  In the  199os,  Congress  reached a consensus
glected  Children:  How Many?  How  Serious the Maltreatment?  What Share  Could  Be  Reached
Only Through  Coercive  Intervention?  29-30  (May  16-18,  1996)  (unpublished  manuscript),  Bar-
tholet contends  that  these  programs successfully  diverted  "only  a limited  portion"  of the  public
child welfare  caseload  (p.  264  n.i).  However,  Bartholet's  own  description  of Wilson's  findings
shows that as many  as two-thirds of the families coercively  handled by the state-run child protec-
tion system could safely be diverted to a voluntary system (p. 264 n.i).
75  See, e.g.,  Mary  B. Lamer, Carol  S.  Stevenson  & Richard  E. Behrman,  Protecting Children
from Abuse and Neglect: Analysis and Recommendations, FUTURE  CHILDREN,  Spring  1998,  at 15
("State child welfare administrators  surveyed in  1996 reported that, while two-thirds of the parents
involved  with the child welfare  system  needed alcohol and drug-abuse  treatment, they could link
fewer than one-third to services.");  Leroy H. Pelton, Resolving the Crisis in Child Welfare: Simply
Expanding the Present System Is Not Enough, 48 PUB. WELFARE,  Fall  199o, at  19 ("The dearth  of
preventive  and  supportive services these agencies  offer families in  child protection  cases has per-
sisted over the decades.");  Patricia A. Schene, Past,  Present, and Future Roles of Child Protective
Services, FUTURE  CHILDREN,  Spring  1998,, at  29 ("The sweeping  reforms  envisioned  in the  law
have not been fully implemented ....  The courts in many jurisdictions were not fully prepared for
their new  role, and child welfare  agencies were  hindered by having  only limited budgets  for serv-
ices while they faced  new administrative  demands and increasing caseloads."); supra pp.  1728-29.
Richard Gelles  is one  of the few  scholars who agrees  with Bartholet that the  gravest  problem  of
child welfare from  I98o through  I997 was that states tried too hard to keep children with families.
See  RICHARD  J.  GELLES,  THE  BOOK  OF  DAVID:  HOW  PRESERVING  FAMILIES  CAN  COST
CHILDREN'S LIVES  115-43 (1996).
76  See, e.g.,  143  CONG.  REC.  HIo,788  (daily ed. Nov.  13, 1997)  (statement of Rep.  Kennelly)
(charging that reasonable  efforts  had  become  "every effort,  [effectively]  putting a child  at risk").
Congress reached  this conclusion in  passing the  Adoption and  Safe Families  Act of 1997  (ASFA),
Pub. L. No.  105-89,  i1  Stat. 2115  (codified as amended at 42  U.S.C.  § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)  (Supp. III
1997)).  ASFA excuses  states from exercising reasonable efforts toward reunification  in certain cir-
cumstances.  For example, reasonable  efforts are not required when a court determines  that there
are  certain "aggravated  circumstances" defined  by state law, id. §  ioi(a), iii Stat. at 216, includ-
ing when parents have  been convicted of certain violent crimes  against children.  These crimes are
murder, voluntary manslaughter, attempted murder or manslaughter, or felony assault resulting in
serious  bodily harm.  See  id.  Additionally, ASFA  suggests  that reasonable  efforts  to return  the
child home shall  not be  required  when the  State  has terminated  parental  rights  to a sibling, but
does not treat prior terminations  as the  sole ground  to file  immediately  for termination.  See  id.
§ ioi(a),  in  Stat. at 2116-17.  In addition,  the law was designed to  increase  the number  of chil-
dren  moving  from  foster  care  to  adoption.  ASFA  created an  incentive  program  designed  to  in-
crease  adoptions  of foster children.  Under the  program,  states  receive  an  additional  $40OO  for
every child  adopted  over the average  number prior  to the  passage of the  Act, and  an  additional
$2000  per additional foster child with special  needs.  See  42  U.S.C.  § 673b(d)(1)(A)-(B)  (Supp. In
1997).  Congress authorized  the expenditure  of $ioo million  over five  years  for  the  program,  or
enough to cover incentive  payments for between  r6,5oo and  25,000  children over five years.  The
law substantially  shortens the amount  of time within  which  parents  may regain  custody of their
children  before the  state is authorized  to initiate proceedings  to terminate  parental  rights.  Under
the new  law, termination  petitions  ordinarily should be  filed  after  a child  has  spent  15 out of 22
consecutive  months in  foster care.  A termination  of parental  rights petition should be  filed  unless
one of three exceptions applies: the child is in the care  of a relative;  there  is a "compelling reason"
to maintain  parental  rights based on  the interests of the child;  or the  state  has failed  to provide
mandatory "reasonable efforts."  Id. § 675(5XE).
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that government  had  been doing  too much  to assist poor families  and
called  for  more  modest  and  time-limited  government  assistance  pro-
grams.  In  1996,  the  104th Congress  abandoned  the  guarantee  of basic
economic support  for families,  which had  been in place since  the New
Deal,  and  rejected  the  notion  that government  should  bolster  the  ca-
pacity  of poor families to raise  children  in a safe and healthy environ-
ment.77  Against this backdrop, we  can begin to appreciate  the signifi-
cance  of  the  Io5th  Congress's  concern  that  child  protection  officials
were too  assiduous  in  working  to rehabilitate  "broken" families.  It  is
not  surprising  that  legislators  were  troubled  by  federal  policy  that
mandated substantial  expenditures  in an  effort to rehabilitate  families
whose  children  had been  removed  from  their  homes  because  of child
abuse.78  In  all  events,  the  clear  weight  of  the  research  refutes  any
claim  that  child  welfare  has  been  overzealous  in  its  efforts  to  keep
families together.
C.  Millions of Abused Children Are Left  Unprotected
by  Child Welfare Officials
If the  evidence  does  not  support Bartholet's  contention  that  virtu-
ally all children in foster  care have  suffered  serious forms  of maltreat-
ment, then  what  about  her  assertion  that nearly  three  million  addi-
tional children suffer from serious forms of abuse?
Research  suggests  that this claim  is  significantly overstated.7 9  In-
deed, Lindsey concluded  in  1994 that "child abuse"  is the "red herring"
of child welfare.8o  According  to Lindsey, although  serious child abuse
receives  the  attention of the media, the  real problems  in child welfare
concern  poverty  and  the  related  difficulties  of raising  children  while
poor."'  Many of the  points made  in Part II.A are again  relevant here.
Bartholet  estimates  that there  are three  million abused  children  in the
United  States  (p.  61).  As  is  well-known,  this  figure  is  based  only  on
77  See Personal  Responsibility and  Work Opportunity Reconciliation  Act of 1996,  Pub. L. No.
104-193,  i1O Stat.  2M1o.  By this law, Aid to Families with Dependent Children,  Emergency  Assis-
tance, and the Jobs Opportunities and Basic  Skills training program were  grouped into the Tempo-
rary Assistance  to Needy Families block grant.
78  "[Then-]Speaker  of the  House  Newt  Gingrich  ...  argued  that government  funds  going  to
children born to welfare  mothers should be diverted to programs that would put their babies up for
adoption or place them in orphanages."  Roberts, supra note  14,  at 133.
79  Even Bartholet's own citations do not support  this claim.  The only  study that she cites esti-
mates no more than  732,000  "serious maltreatment" cases (p. 61).  ANDREAJ.  SEDLAK & DIANE D.
BROADHURST,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  HEALTH  AND  HUMAN  SERVICES,  NATIONAL  CTR.  ON  CHILD
ABUSE  AND  NEGLECT, THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE  STUDY  OF CHILD ABUSE  AND  NEGLECT  3-
13  tbl.3-2  (1996).
80  LINDSEY, supra note  29, at  157.
81  See id.  at 161,  257-300.
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shown  that  up  to  two-thirds  of  these  reports  do  not  involve  serious
charges.
8 3
Bartholet does recognize that only one-third of these allegations  are
"substantiated"  (p.  6i  n.68).  However,  she  does  not  clearly  state
whether these  children are left unprotected  because  officials fail to en-
force the law  rigorously  or because  the law  itself prevents  rigorous en-
forcement.  At times  she emphasizes  the  discretion  exercised  by  case-
workers  "[o]nly  in the  most  serious of the  serious  maltreatment  cases"
(p.  103).  At other  times  she speaks  critically of current laws  that "are
designed  to exclude  all but the more  serious forms of maltreatment" (p.
64).
Bartholet relies  on the  high  rate of cases  dropped  at the  investiga-
tive  stage  as  support  for  her proposition  that officials  irrationally  dis-
miss  claims  of  child  maltreatment.  For  Bartholet,  this  high  rate  of
dismissed  allegations  manifests  a bias  against  intervention  even  when
intervention  is  warranted.  In  her  words,  officials  regularly  fail  to
"substantiate cases  unless the maltreatment  is particularly  egregious or
immediately  threatening  to  the  child's  safety"  (p.  62).  To  the  extent
that she believes  children  at serious  risk  of harm are  left  at home  be-
cause  of a widespread  bias  against removing  them, she  provides little
evidence to support this claim.8 4
At  other  times,  Bartholet  focuses  on  the  narrowly  written  laws8s
that  require  officials  to  dismiss  allegations  of  serious  maltreatment.
82  See Douglas J. Besharov, Introduction  to PROTECTING CHILDREN,  supra note 62,  at 3-4; see
also WALDFOGEL, supra note 36, at 65 (noting that it is unclear  how much of this three million  is
due to a rise in mistreatment or a greater awareness of what constitutes reportable abuse).
83  Critics of child welfare  policy have observed in recent years that the system  has inappropri-
ately transformed  from an assistance  program  to an investigative  one.  Precious resources, includ-
ing caseworker  time,  have  been  diverted from assisting  marginalized  families  in  need  to  investi-
gating what  are often spurious  allegations  of mistreatment.  The  result is that child  welfare  has
changed into a quasi-police mechanism.  Few critics feel this transformation has improved  the lives
of neglected children.  On the contrary, because  overworked caseworkers are obliged to investigate
claims of little merit, verified  cases of maltreatment are left unmonitored.
An important ancillary effect of this transformation  is the corrosion of child welfare agencies'
attitudes  toward  families whom  they serve.  As  the  decisionmaking  framework  of child  welfare
agencies  changes  from "assessment  of need"  to  "investigation  of abuse,"  single-parent and  poor
families, who  form  the core  of the "investigated,"  are  no longer perceived as families-in-need  de-
serving  support but instead  are treated  as potential  child  abusers  deserving  suspicion,  reproach,
and punishment.  See LINDSEY, supra note  29, at 155-56.
84  Bartholet cites  to self-reporting  surveys that indicate a much  higher  rate of abuse  than the
rates reported  to officials (p. 62),  but there  is little evidence that  officials fail  to take action  when
they become  aware of endangerment.  In investigations in which the  caseworker declined  to take
further  action, the  rates of maltreatment  recurring  in the investigated  families are extremely  low.
See John  D. Fluke,  Ying-Ying T. Yuan & Myles Edwards, Recurrence of Maltreatment:  An Appli-
cation of the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System  (NCANDS),  23  CHILD  ABUSE  &
NEGLECT 633, 645  (1999).
85  See supra p. 1732.
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clearly  advocates  that  children  be  removed  to  protect  their  "well-
being"  (p.  27)  far  more  frequently  than  is  current  practice.  Because
only a relatively small  number of children  are hospitalized  or killed in
the United States each year as a result of abuse, 86 Bartholet's  call for a
vast increase in removals must contemplate a significantly broader  ba-
sis  for  removal  - one  focused  on  "well-being"  or  "best  interests"
rather  than on serious harm.  Regrettably, Bartholet  fails to discuss  or
even to recognize  the danger posed by aggrandizing state power in this
way.  Courts and commentators  have long appreciated the  relationship
between  broadly  worded statutes  authorizing  coercive  intervention  in
the family and the danger of arbitrary  enforcement that disproportion-
ately  impacts  the  poor  and  racial  minorities.8 7  One  virtue  of tightly
drawn statutes  is the protection that they provide  against wrongful  in-
trusion.
Bartholet would likely reply that such risks are necessary  if we are
serious  about  the  state's  protecting  children  from  harm.  She  would
urge  that, if  we are  to err, we  should  do  so  on  the  side  of too  much
protection, not too little.  However important this debate,  by failing to
demonstrate  that  children  are  harmed  as  a  consequence  of  non-
removal, Bartholet's argument becomes circular and unconvincing.
Even  Bartholet's assertion  that current  laws  are written  too tightly
to  protect  children  from  serious  maltreatment  is  wholly  unsupported.
In  Illinois,  for  example,  intervention  is  authorized  whenever  officials
conclude  a parent  has failed  to provide  "the  proper  or necessary  sup-
port  ...  for a child's  well-being. '88  Even  more telling, a report must
be substantiated  unless the investigator  finds that there is "no credible
evidence"  of  maltreatment.89  In  South  Dakota,  intervention  is
authorized  merely  upon  an official's  conclusion  that the  child's  "envi-
ronment  is injurious  to  [his  or her] welfare." 9 0  In  most states, an  un-
86  See infra p. 1742.
87  See,  e.g.,  JOSEPH  GOLDSTEIN,  ANNA  FREUD &  ALBERT  J.  SOLNIT,  BEFORE  THE  BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD  13-14, I6-18 (1979);  Robert H. Mnookin, Foster  Care - In Whose Best
Interest?,  43  HARV. EDUC.  REV. 599, 599 (x973); Michael  S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children:  A Search  for Realistic  Standards, 27  STAN.  L. REV. 985,  1033 (975);  see also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455  U.S.  745,  763  (1982) ("Because parents subject to termination proceedings
are often poor, uneducated,  or members  of minority groups  ...  such  proceedings are often vulner-
able  to judgments based on  cultural or class  bias.")  (citations omitted);  Smith  v. Organization  of
Foster  Families for Equality and  Reform,  431  U.S. 86, 833  (1977)  (citing statistics of foster care
incidents among the poor and minorities in New York City).
88  325  ILL. COMP.  STAT.  ANN. 5/3 (West  1993) (amended  1998).
89  325  ILL. COMP.  STAT.  5/8.I (West Supp.  1999); cf Cavarretta v. Department of Children  and
Family  Servs., 660  N.E.2d 250,  258 (Ill.  App. Ct.  1996) (holding that the "credible  evidence"  stan-
dard is too low to justify listing suspected child abusers in a state central register  because  the con-
stitution requires a finding of a preponderance of the evidence).
90  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  §§ 26-8A-2,  26-8A-6 (Michie  1999).
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dence"  to believe  a home  is unfit.9 1  For  this  reason,  courts  and  gov-
ernment  reports  alike  regularly  conclude  that  the  current  scheme  re-
sults in a bias toward over-reporting and over-labeling child abuse  and
neglect.92
In sum, neither Bartholet's  claim that only children who have  been
victims of serious  familial  abuse  end up  in  foster  care, nor  her  claim
that millions  of additional children  who  are victims  of such  abuse  are
kept out  of child  welfare,  is  supported  by sufficient  evidence.  To  the
contrary, experts estimate that 40%  to 70% of children currently  in fos-
ter  care  have  not  been  abused  and  need  not  be separated  from  their
families  if  society  sufficiently  assisted  poor  families  in  raising  their
children  at home.93  Part IV considers whether Bartholet's  proposal to
ensure  the  swift  adoption  of foster  children  is  the  best  solution  that
American  society can or should offer these children.
IV. IS ADOPTION REALLY THE BEST WE CAN OFFER
POOR CHILDREN WHO END UP IN FOSTER CARE?
I suggest  in  Part  I that Professor  Bartholet  may be  cynical  about
the degree  to which  Americans  care  about  the  plight of poor children
in the  United States.94  But such an assertion  does not adequately cap-
ture the  avowed spirit of Nobody's Children. I am confident  that Bar-
tholet considers  her book to be optimistic, even aspirational.  Bartholet
is striving to create  a new  America in which privileged  citizens  would
come to regard the  children in foster  care as part of the larger commu-
nity, even as belonging to them.  She states:
What matters  is  that the  children  get into  homes where  they  can  thrive.
But if we want to  find  truly nurturing  homes  for all the children  in need,
we  have  to  reach  out to  the entire  community  ....  Encouraging  people
who  are  in  a position  to provide  good parenting  to step  forward,  without
regard  to  race  or  class  or  membership  in  the  local  village,  encouraging
them  to  see  children  born to  others  as  children  they  are  responsible  for,
can be  painted  as a form of vicious  exploitation.  But that's not how  I see
it.  It seems to me that if more  members  of the larger community thought
91  See  N.Y. SOC.  SERV.  LAW §  422(5) (McKinney  1992).  New  York's "some  credible  evidence"
standard was found  by the Second Circuit to "result[]  in many individuals being [listed  in a state
central register  of purported child  abusers] who do not belong there."  Valmonte  v. Bane,  18  F.3d
992,  1004 (2d Cir. 1994).
92  One federal study found that investigators are more  than twice  as likely to  "substantiate" a
case  erroneously  than  to  mislabel a case  "unfounded."  NATIONAL  CTR.  ON  CHILD ABUSE  AND
NEGLECT,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  HEALTH  AND  HUMAN  SERVICES,  STUDY  FINDINGS:  STUDY  OF
NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE  AND NEGLECT 6-5  (1988).
93  See supra pp.  1732-33.
94  See supra p. 1722.
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of all the  community's children  as their  responsibility, we'd  have  a much
better  chance of creating the just society that is our goal. (p.  6)
Thus,  an  important  message  of Nobody's Children is a call  to  invoke
the  Golden Rule for the poorest  of American's  children:  Do Unto  Oth-
ers'  Children  as  You  Would  Do Unto  Your  Own.  Bartholet  encour-
ages us to re-imagine,  for a moment, this society as one that regards  all
its children  as equally important.
But Bartholet is  far too  unimaginative.  This  Part first challenges
Bartholet's limited  vision of a new corps  of committed Americans  pro-
viding adoptive homes to foster children, and then maps out a strategy
that  addresses  the  underlying  societal  tragedy  endemic  in  foster  chil-
dren's lives.
A.  The Artificial Narrowing of Child Welfare
An  important  explanation  for  Bartholet's  limited  vision  may  be
found  in the  history of child  welfare  reform.  When  the  child welfare
movement  began  in the  United  States  during the  late  nineteenth  cen-
tury, it was broadly conceived;  child protection  was a piece of a larger
movement  to  rectify  social  ills for  children.95  This  larger  movement
was not to last; in the twentieth  century, the federal  government rarely
furnished  funds  to  ameliorate  the effects  of poverty  on children.  One
exception  was  the  Depression  Era  legislation  providing  Aid  to  De-
pendent  Children.9 6  Another  was  the  short-lived  War  on  Poverty  in
the  mid-I96os.  But  with  the  election  of Richard  Nixon  in  1968  and
the  prompt  collapse  of  the  War  on  Poverty  agenda,  "child  welfare"
policy was purposely shifted to a much narrower  focus.
In  the  early  I970s,  liberals  seeking  to  improve  the  lives  of  poor
children realized the importance  of developing  new strategies  to secure
bipartisan support  for government spending  toward that end.  Chiefly
the  work  of  Senator  Walfer  Mondale, 97  the  new  strategy  found  its
home  in the  field of child abuse  and protection.  Mondale  led the leg-
islative  effort  that resulted  in the passage  of the Child Abuse  Preven-
tion and Treatment Act (CAPTA) in  1974.98  CAPTA directed  a signifi-
cant  amount  of  federal  money  to  states  to  fund  efforts  to  protect
95 See WALDFOGEL, supra note 36, at 139.
96  See Social  Security Act of 1935,  ch. 531,  §  521,  49 Stat. 620, 633 (repealed  1968).  This excep-
tion is, of course, a prominent one.  Money  was provided as an entitlement to  poor families  with
children without regard to any allegation of abuse or neglect, representing a commitment that gov-
ernment  would invest in families so that children  could stay with  them.  But this very important
program was strictly limited to providing money to parents;  it did not address larger  issues of pov-
erty and its effects on children.
97  See  BARBARA  J.  NELSON,  MAKING  AN  ISSUE  OF  CHILD  ABUSE:  POLITICAL  AGENDA
SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS  15,  97-103  (1984).
98  See  Child Abuse  Prevention  and  Treatment  Act of  1974,  Pub. L.  No.  93-247  (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107  (1994)).
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posal  from  being  viewed  as  a  disguised  poverty  program,  Mondale
emphasized  that child abuse was a "national" problem, not  a "poverty
problem."
1 00   Stressing  that  child  abuse  affected  families  of  all
classes10 1 and that federal  money  would  help  children who  were both
rich  and poor,  Mondale won support  for the  proposal from politicians
across  party  lines.
10 2   Ever  since,  "child  abuse  and  neglect"  in  the
United  States  have  come  to  be  seen  and  defined  as  an  individual
problem  caused  by  individual  sets  of parents. 10 3  No  longer  a  social
problem, child welfare has come  to be viewed as  a matter of individual
failure.'0 4  Much of the  public  debate  has  ignored  or  understated  the
evidence  suggesting  a  correlation  between  abuse  and  neglect  on  the
one  hand and poverty  on  the  other. 05  Indeed,  a remarkable  charac-
teristic  of  the  growth  of  support  for  child  protection  in  the  United
States has  been the  deliberate  claim  that middle-class  and upper-class
children  need child protective  legislation just as much as  do poor chil-
dren.
The  consequences  of this  strategy  have  been  profound.  In  recent
years,  most observers  have  come to see  child abuse  primarily  as  a de-
fect in a particular  family, with limited  or nonexistent societal  roots.1 0 6
The  opportunity  to  examine  such  root  causes  has  thus  been  over-
looked.  Duncan Lindsey suggests that the  current "residual approach"
to  child welfare  policy does  a  poor job  of  accounting  for  these  prob-
lems.  He observes:
99  See 42  U.S.C. § 5io6a (1994).
100  NELSON,  supra note  97,  at  107  (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm.  on Children and
Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong. 17-18  (973)  (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (statement of Sen. Mondale)).
101  See id.
102  See id. at 93-94.
103  Child welfare  services are  by their nature  residual, serving only those children suffering or at
great risk  of suffering  the  gravest mistreatment,  rather  than the  whole  population of families  in
which children experience  serious deprivation.  Many  scholars argue  that the residual  approach is
doomed  to be inadequate absent vast new investments in antipoverty programs.  See COURTNEY,
supra note  57,  at  16;  LINDSEY,  supra note  29,  at 4-5;  LEROY  H.  PELTON,  FOR  REASONS  OF
POVERTY:  A  CRITICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  PUBLIC  CHILD  WELFARE  SYSTEM  IN  THE  UNITED
STATES  176-77 (,989).
104  See WALDFOGEL,  supra note 36, at 139.
105  See PETER J. PECORA,  JAMES K. WHITTAKER  & ANTHONY  N. MALUCCIO  WITH  RICHARD
P. BARTH & ROBERT D. PLOTNICK,  THE CHILD WELFARE CHALLENGE: POLICY,  PRACTICE, AND
RESEARCH  66-67  (1992)  (tracing the correlation between  poverty  and  child maltreatment);  Leroy
H. Pelton, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Myth of Classlessness, 48 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY  608,
609 (1978) ("Every national survey of officially reported  child abuse and neglect incidents has indi-
cated that the preponderance  of the reports involves families from  the lowest social economic  lev-
els.'); Pelton, supra note  75,  at 19,  23 (noting the "abundant  evidence  that child abuse and  neglect
are strongly related to poverty').
106  Despite shifts over the years in perceptions  of child abuse, "the dominant model  continues to
be one of child maltreatment as an individual problem."  WALDFOGEL, supra note 36, at 139.
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The traditional  residual approach to child welfare  focuses  on the problems
in the parent/child  relationship  and the provision  of services  to ameliorate
those problems.  However,  the broad social changes  that affected  families,
especially  those served  by the public child  welfare  system, had little  to do
with  that  relationship.  Further, the  problems  created  by  these  major  so-
cial changes  are not amenable  to solution through the residual perspective.
The  main  service  provided  by the  residual  child  welfare  system  is  foster
care  ....  The residual  approach  doesn't  provide  for developing  policies
and programs that would prevent  these egregious  problems from occurring
in the first place.
1 0 7
Although  those  hoping  to  improve  child  welfare  once  examined
broader  issues  of poverty, a  specific  emphasis  on  abuse  has  replaced
those socioeconomic  concerns.
That one could propose the radical  social  re-engineering that lies at
the core of Nobody's Children without first insisting that American  so-
ciety pay  more  attention  to  the  social  conditions  that  create  the  need
for  foster  care  testifies  to  the  success  of  Mondale's  strategy.  That
strategy narrowly  defines the  subject of child welfare  as  a problem  of
pathological  child abuse.  It is especially  ironic that Bartholet  endorses
this  extremely  short-sighted  view  because  she  fervently  aspires  to
transform the values and culture of "privileged" Americans.
Bartholet suggests that certain  "local  villages  ....  are not  going to
have  enough  good  homes  to  spare,"  such  as  Bedford-Stuyvesant  and
the  South Bronx (p. 6).  But we  make a choice when  we act  as  if the
conditions  in  these  villages  no  longer  deserve  serious  attention  from
policymakers  or activists.  Surely the first step toward the creation  of a
more just society ought not to  be cultivating  the  "larger community's"
willingness to take foster children  into their own homes and raise them
as their own children.
The abysmal  conditions of poverty  and despair into which millions
of poor children are born are not immutable  facts of life.  It  is essential
that we determine  the  extent  to which  these conditions  are  caused  by
factors  for  which  we  may  hold  the  larger  society  accountable  and,
therefore,  could  improve or eliminate.  Nobody's Children fails  to con-
sider the extent  to which these  conditions are  a product  of various  so-
cial forces influencing American  society and policy.
Herein  lies  the  central  unanswered  question  of  Nobody's Chil-
dren: If Bartholet is right that the core plight suffered today by Amer-
ica's  foster  children  is  that  they  are  "nobody's  children"  (that is,  the
children  of nobody  particularly  important),  is Bartholet's  proposal  the
morally  appropriate  response? l08  Let  us  briefly  examine  some  facts
107  LINDSEY, supra note  29, at 79 (citations omitted).
108  It is  never clear  precisely what Bartholet  means  by  calling  her  book "Nobody's  Children."
Most  of the  children  Bartholet  writes  about  have  families,  including  parents.  It  is inarguable,
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and  conceive  of child welfare as  a public health or shared social prob-
lem, rather  than focus on the "red  herring" of child abuse, 1 0 9 we  could
develop  policies  that address  directly  and proactively  those conditions
that  adversely  affect  the  health  and  welfare  of  poor  children  in  the
United States.
r. Poverty. - About  fourteen million children  in the United  States
live below the poverty line. 110  Children are twice  as likely as adults  to
live  in  such  conditions.11'  Of  all  industrial  nations  worldwide,  the
United  States has the  highest child-poverty  rate.  This may be  related
to  governmental  policies  and  priorities:  Britain,  France,  Sweden,  and
Canada  each  spend two  to  three times  more  on children  and  families
than does the United States.'12
The percentage  of the United States  population that falls below  the
poverty  line  is  disproportionately  composed  of people  of color.  Close
to  half  of  the  children  who  live  in  poverty  conditions  are  African-
American;  only about  i6% are white.113
In  addition,  the  child-poverty  problem  is  steadily  getting  worse.
Since  1969,  even  as  the  GNP  has  risen  50%,  child  poverty  has  in-
creased  by  50%.114  And poverty  is  increasing  at an  even  more  rapid
rate as  the  effects  of recent  welfare  "reforms" begin  to take effect.  In
1997,  a  year  after  welfare  reform  was  enacted,  there  were  400,000
more children living below one-half the poverty line than there were in
1995.115  A study  of former  welfare  recipients in South  Carolina  found
that one in  ten could  not afford medical  care,  one  in six  could not af-
ford  food,  one  in  four  could  not  pay  the  rent, and  one  in  three  had
fallen behind in paying utility bills."
16
2. Housing. - There  is a drastic  shortage  of adequate housing  for
indigent children in the United  States.  In  1995,  there were  4.4  million
however, that almost all foster  children have parents  who are without political  influence  and that,
consequently,  these children are not the concern of citizens with significant influence  on social  pol-
icy.
109  LINDSEY, supra note  29, at  157.
110  See  RENNY  GOLDEN,  DISPOSABLE  CHILDREN:  AMERICA'S  CHILD  WELFARE  SYSTEM  55
tbl.i (1997).
111  See Jim  Weill,  The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Well-Being of America's
Children,  5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY  257,  257  (1998).
112  See GOLDEN,  supra  note  iio, at 55.
113  See id.  at 68.
114  See id.
11s  See  ARLOC  SHERMAN,  CHERYL  AMEY,  BARBARA  DUFFIELD,  NANCY  EBB  & DEBORAH
WEINSTEIN,  WELFARE TO WHAT: EARLY  FINDINGS ON FAMILY  HARDSHIP AND WELL-BEING  5  '
(1998),  available  at  http://www.childrensdefense.org/fairstarLwelfare2what.html  [hereinafter
WELFARE TO WHAT].
116  See id. at 2.
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more  low-income  renters  than there  were  affordable  housing  units.117
As a  result, a  vast number of families  settle  for  substandard  housing;
those who seek  minimally adequate  conditions  are  often  forced to pay
more  than  half their  income  in  rent.11  Here  again,  children  feel  the
brunt of the  problem:  in a  survey of thirty cities,  children  constituted
25%  of the homeless population.119
This problem  is  also getting more serious  every year.  The average
period  of time  spent awaiting  Section  8  housing  assistance  rose  from
twenty-six  to twenty-eight  months  between  1996  and  1998;  in the  na-
tion's largest housing authorities, the  average waiting period  increased
from twenty-two to thirty-three months during this same period. 120
Welfare  reform has  further exacerbated  the problem.  With welfare
benefits eliminated  or substantially reduced, indigent families have less
money  to  pay  for  housing  and  utilities.  A  Children's  Defense  Fund
survey of former  welfare  recipients  who were  seeking  services  at non-
profit agencies found that 23%  of the families had been forced to move
because  they could not pay their rent,  25%  had doubled up housing to
save money, and  25%  had had their heat shut off.121  In  one Wisconsin
county,  the  number  of homeless  children  increased  by  5o%  after  the
implementation  of welfare reform.1 22
3.  Health. - More  than  eleven  million  children  in  the  United
States  have  no  health  insurance. 123  In  1997  alone,  400,000  children
lost their insurance as a result of welfare reform. 124  Between  1996 and
1998, approximately  643,000  children lost Medicaid coverage.1 2 5
Life in the urban ghetto holds numerous, substantial  health hazards
for children.  Data suggest that nearly two million  children suffer from
117  See id. at 30.
118  One study found that 5.3 million households pay more than half their income in rent, or live
in substandard conditions, or both.  See id. at 31.
119  See  U.S.  CONFERENCE  OF  MAYORS,  SUMMARY:  A  STATUS  REPORT  ON  HUNGER  AND
HOMELESSNESS  IN AMERICAN  CITIES - 1998,  at  2 (1988),  available at http://www.usmayors.org/
uscm/homeless/hhsummary.html.
120  See id. at 87-89.
121  See id. at 13.
122  See id. at 16.
123  See U.S.  CENSUS  BUREAU,  HEALTH INSURANCE  COVERAGE:  1998,  http://www.census.gov/
hhes/hlthins/hlthin98/hig8t2.html  (on  file  with the  Harvard  Law  School  Library);  see also  Weill,
supra note 1i,  at 259 (reporting that there are now more than io million American children with-
out health insurance).
124  See Families USA  Found.,  Losing Health  insurance: The  Unintended Consequences of Wel-
fare Reform 2 (May 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library),
available at http://www.familiesusa.org/united.pdf.
125  See Jocelyn  Guyer, Matthew  Broaddus  & Michelle  Cochran,  Missed Opportunities: Declin-
ing Medicaid Enrollment Undermines the Nation's Progress in Insuring Low-Income Children, at
http://www.cbpp.org/io-2o-g9health.htm  (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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126 and those with  lead poisoning  are  most often found
in families  in the  lowest income  brackets. 127  Indigent  children  suffer
asthma at rates  twice  as  high as  children  in higher-income  families.
12
Every  year, asthma  attacks  caused  by cockroach  infestation  at  home
require  hospitalization  for  io,ooo  children  between  the  ages  of  four
and nine.129  Asthma can adversely affect a child's essential well-being,
ability to participate  in sports and  other activities,  academic  perform-
ance, and even life expectancy.
30
Here again, the burdens and the suffering fall disproportionately on
children of color.  Twice  as many black children  as white children suf-
fer from lead  poisoning  in the  family income  bracket  of $6ooo  or less;
in the slightly  higher  income bracket  of $6ooo  to $I5,0o0,  three  times
as many black children suffer from lead poisoning as white children.' 3'
The asthma rate for African-American  children  is  26%  higher than the
rate for white children.
132
B.  Who Is Responsible  for Poor Children?
When we recalibrate  the lens of child welfare  to include  these basic
issues  within  its  view,  the  core  proposal  in Nobody's  Children seems
both  inadequate  and  inappropriate.  It  is  inadequate  because  it  still
will leave millions of children to suffer the consequences  of being born
into  poor  families. 133  It  is  inappropriate  because,  fully  understood,
Bartholet's  proposal  that  privileged  Americans  adopt  these  children
subverts,  instead  of  advances,  the  Golden  Rule  by  championing  the
unnecessary permanent destruction of familial ties.
In addition, when we widen the lens in this way, we quickly realize
that, of the  preventable  conditions  most  threatening  to  children,  mal-
treatment  by  parents  is  a  relatively  minor  public  health  concern.
Emergency  medical  accidents,  for  example,  kill  22,000  children  annu-
126  See Robert D. Bullard, Leveling the Playing Field Through Environmental  Justice, 23  VT. L.
REV. 453,468 (ig9).  Lead poisoning is defined as a blood level equal to or above  ten micrograms
per deciliter.  See id.
127  See infra note 131.
128  See Weill, supra note 111, at 259.
129  See  MEGAN  SANDEL,  JOSHUA  SHARFSTEIN  & RANDY  SHAW,  THERE'S  No  PLACE  LIKE
HOME: How AMERICA'S  HOUSING  CRISIS THREATENS OUR CHILDREN 6 (1999).
130  See Bullard, supra note  126, at 470.
131  In families with a yearly income  of less than $6ooo,  68% of black children and 36% of white
children  had  lead poisoning.  In families with a yearly income  of less that  $15,ooo,  38% of black
children  and  12%  of white  children had lead  poisoning.  See id. at 467-68  (citing a 1988  study by
the Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry).
132  See id. at 470-71  (citing a 1994 CDC-sponsored  study in Atlanta).
133  In most cities, for example, we can predict the number of children  that will end up in  foster
care  by the single variable of their zip code.  In New York City's Central Harlem, for example, one
of every  ten children  is in foster  care.  See Child Removals: Dislocating  the  Black Family, CHILD
WELFARE WATCH, Spring/Summer i998, at 4.
2000] BOOK RE VIE WS 1741
HeinOnline -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1741 1999-2000HARVARD  LA WRE VIEW
ally in  the  United  States;134  "inexpensive  injury  prevention  programs
and emergency  medical  systems  for children"  could save  an  estimated
6ooo  to  io,ooo  of  these  children's  lives  each  year. 35   An  additional
4205  children  were killed  by guns in  1997.136  By contrast,  child abuse
fatalities  appear  to be  a rare  event (estimated to be  between  iooo and
12oo annually).
137
Imagine for a moment that we  could achieve  the goal of convincing
all Americans to take responsibility for all children living in the United
States.  In such a world, two consequences  would be readily apparent.
First,  we  would  find  ways  to  make  substantial  improvements  to  the
quality of life of poor minority  children  and to ameliorate  most of the
currently  unacceptable  conditions  they  experience.  The  children
would  receive better health  care  and live in cleaner, safer, and health-
ier communities  and homes.  They and their  families would  be treated
with dignity and respect by the myriad adults with whom they interact
on a daily basis.  This change alone  would obviate  the need for taking
these children out of their own  communities and having them adopted
into "better" ones.
Second, and even more crucial,  once Americans  started loving other
people's  children  as their  own,  they would find repugnant and  abhor-
rent  a  systematic  strategy  of taking  children  from  their  families,  per-
manently banishing  their  birth relatives  from  their  lives, and sending
them to live with strangers.  Bartholet argues that:
At the  core of current child  welfare  policies lies  a  powerful  blood  bias -
the  assumption  that  blood  relationship  is  central  to  what  family  is  all
about.  Parents  have  God-given  or natural  law  rights to  hold  on  to  their
progeny....  These  beliefs  are  deeply  entrenched  in  our  culture  and  our
law.  And they are  common  to the thinking  of people from  one end  of the
political  spectrum to the other ....  (P. 7)
It  is  this  aspect  of  Bartholet's  reasoning  that  I  find  astonishing.
The power  of government to permit  the formation or continuation  of a
family  is  totalitarianism  at  its  most  basic  level.  American  constitu-
tional  law  rightly insists  that any  government  attempt  to regulate  the
intimate details  of family  life  be  subject  to  the  strictest  scrutiny and
justified  only  by  a  compelling  state  interest.  Thus,  the  rights  of
134  See R. Christopher Barden, Robert Kinscherff, William  George  III, Richard Flyer, James  S.
Siedel, Debra Parkman Henderson  & Harvard  Law Sch. Law and Med. Soc'y, Emergency Medical
Care and Injury/Illness Prevention  Systems for Children,  30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461,  462 (1993).
135  Id.
136  See Jill  M.  Ward,  CHILDREN  AND  GUNS:  A  CHILDREN'S  DEFENSE  FUND  REPORT  ON
CHILDREN DYING FROM GUNFIRE IN AMERICA  2 (i999), available at http://www.childrensdefense.
org/youthviolence/report.html.
137  See  LINDSEY,  supra note  29, at 93 tbl.5.2.
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Americans  to  choose  their marital  partner,138  to  procreate, 139  to  keep
custody of children, 14 0  and to control  the details  of raising them1 4 '  are
not accidentally  or carelessly  selected  freedoms.  Properly understood,
they form the core  of our most sacred  liberty.  As declared  by  the  Su-
preme Court, "[t]he  history and culture of Western civilization  reflect a
strong tradition  of parental  concern for the  nurture and upbringing  of
their children.  This  primary  role  of the  parents  in the  upbringing  of
their children  is now  established beyond debate as an enduring  Ameri-
can tradition.'
142
Justice  Goldberg  articulated  this  principle  eloquently  in  his  Gris-
wold v. Connecticut concurrence:
"The home derives its pre-eminence  as  the seat of family life.  And the in-
tegrity of that life  is  something  so fundamental  that it has  been  found  to
draw  to  its  protection  the  principles  of more  than  one  explicitly  granted
Constitutional  right."  . . . The  entire  fabric  of  the  Constitution  and  the
purposes that clearly underlie  its  specific  guarantees  demonstrate  that the
rights to  marital  privacy  and to marry and raise  a family are  of a similar
order and magnitude as  the fundamental  rights specifically  protected.143
In  this  sense,  Bartholet's  attack  on  the  application  of  these  core
freedoms  to child welfare  must be seriously  examined.  The  use of co-
ercive state  power to redistribute children  from their  biological  parents
to  others  deemed  by  the  state  to  be  superior  caregivers  is  perhaps  a
necessary  power  to  cede  to  government.  But  it  must  be  given  and
utilized  on  an  exceedingly  spare  basis.  We  protect  liberty  best  by
thwarting  government  power  to  redistribute  children  in  accordance
with the opinions of welfare officials  or judges.
Bartholet's dismissal of the value  of the rights of biological  parents
is  of great  concern. 144  If we  adhere  to  the  Rawlsian  principle  of or-
138  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.  1 (1967).
139  See,  e.g.,  Roe  v. Wade,  410  U.S.  113,  162-64 (i973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405  U.S.  438,  453
(1972);  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381  U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
140  See, e.g.,  Santosky  v. Kramer, 455  U.S. 745,  753  (1982);  Stanley  v. Illinois, 405  U.S. 645,  658
(1972).
141  See, e.g.,  Wisconsin  v. Yoder,  4o6 U.S.  205,  232 (1972);  Pierce v. Society  of Sisters,  268  U.S.
510,  534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262  U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
142  Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
143  Griswold, 381 U.S.  at 495  (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367  U.S.  497,  551-52  (1961)  (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
144  Bartholet's disdain  for our legal system's preference  for  keeping children  with their biologi-
cal  families is especially  troubling in light of Peggy Cooper Davis's important  book Neglected Sto-
ries:  The  Constitution  and Family Values (i997).  In that book, Davis demonstrates that  the draft-
ers  of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly  intended to include  family and personal autonomy  -
rights that slavery  notoriously denied - within the freedoms that the Amendment was designed to
protect.  See id. at 214-21,  223-24.  In this important sense,  the American  commitment to constitu-
tional  protection against government intrusion into the intimacy of the family (what Bartholet re-
duces to a "blood bias") is considerably  more than merely a reflection of a value  system.  It is born
out of hard fought experience.  Many  commentators in  the past generation, including Malcolm  X,
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dering society  without knowing  how  the  rules  will  be applied  to each
of  us, 14 5  it  is  important  to  ponder  the  implications  of  a  policy  that
would  treat  families  without  means  differently  from  families  with
means. 146  In  the  case  of the  poor, we  would  tolerate  the  permanent
separation  of children  from their families even though  we have not se-
riously considered  making meaningful  efforts  to ameliorate  the  condi-
tions that precipitated  their placement in the first place.
When we realize  the society to which Bartholet and I both aspire, I
am confident  we  will regard coercive  adoptions  of other people's  chil-
dren  - somebody's  children  - as  a  necessary  evil,  not  a  desirable
goal.
In  addition  to  this  basic  principle,  Bartholet's  call  for  massive
adoptions  of children currently in foster  care  (and children  who ought
to  be  in foster  care) is hopelessly  impractical  on  several  levels.  First,
the  legal  standard  necessary  for removal  and  termination  of parental
rights prohibits  such  an ambitious  project.  Although  Bartholet  advo-
cates that many more  children  be removed from their families,  placed
in  foster  care,  and  subsequently  adopted,  she  offers  no  details  about
the  standards  officials  should  use  when  deciding  whether  to  remove
children  or to terminate parental  rights.  Without  new standards, it is
unclear  whether or  why more  removals  would occur.  Second,  an  in-
crease of cases by the factor Bartholet seeks would overwhelm the cur-
rent child  welfare  system.  We  would  need  not only  to quadruple  the
number  of case  workers  and  agency  personnel  responsible  for  placing
children  and  monitoring  their  placements,  but  also  to  quadruple  the
number  of judges  and  court  personnel.  These  expenses  are  simply
prohibitive.  Third,  even  were  we  to expend  these  resources,  we  still
would  likely never  achieve  the  results Bartholet  advocates.  She  sug-
gests  that  adults  will  come  forward  to  adopt  these  children  once  all
barriers  to  transracial  adoptions  have  been  eliminated  (pp.  181-83).
But she fails to address  the timelines  necessarily  built into the  process
of adopting foster children.  When children  enter  foster care,  the plan-
ning  goal  for  virtually  all  cases  - and  certainly  for  the  non-life-
threatening  cases that Bartholet argues merit foster  care - is to return
children to their families.  When children  enter foster  care,  parents are
given  services  and  time  to  improve  the  conditions  that led  to  the  re-
have  compared  the  ease  with which  state  officials  in the  child  welfare  system  separate  children
from  their  parents,  either  temporarily  or  permanently,  to  slavery.  See  MALCOLM  X,  THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MACOLM  X 24 (Ballantine Books 1992)  (1964).
145  See JOHN RAWLS,  A THEORY  OF JUSTICE  12,  17-22 ('97').
146  Marsha Garrison  reminds  us that in the area of custody and  divorce, it is a truism that chil-
dren deserve  the right to maintain  ties with  biological  parents but that, for some,  this right is dra-
matically undervalued in the context of foster care.  See  Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights v. Chil-
dren's  Interests: The  Case of the Foster Child, 22  N.Y.U.  REV.  L. & SOC.  CHANGE  371,  378-86
(1996).
1744 [Vol. 113:1716
HeinOnline -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1744 1999-2000BOOK REVIEWS
moval.  Under  current  federal  law,  a  minimum  of seventeen  months
must  elapse  before  termination  proceedings  may  even  commence. 147
Commencing termination proceedings  itself involves  a time-consuming
process  of protracted  trial proceedings  of up to  one year  and appeals
that  can  easily  add  an  additional  year.  Moreover,  the  prospects  of
biological  parents  winning  at  the  trial  or appellate  level  are  substan-
tial.
Finally, Bartholet  takes no account  of the complexities  of adopting
a  foster child.  The  infertile  couples  Bartholet  expects  to adopt  these
children want to form  a permanent family.  But these couples  may  be
either unwilling or ineligible to  become foster parents  of newly  placed
children.  They  will be  unwilling  once  they  understand  that there  is
neither a  promise  they will  be  able  to adopt  the  child  nor a  commit-
ment to strive for adoption.  The most an agency can promise is that if
the  child becomes  eligible  for  adoption,  the  foster  parent  will  be per-
mitted  to adopt  over  anyone  else.  But the  agency will  be obliged  to
work  assiduously  with the  birth family  to  assist it  in overcoming  the
barriers  to returning the  child.148  Reunion  is success.  Adoption  is  an
option only when failure occurs - failure to reunite the  child with his
or  her  birth  family.  Under  these  conditions,  the  couples  Bartholet
talks about are likely to be unwilling (as they have been historically) to
become  foster  parents  (p.  180).  Even  if they  would  be  willing,  they
would be ineligible unless they truly were committed to the idea of fos-
ter  parenting;  namely,  that  they  are  not  striving  ultimately  to  adopt
the  child, but instead,  are offering  their  home and their love  with the
aim  of eventually returning the child to his or her birth family.
For  the  foster care  system  to truly  work, everyone  connected  with
the  child must  be working toward the  same  goal rather  than conflict-
ing  ones.  The  people  Bartholet  imagines  becoming  adoptive  parents
are not going to become foster  parents.  By the time  the foster children
are  eligible  for  adoption  - the  time  it will  take  to exhaust  reunifica-
tion efforts and the time it will take for the courts to order  termination
- children  will  almost  certainly  be  older  than  two  years,  and  often
considerably  older.  These  simply  are  not the  children that these  cou-
ples  want to  adopt.  Bartholet's  proposal  is  thus  utterly  impractical
unless we thoroughly change the rules of foster  care and the process  by
which  foster  children  become  eligible  for  adoption.  Of course,  Bar-
tholet  could  be  proposing  that  whenever  children  are  removed  from
147  See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E);  see also supra note  76.
148  See, e.g.,  In re Sheila G., 462 N.E.2d 1139 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that only after the agency has
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it has fulfilled its statutory duty to attempt to reunite
the family may  the court consider whether a parent has fulfilled his  or her  duties); In re William,
448 A.2d  1250 (R.I. 1982)  (noting that the agency is obliged to do everything in its power to assist
the family before  termination will be permitted).
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their  parents  because  of  suspicion  of abuse  or  neglect,  the  children
should  be  placed  for  adoption.  However,  such  a proposal  is  so  pat-
ently  unlawful  that  it cannot  be  implemented.  If she  means  to  give
parents  some  time  to demonstrate  that  the  children  can  be  safely  re-
turned to their custody, then we are back in the current system and the
book provides  no hint of how things would be different.
C.  An Alternative to Bartholet's Alternative Vision
It is one  thing to  tolerate the  radical social engineering  that consti-
tutes  the core of Bartholet's proposals  as  a "least worst" alternative. 149
It is another  to advance  it before insisting that less drastic solutions  be
attempted.  Regrettably, the  reason Bartholet  touts  adoption  of foster
children  remains  unclear.  Either  it  is  because  she  anticipates  that
America will  continue  to fail to equip poor families with the  resources
necessary to keep  their  children  at home,  or it  is because  she so nega-
tively  assesses  foster  children's  families  and  communities  them-
selves.
150
Since the  197Os,  the concept  of "child welfare"  has  been  artificially
narrowed  to  mean  little  more  than  protecting  children  from  parental
harm.  During  this  same  period,  child  welfare  agencies  have  been
transformed from programs  that attempt to serve needy  families to in-
vestigative  bodies  that follow  up on  often spurious  allegations  of mal-
149  Joseph Goldstein and his colleagues  coined the term "least detrimental alternative" as a sub-
stitute for "best interests of the child" as a reminder to judges obliged to make custody determina-
tions that often it would not be  possible for  them  to issue orders that  were  "best" for children;  it
would  be wiser for  them  to recognize  that their  task frequently is to  order what would  be "least
worst."  JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN,  ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT,  BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 6 (1979).
150  See supra pp.  1722-23.  The impression one gets is that adoption  will be very  good for these
children in their  own right.  Because  they are poor, single parent families in urban ghettos  need a
broad range of services, from universal health  care to universal,  free child care.  Bartholet  suggests
that the biological families of these children are so inappropriate  as people,  and their communities
so inappropriate as neighborhoods, that the children deserve  new communities and new neighbors:
[W]e  need  to  recognize  that children  who are  abused  and  neglected,  children  who  are
growing up in foster and group homes, are ...  victims.  Like their  parents, they are often
black  and  brown-skinned  victims,  and  most of them  are  poor.  Keeping  them in  their
families and  their  kinship  and  racial  groups  when  they  won't get decent care  in  those
situations may alleviate  guilt, but it isn't actually  going to do anything to promote racial
and  social  justice.  It  isn't going  to  help groups  who  are  at the  bottom  of  the  socio-
economic  ladder to  climb that ladder.  It is simply going  to victimize  a new generation.
(p. 6)
Some  of the  book is  regrettably reminiscent  of a Connecticut  Supreme  Court decision  written  in
1883:
Next to intemperance, and generally accompanying it, a habit of idleness helps to fill our
alms  houses with paupers and our jails with criminals.  By means of these two causes  the
burden  is imposed on the public of maintaining  a worthless class of humanity as well as
the great expense of our criminal courts.
Reynolds  v. Howe,  5I  Conn. 472,  477  (1883); see  also Harrison v. Gilbert,  43  A.  19o,  191  (1899)
(displaying a similarly disdainful view of poor people).
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treatment.1 51  As observed  by Jane  Waldfogel and others, "the problem
is not just that CPS is the only door; it is also that CPS is  'a door to an
empty room.'"
15 2
As  we  look  to  the  near  future,  we  can  predict  that child  welfare
personnel will  be able to provide even less for poor families  as changes
in government  policies require that they interact  with increasing  num-
bers of families. 5 3  We  need to change  this predictable  path if we are
to improve the  lives of poor children.  To accomplish  this, it is critical
that we  restructure  child welfare  to  include,  for  example,  early  inter-
vention services  for  health  care, child  care, and education.  Paradoxi-
cally, this  vision  requires  that  we  find  a  way  to  narrow  what  now
overwhelms  the  child  welfare  system  - the  investigative  function  of
child  welfare  personnel.  Although  Bartholet  proposes  a  mandatory
home  visitation  program  for  all  "highest-risk  families"  (p.  170),  she
stresses  the  value of surveillance of dysfunctional  families  as much  as
the benefits of service  provision (pp.  I63-75).15
4
There  has  been  considerable  ferment  in  the  field  during  the  past
few years  surrounding  initiatives  that would  advance this specific  and
important  agenda.  Through  the  far-sighted  efforts  of  the  Edna
McConnell  Clark Foundation, among others, a number of communities
have experimented  with "community partnerships" that seek to change
the function of child welfare  from policing  to helping.  In  these initia-
tives, the focus is on helping families rather than assessing  blame.
151  See supra pp. 1736-37.
152  WALDFOGEL, supra  note 36, at 119.
.153  Waldfogel states:
It  is generally  agreed  that the  safety  net for children  whose  families cannot provide  for
them is  the child  welfare  system,  including  foster  homes,  groups  homes,  or some other
form of residential care.  To the extent that reductions in cash assistance and food stamps
increase the number of families who cannot provide  for their  children, such  reforms are
likely  to increase the  number of families  referred  to CPS.  Thus, even as  CPS agencies
were trying  to  define  their mission  more  narrowly  to exclude  lower-risk  cases (such as
poverty-related  neglect), they might receive more referrals  as a result of families'  deterio-
rating economic  circumstances....  Because  so many  more children  are on welfare  than
are  in  CPS, the  children  affected  by  welfare  reform  could  swamp  the  child  protective
services system,  especially  if they have  to be  placed  in  foster  care  or other out-of-home
care.  It is estimated that i.i million children will  be made poor as a result of the welfare
reforms.  Placing  one in  five  of those  children in out-of-home  care  would  add  220,000
children to the pre-welfare  reform foster-care population of some 450,oo  and constitute  a
nearly 50 percent increase in the foster-care caseload.
Id. at 130.
Bartholet implicitly acknowledges the relationship between dwindling governmental support
for  poor families and an increasing reliance  on foster  care: "In the  I98Os new emphasis was placed
on preserving  the family, but with ...  other social and economic problems came an increase in the
number of..  . child removal rates" (p. 154).
154  This  proposal  is even  more  radical  than Bartholet's  adoption  proposal,  and she  acknowl-
edges that it is unlikely to be implemented  (pp. 174-75).
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The  simple  fact  is  that government  agencies  alone  cannot  protect
children.  Thus,  efforts  to  organize  networks  of  neighborhood  and
community  support  that  reach  out  to  families  at  risk  provide  great
hope  for the future.  The  goals are to reach  these families  before  a cri-
sis  occurs  and  to  expand  the scope  of those  who  receive  services  well
beyond the category of "unfit families."
This  transformation  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  accomplish  because
there is no single formula that works for all communities.  But the core
goal  is  to  make  the  "local  villages"  work  well  for  their  children  by
seeking  to accomplish precisely what I understand to be Professor Bar-
tholet's  ultimate  aspiration:  to make  the  adults in  the  community feel
responsible  for all the children  within  it.  Regrettably  and surprisingly,
Bartholet  reserves  her  strongest  condemnation  for  the  community
partnership  programs,  which  she  very  broadly  calls  "family  preserva-
tion" efforts  (pp. 141-42).  Critical  of virtually  all  projects  designed to
identify  the  specific  needs  of families  and  to redress  them  with  inten-
sive  support services,  she is particularly  skeptical  of broader  efforts to
improve conditions within the communities  from which foster children
disproportionately  come.  Her  major  criticism  of community  partner-
ship initiatives is the following:
Community  Partnership  advocates  argue  for putting  responsibility  in  the "village"  for raising  the child.  But they  fail  to address  the  realities  of to-
day's  villages.  Child  abuse and  neglect  take[]  place  disproportionately  in
the poorest,  most dysfunctional  communities  in our society  - in commu-
nities  which  are  the  least  likely  to  have  the  healthy  organizations  which
are seen  as central to the Community Partnership concept.  (p.  153)
This is  a circular  complaint.  It is  precisely  because  so many children
in  foster  care  come  from  identifiable  dysfunctional  communities  that
these  new  initiatives  seek  to improve  them.  It is  hardly  legitimate  to
point out  that these  communities  should  not be  targeted  because  they
are dysfunctional.5
It  is  vital  to  acknowledge  the  disorganization  of the  communities
from which the  disproportionate  number  of foster children  come.  Ef-
forts  to  improve  those  communities  deserve  our  full  support,  unless
those efforts result in inadequate  protection  of children.  But the most
155  Bartholet describes some of these efforts:
[Family Group Decision Making] advocates  have chosen the feel-good  phrase family
empowerment to describe the essence of what their movement is about.  In fact it is about
giving parents accused of maltreatment, together with other adult family members, even greater power than they now have over the fate of their children.  It is about limiting the
state's power to intervene  to protect these  children, and  limiting the larger community's
sense of responsibility  for them.
It is important to support and empower  families and  to encourage  extended  family
members  to  take  responsibility  for  their youngest  members.  But  when  children  have
been subjected to severe  forms of abuse  and  neglect, the state should not abdicate its re-
sponsibility. (p. 146)
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so clear  that they will  reduce  child  abuse  and neglect"  (p. 49).156  Al-
though no  definitive evidence  has yet been obtained that demonstrates
the effectiveness  of community  partnerships, these  efforts  are allowing
earlier interventions  to  identify  at-risk families,  revealing  strengths  in
communities, and filling gaps in services for parents. 1 5 7
V.  CONCLUSION
"Child  welfare"  as  defined  in  the  United  States  during  the  past
thirty years  is a social construct that deliberately  excludes larger, more
pressing  issues  affecting  the well-being  of children.  This  narrow  defi-
nition  - protecting children  from parental  abuse  - not only excludes
from  its  focus  extremely  important  problems  that  policymakers  con-
cerned about children must address, it also contributes  to proposals by
well-meaning  advocates  that  actually  worsen the  plight  of many  chil-
dren.
Duncan Lindsey, who has pondered these problems for many years,
concludes  as follows:
The  problem  of  poverty  among  lone-parents  and their  children  has  be-
come  the  core  social problem  in  North America.  The  problem  has been
cast  as the collapse  of the  family, a  plague  of illegitimacy, an epidemic  of
child abuse,  and a crisis  for  children.  At the  core  all stem  from the same
problem, child poverty.  Child poverty  will  not end  without intervention.
Yet, there has  not  been  a broad  commitment  to solving  this problem,  in
part  because  the  problems  facing  these  mothers  and their  children  have
been defined within a residual perspective.'
5 8
The  narrow  picture  of  child  welfare  policy  that  is  currently  ac-
cepted primarily  focuses on children  harmed by their own families and
the apparatus  and policies  of state  action that aim to  find and protect
those children.  However  important the issue of children  being harmed
by  their parents, it is far from the most pressing issue in child welfare.
Those  of us  who  care  most  about  children  need  to develop  strategies
that broaden  the  lens  of problems  facing  children  so  that states  with
156  Bartholet suggests that residents of these communities may not be  reliable because  there is "a
risk that neighbors and trusted community representatives will be unduly reluctant to intervene to
protect children for fear of alienating their parents" (p.  152).
157  Bartholet never  quite explains her opposition  to these  initiatives.  At one  point she  provides
the following clue, to which I am reluctant to give much weight: she  once attended a conference at
which one of the advantages listed for community partnerships was their instrumental role in pre-
venting transracial  placements (p. 144).  I recognize, of course, that Professor Bartholet is the coun-
try's leading advocate of transracial  adoptions.  However, I am most reluctant to believe  that Pro-
fessor  Bartholet  has  come  to  regard  transracial  adoption  not  as  a  tolerable  solution,  but  as  a
preferred one.  I cannot easily conclude that Professor Bartholet sees adoption as good for children,
when a caring society could have prevented the need for adoption by helping families stay together.
158  LINDSEY,  supra note 29, at 327.
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the will to ameliorate or avoid these problems can do so.  Most impor-
tant, this  strategy must find  a way  to maximize  the chance  that  chil-
dren will be raised by their own willing families.
There  will, of course, be  occasions when  it is  necessary to separate
children  from  their  families  and  even  to  sever  permanently  all  legal
ties  between  children  and  their  families  to  protect  them  from  harm
and  to  permit  them  to  be raised  by new  families  who  will  love  and
guide them.  But a child-friendly  child welfare  policy certainly  will  re-
gard the  forcible  removal  of children  from  their  families, and particu-
larly  the permanent banishment of birth relatives  from their lives, as a
necessary failure, rather than an outcome worthy of celebration.
The last words  of Nobody's Children are  ideal  ones  with which  to
end this review.  Although  Professor Bartholet and I may differ  on  ex-
actly how  the sentiments  of these  last words  ought  be manifested,  we
are  in  full accord  on the  importance  of recognizing  the  risks  inherent
"in continuing  to  abdicate  any  community  responsibility  for  our  na-
tion's children - in continuing to  see the children suffering abuse  and
neglect as not belonging to all of us" (p. 243).
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